I agree with Justice Chavez that the writ here should be granted, but if it were me, I would add one important caveat to the opinion.
I'm on board for the Court of Appeal's holding that the prosecution can file a timely 170.6 challenge to a judge who's acting as a "master calendar department" in a criminal case when that judge indicates that they're going to provide an indicated sentence, rather than just refer the matter out to a department for trial. Once a judge decides that they're going to resolve a disputed issue themselves -- here, whether to strike priors as part of the sentence -- then they're no longer acting in a purely ministerial function (e.g., simply assigning courtrooms), and a 170.6 challenge is timely and appropriate at that point. Agreed.
But the opinion here reads as if the reason the challenge here was timely was because the relevant "disputed issue" was the actual acceptance of the plea, rather than issuance of the indicated sentence. I understand that reasoning: the "indicated" sentence is essentially a conditional prediction, since the defendant hasn't yet pled guilty. Hence the opinion's focus on the actual acceptance of the plea, which takes place only after the indicated sentence (and, even then, only if the defendant accepts the "offer").
But that focus seems rife for abuse.
To me, the 170.6 time period would run from when the judge stated that they intended to provide an indicated sentence, rather than serving merely as a master calendar department. At that point, the judge has indicated their intention to decide a disputed issue of law or fact. So that's when the 10- (or 15-) day clock starts ticking. The later dates -- either when the indicated sentence is pronounced, or when the guilty plea is ultimately accepted (and/or formal sentence imposed) -- aren't the relevant dates. Just like when you get a judge assigned for all purposes, it's the date of the assignment that starts the 170.6 clock, not the date on which the judge ultimately makes any rulings.
The distinction matters. Here, the prosecution made a 170.6 challenge three days after the trial judge indicated they were going to provide an indicated sentence. Great. That's timely. I agree. And, three days later, the court denied the challenge (wrongly), issued the indicated sentence, took the plea, and entered the sentence. That's not okay. A different judge should have been assigned. Spot on.
But imagine a slightly different temporal setting. Let's say the judge indicates that they're going to issue an indicated sentence three weeks later, and the prosecution does nothing. Then, on the appointed date, the judge indicates a particular sentence that the prosecution doesn't like, and only then does the prosecutor file a 170.6 challenge. Before the actual sentence -- the purported "determination of fact or law" under today's Court of Appeal opinion -- but after the indicated sentence.
That would be untimely, in my opinion. Can't do that. You have to file your challenge before, not after, the indicated sentence. The clock starts upon assignment, not the indicated (or ultimate) sentence.
So I would make that clear in the opinion. It's an important caveat.