People v. Garcia (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 31, 2024)

This year ended in the Court of Appeal with a bang. I read this opinion -- the penultimate one published in 2024 -- with particular interest for multiple reasons.

First, the facts. As it turns out, if you see a ghost gun advertised for sale on Snapchat for $750 and then meet up with the seller in a parking lot to buy it, sometimes, rather than sell you the ghost gun, they will simply rob you instead -- and then murder you if you resist. Seems like that's an important lesson.

Second, the result. The defendant here gets sentenced to LWOP -- no small penalty -- but the Court of Appeal reverses, holding that the trial court erroneously admitted various gang-related evidence. Given the evidence against him, I have a strong sense that the defendant will be convicted yet again at the ultimate retrial, but for now, that's a big win.

Third, the location. The murder here happened in the parking lot of the Vons on Midway Drive in San Diego -- the same one I shop at, and that's three miles from my home. Now, for the most part, I merely purchase groceries at the Vons, rather than firearms in the parking lot. But good to know that I might want to steer clear of alternative acquisitions at that particular location.

Fourth, the victim. The opinion mentions that the murder victim was "Eduardo S." -- and refers to him by his first name, to protect his anonymity, 60 different times. But the California Supreme Court and the California Style Manual declare that "Anonymity, however, is inappropriate for homicide victims, who are to be identified whenever possible." So I think the Court of Appeal should memorialize him in its published opinion, and I'll do so here. His name was Eduardo Salguero. Rest in peace.

Finally, the lawyer. I noticed on the caption that the court-appointed attorney for the defendant was Marcia Clark. Yes, that Marcia Clark. Still plugging away on criminal cases even at age 71. Good for her. I'm glad the stuff stays interesting, even after all these years.

That's it for the year. May your 2025 be even better than 2024.

U.S. v. In (9th Cir. - Dec. 30, 2024)

Watch out for those police officers on bicycles near the Las Vegas Strip. Especially if you happen to have a gun in your vehicle. Because even if they take you out of the vehicle, you "might" be able to run back to it and get the weapon before they can tackle you; accordingly, the police can handcuff you even without probable cause.

So holds the Ninth Circuit.

Admittedly, here, the defendant had also (obviously) lied about whether there was a weapon in the car. The Glock was in plain sight on the backseat passenger-side floor of the vehicle, and yet when the police asked him if there were weapons, he (unwisely) said "No." That lie undoubtedly led, in part, to the police officer's decision to handcuff him.

As an aside, I found particularly humorous the officers' dialogue here. After the defendant denied having any weapons in the vehicle, here's the relevant exchange:

"Officer Andersen asked “Why is there a Glock back there? You don’t know now?” In [the defendant] said he had left the shooting range, and Officer Diaz responded, “Did you? In some sandals? Do we look new to you?”"

I think the line "Do we look new to you" is destined to become a classic.

(It'd have been even more humorous if the defendant had responded "Well, you are assigned to patrol on a bicycle, so I don't think you're anything like a wily veteran." But I get that a response like that would likely only get the handcuffs tightened even further.)

People v. Gudiel (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 26, 2024)

The year is rapidly coming to a close, so if anyone wants to get into the "Best of 2024" categories, now's the time.

Today, Justice Stratton takes her shot; in particular, at the "understatement of the year" category. 

She says, in the second paragraph of her gang-related second degree murder opinion:

"The West Side Locos and Toonerville gangs do not get along."

Yeah. You could definitely say that.

People v. Perrot (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 23, 2024)

You might think that work at the Court of Appeal stops entirely during the holidays. Not so. It slows down, for sure. But opinions continue to be written and published. At least for a while.

Today's opinion addresses a variety of issues, but the particular one that caught my attention was this:

Does a prior sex offender have a right to possess . . . a penis pump and/or dildo?

Is that the most onerous parole condition in the universe? No. The other restrictions -- for example, on access to the Internet, etc. -- are far more substantial.

But the guy did get busted for having the pump and dildo, and ended up getting thrown in the pokey for 60 additional days as a result.

His defense was that he needed the pump to get an erection, and that the dildo was his girlfriend's -- the latter defense confirmed by the girlfriend herself, though apparently rejected by the trial court.

Do I want a child molester to get erections? I guess not. Though, at the same time, if he's got a girlfriend, isn't molesting children, and needs the thing (which, after 20 years in prison, he perhaps might), I'm not certain that I care all that much.

