People v. Ammons (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 16, 2026)

Here's the opening sentence of today's opinion from the Court of Appeal:

"Charles Nelson Ammons appeals his conviction, by jury, of the attempted murder of City of Pismo Beach police officer Christopher Siglin . . . ."

Here are two paragraphs from the opinion that explain what transpired when Officer Siglin pulled over the defendant for making an illegal left turn, almost all of which was confirmed by the officer's body camera:

"Appellant was confrontational and refused to turn off the engine. Siglin opened the driver’s side door and reached into the van to get appellant to step out of the vehicle. Appellant swung his right hand toward Siglin while holding a handgun. Siglin diverted the blow with his left hand and tried to disarm appellant. The two men grappled with each other for a considerable amount of time, at extremely close quarters inside the van. Siglin constantly tried to pry appellant’s fingers from the firearm and press its muzzle away from his head and face. For his part, appellant struggled to maintain control of the firearm and to pry Siglin’s fingers off it. During the struggle, the firearm was about 12 inches away and pointed at Siglin’s face. The pistol “clicked” but did not fire."

Here are the final two paragraphs of the opinion's statement of facts, alongside the footnote therein:

"Siglin’s body camera documented a “clicking” sound that occurred when appellant pulled the trigger. An examination of the firearm, a .40 caliber Beretta semi-automatic 96 pistol explained the “clicking” but not the firing: the bullets in the magazine clip were loaded backwards. Had the firearm been properly loaded, it would have fired. [Footnote]

After his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital. A screening test determined his blood alcohol content was .21.

[Footnote] - We parenthetically comment on appellant’s lack of even a rudimentary knowledge of firearms. The fact that he loaded the magazine with bullets facing backwards is the only reason Siglin was not murdered."

Given those contents, you can probably figure how the Court of Appeal came out here, right?

Conviction affirmed. 

Meehan v. Aguirre (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 15, 2026)

Plaintiff collides with a semi-trailer while biking in the bike lane and sues. She makes a section 998 settlement offer for $1 million in 2021, and the same offer again in 2022 and 2023. All of those offers were rejected.

Then, in April 2023, six months before trial, she makes a new section 998 offer. For $2 million. Also rejected.

So goes to trial and is awarded damages of $1.06 million.

She then seeks $993,000+ of costs as the prevailing party, including over $600,000 in interest and expert fees, claiming that her $1.06 million recovery was greater than her initial 2021 offer.

She doesn't get that, and appeals, but the Court of Appeal affirms. Only the last section 998 offer controls; that one was for $2 million, and she didn't do better than that at trial.

It seems absolutely crazy to me that plaintiff's counsel made the final $2 million offer. A massive strategic error, for utterly no point. There was already an expired offer, two years earlier, for $1 million. Why make another 998 offer, at a higher price point?

Zero reason to do so. If you want to indicate that you're only willing to settle for double what you asked for before, go ahead. Just don't make it a 998 offer.

Doing so here cost the client dearly. Over half a million bucks.

People v. Singh (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 14, 2026)

Particularly after the Supreme Court's 2026 opinion in Ellingburg v. United States, it's far from frivolous to argue that restitution payments are penalties and hence criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial on that issue. The Supreme Court basically held precisely that in Ellingberg, at least as applied to the federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.

But if you're going to make that claim, as a tactical matter, it's probably best not to do so -- as here -- in the context of a conviction for forcible rape of a college freshman.

The Court of Appeal unanimously rejects that challenge.

In re Kia Hyundai Vehicle Theft Cases (9th Cir. - Sept. 14, 2026)

The Ninth Circuit unanimously reverses the district court's holding that Hyundai and Kia are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California for a lawsuit by insurers alleging that these manufacturer's vehicles were defective because they were way-too-easily stolen.

Judge Miller, and the rest of the panel, are right. The district court judge, Judge Selna, was wrong. A good opinion and a good result.

Fairly straightforward, in my view.

Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 9, 2026)

The Universal Shopping Plaza owns a shopping mall in San Gabriel. Piong Hong owns the Five Star Restaurant, a seafood place in that shopping mall. Hong and the restaurant pays a huge amount of rent; over $60,000 every month. During COVID, Hong says that the office manager at Universal reduced his rent by ten percent to compensate him for the closures during that period. So in January 2023, Hong deducts $65,989 from his rent, to correspond to the ten percent discount during 2022.

Universal doesn't appear to agree with the discount, but doesn't appear to do anything in response. After deducting the $65,989 in early 2023, Hong then continues to pay his full monthly rent. For all of the rest of 2023. For all of 2024. For 23 straight months.

In February 2025, Hong again pays his full monthly rent. But now, Universal tells him that's not good enough. They issue a 3-day notice, saying that Hong didn't pay the full amount two years ago, in January 2023, so he's got to pay up. Hong disagrees, and responds that not only was he promised the discount, but that in any event, there's a specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 1161) that prohibits three-day notices that are filed more than a year after the alleged nonpayment of rent. But Universal says that because the lease agreement says that all rental payments are applied first to any overdue rent, Hong was "constantly" overdue, including in 2025, so the notice is timely.

