Timothy S. v. Sarah H. (Cal. Ct. App. - Nov. 3, 2026)

This opinion is about attorney's fees, and I have no problem with how the Court of Appeal resolves it. But I nonetheless wanted to mention it because of what the trial court did below.

It's a case from Riverside. Sarah's an unmarried teenage mom who has two infant children, and Tom (I made that name up) is the father. When one of the kids was 17 months old, Sarah lost custody, and the baby was raised by Tom's father -- the child's grandfather -- Timothy (alongside his wife, the child's grandmother).

For roughly two years, the grandparents raised the kid. Eventually, Sarah cleaned up her act and regained custody of the child.

Things then seemed to be going fine for a couple of years. But in 2024, Sarah cut off the grandparents from seeking the child -- someone they'd raised for almost as long as the mother. For whatever reason, Sarah didn't want her baby-daddy's parents in her child's life.

At which point the grandparents asked the court for visitation. They wanted one weekend a month, plus two dinnertime visits each month, alongside a weekly video call.

To me, that's not an unreasonable request at all. Maybe I would shorten the requested "weekend" visit to a Saturday or Sunday. But two dinners every month? Seems 100% fine. Particularly for grandparents who voluntarily stepped in to raise a child when the mother lost custody. And the additional weekly video call seems totally reasonable.

What visitation does the trial court permits the grandparents to have, you ask?

"A five-minute phone call with the children once a month."

What?!

This seems incredibly parsimonious to me. Unless the grandparents are monsters, and the mother a paragon in child-rearing, that is quite a bit different than the order that I would have been inclined to enter were I the trial judge.

Not technically relevant to the appeal at issue. But still. It struck me as incredibly harsh.

Srinivasan v. Milestone Financial LLC (9th Cir. - Nov. 4, 2026)

I'm glad that Judge de Alba comes out this way. While I'm sympathetic to people who find themselves in dire financial straits and need to file for bankruptcy, I'm ruthlessly unsympathetic to people who abuse the process. So while I agree with today's opinion that the text of the statute (and precedent) do indeed allow debtors the absolute right to dismiss their bankruptcy petition (as long as they do so timely), it thrills me that the Ninth Circuit simultaneously affirms the district court's decision to bar the appellants here from refiling another bankruptcy petition during the next year.

You can read the full opinion for more details about the particular procedural moves the debtors here employed, but this snippet from page 21 will at least give you a sense:

"Here, the bankruptcy court considered Appellants’ multiple bankruptcy filings, repeated failure to fully prosecute those petitions, and their conduct in the instant case, such as failing to submit necessary documents and failing to appear at hearings. One of the Appellants, though the record is unclear which one, has previously had a 180- day bar against them. Despite their significant history in bankruptcy court, both Appellants failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to bar them from filing. The Court infers that a lack of schedule filings and other documentation in their past bankruptcy cases is due to repeated bad faith filings. Moreover, the Appellants have been living rent/mortgage free in their home for multiple years during the pendency of these proceedings, and they only filed bankruptcy cases—the twelfth and thirteenth cases filed by the Srinivasan family—when the Appellee attempted to evict them from the home by foreclosure or other action. Based on this record, the bankruptcy court reasonably calibrated the refiling bar to Appellants’ specific history in bankruptcy court."

Oh yeah. Indeed, had I been the judge, they'd have been barred from refiling for much longer than a year.

SEIU v. DOJ (9th Cir. - Nov. 3, 2026)

Luck of the draw.

The Department of Justice threatens to arrest state officials if they count ballots from people the DOJ lists as potentially ineligible to vote. The district court concludes that the purported list is terrible and that the federal government has no authority here and enters a TRO enjoining the threats. The DOJ asks the Ninth Circuit for an immediate stay.

The panel draw is Chief Judge Murguia (an Obama appointee), Judge Callahan (a Bush appointee), and senior Judge Bea (a 92-year old Bush appointee). The two Republican appointees agree to stay the district court's order, and the Democratic appointee dissents.

The Ninth Circuit then pretty much immediately vote to take the case en banc and vacate the panel's opinion. No draw; every active judge gets a vote on that one.

But then there's another draw for the 11-member en banc panel. Chief Judge Murguia is automatically on it, and although Judge Bea is senior, so ordinarily wouldn't be eligible, since he was on the panel, his name goes into the hopper as well.

The ultimate draw: 6-5 in favor of Republican appointees. Including senior Judge Bea.

So, today, the en banc panel votes to reinstate the prior panel's opinion (and stay).

To reiterate: Luck of the draw. (Or, depending on your perspective, lack thereof.)

Johnson v. Adgar (9th Cir. - Nov. 2, 2026)

The jury found that during the George Floyd protests in San Jose, Officer Adgar fired his weapon into a crowd of largely peaceful protesters, thereby injuring an innocent bystander, rather than firing at someone in particular who allegedly threw a bottle.

The majority opinion (by Judge Tallman, joined by Judge Bennett) concludes that this constitutes unlawful excessive force, but holds that this right was not clearly established. Judge Paez dissents in part, arguing that this right was indeed clearly established. (The majority also certifies a pendent state law claim to the California Supreme Court for clarification of the relevant state law standard.)

Neither the majority nor dissent mention it, but since the dispute is about whether a particular right is clearly established, I thought it might be worth noting that this is far from the only time a state officer has indiscriminately fired his weapon into a largely peaceful protest and thereby injured innocent bystanders. One of these events was well-known even before the founding our our Republic, and one might even argue instrumental in its founding. I'm pretty sure it was well-established even then that this was no good, and in derogation of our natural liberties. Another indiscriminate firing into a group of largely peaceful protesters transpired somewhat more recently, and the reaction thereto was similarly fairly uniform.

I understand that the relevant issue is the level of generality; how "specific" does a holding have to be before state officers are expected to realize that certain conduct is excessive. But, with respect, as to this particular issue -- firing your weapon indiscriminately into a group of largely peaceful protesters -- my own view is that everyone knows full well that this isn't allowed.

From the 1770 to the present day.