Do I care that he has a dildo? Again, as long as he's not using it on children -- and it doesn't seem like he ever did that before -- I'm not sure that I do. And, at least facially, it sounds fairly persuasive to me that it isn't his, but rather his girlfriend's. That it was -- as the Court of Appeal argues -- "not locked away or kept in a location in his residence beyond Perrot’s ability to access" doesn't seem all that persuasive to me. It's not a gun or drugs or anything like that. It's a dildo. If the girlfriends wants (or needs) one, I'm not sure I'm really going to insist that it be locked up, lest Mr. Perrot attempt to misuse it.

I don't know. The whole pump-and-dildo thing seems silly to me. Could you bust the guy for having the internet devices he's not supposed to have. (Oh no! A PlayStation!) Sure. I definitely do not want the guy communicating with minors.

But the marital aids? I'm just not sure that I really care -- or care enough to throw a guy back in prison for the stuff. (Even for 60 days.)

Though I understand that reasonable minds might perhaps differ on this.

Back to the main point, though:

The Court of Appeal rests not during the holidays. There's pump and dildo work remaining to be accomplished.

JJD-HOV Elk Grove LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Dec. 19, 2024)

I'm no fan of liquidated damages provisions. They're often (indeed, typically) employed in an oppressive fashion, and included by the economically superior party in a contract with a much more vulnerable counterparty.

But when a sophisticated shopping mall negotiates with a sophisticated business and they mutually agree on a cotenancy provision -- basically, that rent gets reduced if and when an "anchor" tenant leaves and the foot traffic to the mall thereby diminishes -- I have zero problem with them. And very much appreciate Justice Evan's unanimous opinion holding that the cotenancy provision here was just fine.

To me, the case for intervening in the contractual relations is at its nadir when the matter involves very sophisticated business parties, little to no public policy concerns, and provisions that are beneficial to both sides at different points in time. The cotenancy provision here is a perfect example. The shopping mall was able to receive higher rent when it had anchor tenants with a lot of foot traffic, and the store was able to pay lower rent when the anchor tenants were gone and the foot traffic diminished.

The fact that the departure of the anchor tenants was not under the "control" of the shopping mall is of no moment. For one thing, the shopping mall could have gotten someone in there by offering incentives; I bet a lot of stores would take the space if the mall owner charged, say, a penny a foot in monthly rent. 

And even if the anchor tenant's departure was entirely beyond the control of the shopping mall owner, so what? Lots of contracts provide for higher (or lower) rent when things beyond the control of the parties occur. I'm not in charge of the U.S. money supply, for example, but if my contractual rent increases (or decreases) based on the nationwide inflation rate, tough. Ditto for a contract that establishes a set price when the cost of the underlying commodities rises or falls. Those provisions harm the party adversely affected by the things the occur beyond their control. But we're fine with that.

So I'm a thousand percent on board for today's opinion. Indeed, I affirmatively like these provisions. They make sense for everyone.

So yay, California Supreme Court.

Merrick v. Lau (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 17, 2024)

“I already rejected those arguments. Okay. I know your client was not happy with my ruling. I mean, she was there, you know, mad dogging me, which didn’t bother me at all. It was almost amusing to see this little Chinese woman stare me down, because she didn’t like the ruling. But again, it’s just business. I didn’t take it personally.”

We can all agree, I think, that the judge's reference to the litigant's ethnicity and gender was unfortunate, unnecessary, and should be avoided. I suspect that even the trial judge, at this point, is of that view.

The Court of Appeal affirms the decision below, which I think is the correct result on the merits.

I also think it made sense to (belatedly) publish the opinion.

Keep those thoughts to yourself. Or, better yet, don't have them in the first place.

Majestic Asset Mgmt. v. The Colony at California Oaks (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 16, 2024)

Ah, the hassle of living in a golf course community.

I really appreciate what the Court of Appeal (as well as the trial court) did here. Buyers purchase a golf course in Murietta (the California Oaks Golf Course) subject to an agreement with the homeowner's association of the various homes that surround the golf course to keep the place in good shape. Buyers, however, fail to do so; the grass gets brown, trees die, a lake dries up, etc. So the HOA sues Buyers.

The HOA wins, and the trial court enters an injunction that compels Buyers to bring the course back up to snuff. They fail to do so. So the HOA moves to foreclose.

The HOA wants a "credit bid" so it can buy the property. But Buyers say they aren't entitled to one, or that, if they are, it should only be for $3000. The trial court disagrees, and grants the HOA a credit bid of $2,000,000+. Alongside an order that if the HOA (or anyone else) buys the property, they're still subject to the requirement to keep the course in good shape. Whereas Buyers say that if, instead, they purchase the property at foreclosure, the requirement that the course be properly maintained should be gone.