The case goes to a three day bench trial. Hong represents himself, and does so through a Mandarin interpreter. He loses. The trial court evicts the restaurant from the mall, and orders Hong to pay around $190,000.

Hong then appeals, and represents himself pro per.

And wins.

If you're the law firm that represents Universal, it's not exactly a career highlight to lose to a pro per litigant.

In any event, I was somewhat rooting for Hong. Maybe he shouldn't have unilaterally decided to deduct the alleged ten percent discount from his rent. But if Universal had a problem with that, it should have sued initially. Not waited two years, retaining the full amount of rent for that entire period, and then file suit. That's exactly what Section 1161 was designed to prevent.

And because of all this, Hong gets evicted from the mall, and his restaurant there closed down. Events that are not suddenly reversed notwithstanding his success on appeal.

Though he seems to perhaps reopened his restaurant inside the Hilton in San Gabriel. Good for him.

(Though those Yelp reviews aren't exactly stellar, TBH.)

Adom v. California DOC (9th Cir. - Sept. 8, 2026)

The majority (Judges Paez and Forrest) and dissent (Judge Bea) disagree on whether the California Department of Corrections may have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act when it took away adult diapers from a 57-year old prisoner with spinal damage (alongside a prior stroke) who uses a wheelchair and who suffers from incontinence -- both Nos. 1 and 2. The majority says "Yes" whereas the dissent says "No."

At its core, Judge Bea's dissent relies on the fact that staff at the prison "reviewed [the patient's] medical records" and "were unable to find any evidence to sustain [his] claim that the [] incontinence supplies were medically necessary." It's an "adequate investigation," he says, to review some documents and to conclude therefrom that someone does not, in fact, involuntarily pee and poo in their bed. (Why someone would purportedly fake incontinence to obtain adult diapers -- hardly your typical prison currency -- is left unexplained.)

I assume that there are indeed some medical conditions that can be viewed on a CT or MRI or the like that may cause someone to become incontinent. But I doubt that every reason for incontinence can be so easily objectively verified. I would assume that the most powerful evidence of incontinence is the pee and/or poo in someone's bed, no?

So when -- as seemingly undisputed here -- someone is regularly soiling one's sheets, it seems very hard to me to argue that a doctor can legitimately say "Sorry, you don't actually need diapers, because I can't find any physical evidence that explains why you're doing what you're doing." If a doctor said that to a federal judge, for example, I'm fairly confident that the judge wouldn't say "Oh, okay then. I guess I'll just keep crapping my pants. Thanks for the help."

I would think that a fairly fundamental component of human decency is not being forced to wake up with pee and/or poop coating one's person. No?

People v. Stammers (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 4, 2026)

Be careful of the memes you share with your friends.

The Court of Appeal provides graphic details about what happened on this particular date, after the two met on a dating website. The victim went to his house, the (alleged) perpetrator made dinner, they shared some wine, they got in his hot tub, they made out, they went to his couch and watched television, and then: [Warning -- This is where it gets graphic]

"While on the couch, they touched one another and had consensual vaginal sex. Defendant stopped after a few minutes. Doe was “confused” when he stopped and “was questioning why.” Defendant testified that he and Doe attempted to have vaginal sex but stopped because he was unable to maintain a sufficient erection.

Defendant positioned himself behind Doe on the couch and touched her anus with his finger. After she told him to stop and pulled his hand away from her anus, he told her, “It’s okay, just relax.” Doe described what happened next: “After that it’s just all of a sudden I felt a big pressure pull me down and my face was facing the TV, then became facing down to the pillow, and a huge force on me and I couldn’t move. And there was enormous pain just came to something was in my butt. It was really, really painful and I was so scared. And first I couldn’t breathe at the beginning because my face was in the middle of pillow and I had to struggle to – to get to breathe first, and then – then trying to get him off of me.” She believed defendant’s penis was inside her anus because she did not think the “enormous pain” she felt could have been caused by a finger. Doe struggled and screamed, but defendant continued for several minutes.

Doe eventually got away and went into the bathroom. Her anus was bleeding. (A forensic examination conducted later that night revealed tearing in Doe’s perianal area.) Doe then stood outside the bathroom, attempting to get defendant’s attention, but he did not notice her. After gathering her belongings, she approached defendant and told him she was bleeding. Doe asked defendant, “you don’t understand what no means?” She left the house and called 911 from the driveway."

Defendant gets tried for forcible digital penetration, is convicted, and is sentenced to three years in prison. (The opinion doesn't mention this, but from the Megan's Law website, seems like he's already served his entire sentence at this point.)

The Court of Appeal reverses the conviction. At trial, there was a ton of evidence introduced regarding memes that the defendant had forwarded to his friends. As Justice Grover explains: "The challenged evidence conveyed to the jury that defendant is crude, sexist, and racist. And therein lies the problem. With two possible exceptions, the evidence of defendant’s communications has no legal relevance to the legitimate issues of his truthfulness, use of force, or intent to commit sexual assault. The communications as a whole reflect defendant’s apparent enthusiasm for sharing demeaning jokes about women and people of certain races, but they shed no light on the issues being tried."