The Court of Appeal almost entirely agrees with the HOA, and rightfully so. The Court of Appeal reduces the HOA's credit amount by $244,000 to $2.5 million (again, correctly), but otherwise agrees with the HOA and grants them costs and fees on appeal.

All of which will, hopefully, lead to a result that's the best possible under the circumstances: the HOA will buy the course with its credit bid, get a real management company to run the place, and the area will be at least as green and pretty as it can be for a desert community in which I can personally attest it gets SUPER hot (sometimes over 100 degrees) in the summer.

Happiness to the maximum extent possible. (Except for the Buyers, of course.)

People v. Caratachea (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 13, 2024)

Defendant is convicted of molesting four children. So you know he's going to be sentenced for a long time, even if he has no prior criminal record.

He receives a sentence of 785 years to life (plus an additional six years). That's because the trial court imposed the sentences consecutively, agreeing with the prosecutor that the law granted no discretion for concurrent sentences in these types of cases.

The Court of Appeal reverses. There is, in fact, discretion. So maybe some, or all, of those 25-to-life sentences can be served concurrently. Remand.

Though I'll mention one thing in this regard that's nowhere in the opinion, but which you can nonetheless find out when you look up the defendant on the California Inmate Locator website.

He's 72 years old.

Which means that there's no way that any of this actually matters. He's going to die in prison regardless, or (if he's lucky) get compassionate release shortly before he dies.

But, hey, at least we eventually got the law right.

Kaur v. Dual Arch Int'l (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 11, 2024)

I know it's a pain in the butt to have to sit through a trial and listen to the evidence when you strongly think that one side deserves to prevail. But it generally seems a mistake to me -- doctrinally, we call the move "disfavored" -- to grant a nonsuit after the plaintiff's opening statement on the grounds that the evidence she's described therein is insufficient to support a judgment in her favor. As a general rule, why not actually listen to the evidence instead and then decide whether or not to grant a nonsuit then?

Otherwise, you risk substantial wasted time and effort when the Court of Appeal reverses the dismissal and finds the opening statement sufficient (assuming, of course, that the actual evidence ultimately shown at trial accurately corresponds to counsel's description during her opening argument).

Like, for example, the reversal here.

People v. Billy (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 9, 2024)

"Defendant and appellant Anthony Jordan Billy was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) with three or more DUI offenses in the prior 10 years (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b) & 23550, subd. (a)). 1 Under section 23552, subdivision (a), if a person convicted under section 23550 receives probation, “the court shall impose as [a] condition[] of probation that the person be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days.”"

Anthony. Tony. J-Rod. Billy. Whatever you prefer to be called. Please, please, please get it together.

Mr. Billy spent 180 days in a residential alcohol treatment facility, so that's good. But the Court of Appeal holds that he still has to spend 180 days in jail as well, because that's the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 23552(a). It doesn't matter that other provisions say that residential treatment counts. The specific subsection here controls.

Mr. Billy hasn't served his time in jail yet; the sentence has been stayed while his appeal was pending. Unfortunately for him, the time has now come to pay the piper.

People v. Hall (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 5, 2024)

Am I wrong, or did something here get mixed up in the opinion editing process?

The Court of Appeal affirms the defendant's convictions, and that result seems right to me. In a child abuse prosecution, you can't help make your children unavailable for trial -- which it seems clear to me (alongside the trial court and the Court of Appeal) that the defendant did -- and then claim a hearsay or Confrontation Clause violation. That's your fault. Forfeiture.

But while the result seems correct, here's how the last paragraph of the first page of the opinion reads:

"Hall concludes that without the children’s statements his convictions on the two child abuse counts lacked evidentiary support. On this point the People do not disagree and instead contend that both the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were correct."

Shouldn't that read "do not agree" (rather than "disagree"), or shouldn't "do not" be deleted (so it reads "the People disagree")?

I wish that I could say I always reviewed my work product one last time -- and did so perfectly -- to make sure I caught all the minor typos. I most definitely cannot so claim. (Not truthfully, anyway.)

POSTSCRIPT - A well-informed reader says that the Court of Appeal probably meant what it said, and I'm persuaded. The People agree that they need the kids' statements, but disagree that the statements were inadmissible. Okay. Got it. Though definitely missed it the first time!

Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. - Dec. 4, 2024)

Were I the one responsible for writing the unofficial syllabus for this opinion, this is how it'd have gone (in its entirety):

"Ninth Circuit: 'Summary judgment reversed. Feel free to go to trial.' Mandate issues.

Party Stipulation (to District Court): 'Please stay the case while the loser petitions for certiorari.'

District Court: 'No can do. The mandate issued. No power. Ask the Ninth Circuit if you want one.'

Party Stipulation (to the Ninth Circuit): 'Please stay the case?'

Ninth Circuit: 'Nope. Denied. Ask the district court.'"

Admittedly, the Ninth Circuit also (helpfully) tells the district court: "You do have the power to stay, so stop saying you don't. Your call, not mine."

Otherwise this ping-pong could have gone on forever.

Planned Parenthood v. Labrador (9th Cir. - Dec. 4, 2024)

The Ninth Circuit today affirmed a preliminary injunction against Idaho's efforts to stop doctors from referring patients to out-of-state providers. Losing on the merits was definitely not what the Idaho Attorney General (alongside the Idaho Solicitor General) wanted.

But the last part of Judge Fletcher's opinion adds insult to injury, saying (in rejecting Idaho's efforts to have a different judge assigned on remand):

"No 'reasonable outside observer' could conclude that the district judge harbors personal bias against the defendants or that reassignment is warranted to preserve the appearance of justice. See id. at 1046. The Attorney General charges that the district judge ignored relevant materials, mischaracterized the record, and unfairly denied supplemental briefing. This charge is patently false. The thorough preliminary injunction order shows that the district judge carefully considered the record, the Attorney General’s arguments, and the parties’ timely filings. The compressed briefing schedule reflects the emergency nature of the relief plaintiffs requested. The decisions to deny supplemental briefing and reject untimely filings were well within the district judge’s broad discretion to manage his docket."

"Patently false" are fairly strong words to describe an advocate's representations to a court. Definitely not something I'd want said about me. 

Today's Insurance Opinions (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 3, 2024)

Both of these opinions -- coincidentally published on the same day -- amply demonstrate why some people rationally elect not to purchase insurance coverage. Because what you may well think that you're buying doesn't actually protect you from the losses you fear.

The first opinion involves fire coverage for a home in Malibu. Ms. Hughes bought a homeowner's policy from Farmers. You'd think that'd cover you if your house burned down, right? Nope. Her house burned down, but there's an exclusion in the policy (that her broker allegedly absolutely didn't mention) that says that the policy doesn't cover fire if you could buy a state-sponsored FAIR policy. So lawsuit dismissed.

The second opinion involves a  commercial general liability policy issued by Continental Casualty to a massage parlor owner. What's the absolute biggest risk you face when you own one of those businesses? Right. You're worried that you might get sued if you or one of your employees allegedly touches someone without their consent. Which, of course, happens here. At which point the insurer refuses to defend the lawsuit, relying on an exclusion in the policy, and a stipulated $6.8 million judgment results. The owner sues the insurance company for coverage. Lawsuit dismissed.

Both of these judgments get affirmed. Which is hardly surprising. The relevant exclusions do indeed negate coverage for the exact thing the owners probably bought the insurance for in the first place.

Which you'd think, at some point, would diminish the number of people willing to buy insurance.

Though that assumes you read the fine print of these massively long policies. Which few people do.

Which in turn is, of course, why those exclusions persist.

Schneider v. Hull (Cal. Ct. App. - Dec. 2, 2024)

It's boring, I know, but sometimes I just want to call out an opinion as being really smart and comprehensive. Like this one today by Justice Hull.

It's not the most critical opinion in the world, other than to the parties. There are two adjoining parcels by a river, and the only way to get to one of them is through an easement over the other. To minimize the intrusion on the dominant tenement (*fancy word*), the easement on behalf of the servient tenement (*ditto*) runs along the river.

But that has problems of its own. In 2002, flooding destroyed the riverbank and hence the easement, leading to litigation that was resolved in 2011, in which the trial court moved the easement a little bit inward from the riverbank. The goal, again, was to minimize the impact on the dominant tenement.

But floods will be floods. Then, in 2018, there was another flood, which made the new easement too difficult to traverse. Leading to new litigation, and a plethora of arguments about claim preclusion, issue preclusion, the nature of easements, etc. Imagine a really difficult property class combined with a really hard class on civil procedure. That's today's opinion.

Nonetheless, Justice Hull does a great job. His opinion seems sensible and entirely just -- as well as doctrinally correct. There's a new easement, this time (again) a little bit further inland. And unlike the trial court, the Court of Appeal doesn't make the owner of the servient tenement pay the million bucks or so it'd take to stabilize the riverbank so we don't see round three.

Hopefully this latest easement won't be washed away too. But if it does, well, that's life. Back to square one. Again.

For now, though: Justice.