It would be interesting to see what happens on remand. (Though I doubt I'll ever actually find out.) The defendant has already done his time in prison. So you might think both sides might be fine if he simply pleaded guilty at this point, since it doesn't really doesn't matter. But he's also a registered sex offender, and I'm sure he doesn't want that, so maybe he takes a shot at getting an acquittal at a retrial? But that'll cost him attorney's fees, etc. The state, meanwhile, has gotten its pound of flesh, but might want to both save money (and hence not re-prosecute) and yet simultaneously probably wants to keep the defendant on the sex offender registry. And the victim? Does she want to go through yet another trial?

Maybe he pleads down to a lesser offense at this point? Who knows.

Regardless, one lesson remains: Be careful what you send to others. Even your friends. Even if you trust them, there's always the possibility that someone else will get a hold of them.

Including but not limited to the authorities.

(Of course, the appropriate lesson might also be not to send racist and sexist memes in the first place.)

Sandford v. Sandford (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 3, 2026)

Sometimes it pays to (allegedly) steal hundreds of thousands of dollars from your siblings.

U.S. v. Nasri (9th Cir. - Sept. 2, 2026)

Do you long for those halcyon days of first-year (and/or advanced) Civil Procedure? Do you feel compelled to get a daily dose of Pennoyer v. Neff, the intricacies of in rem jurisdiction, and the complex principles of territorial sovereignty?

If so, these 127 single-spaced pages are for you.

The opinion is by Judge Desai. Judge Bybee authors a concurrence. Judge Desai writes a concurrence of her own. Then Judge Bennett writes a dissent.

It is a civil procedure professor's dream.

And an ordinary litigant's nightmare.

Even more so when you add in, as here, complexities involving waiver, fugitive disentitlement, and the party presentation doctrine.

Overall, a roller coaster ride of procedure.

People v. Espinosa (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 31, 2026)

Here's a line you don't see that often:

"Defendant was 75 years old when he committed his crimes in September 2009. . . ."

You wouldn't think that'd be a murder or anything like that, and it's not. "Defendant was convicted on three counts: (A) one count of engaging in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child who is 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); and (B) two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child who is younger than 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a))." Ooof.

According to the opinion, Mr. Espinosa is still confined, albeit in "a privately owned, noncustodial, long-term care facility (the Facility)." The question is whether he should be granted compassionate relief, as he is 92 years old at this point and functionally immobile.

You might think that the issue is about "compassion" or something like that, but not really. It's instead simply who pays. Right now, the Department of Corrections is paying for his facility, since he's still "in prison." The Department wants him to apply for Medi-Cal so someone else -- e.g., the federal government -- pays.

For Mr. Espinosa, it probably matters little. Except that maybe he gets transferred to a worse facility.

Sometimes "prison" is better.

U.S. v. Morgovsky (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

Judge Bea begins this opinion with:

"For years, Naum Morgovsky smuggled components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes into Russia and laundered the proceeds of his illicit enterprise through a network of offshore banks. But federal investigators eventually got Morgovsky in their sights."

Get it?

Liu v. Kaiser Permanente (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

It's a standard sentiment, held by a nontrivial number of people, and succinctly summarized by the phrase: "F***ing Kaiser." (For a slightly longer diatribe with additional obscenities, see here. Thank you, Helen Hunt.)

That feeling typically arises out of a view that Kaiser -- alongside other HMOs, or insurance companies in general -- often put profits over people, and withhold benefits even when they are obviously due. For an HMO like Kaiser, the most common setting in this regard is when they refuse to provide necessary medical care to a subscriber even when it is obviously (or at least allegedly) due.

Today's Ninth Circuit opinion arises in a different setting, but very much to the same effect.

Ya-Xia Liu worked for Kaiser for over two decades. She got cancer in 2021. She took a leave of absence from work, and battled the disease for a year. But in 2022, she began to lose the fight, and was admitted to Kaiser as a patient on March 19. She was dying, needed 24-hour care, and ultimately succumbed to the disease on March 29, 2022.

Because she worked for Kaiser for 20-plus years, she had a 401(k) plan that was worth over $675,000. She was entitled to roll that over as a lump sum, and on March 26, 2022, she submitted an online request that Kaiser send the entire $675,000+ to E*Trade, and naming her sister (Sherry Liu) as her beneficiary. Ya-Xia knew she was about to die. She wanted her sister to have her money. She did everything she needed to do to make sure that happened.

Unbeknownst to Ya-Xia, however -- or any other employee outside of the benefits office, for that matter -- Kaiser had an internal policy that it always sought to "confirm" any request for a rollover. Although Kaiser admitted that Ya-Xia filled out her request properly, Kaiser refused to pay, saying that because Ya-Xia died before she could "confirm" the rollover request, the sister wasn't entitled to the $675,000+.

The sister sued, and Kaiser still refused to pay. The district court -- Judge Martínez-Olguín, in the Northern District of California -- agreed with Kaiser, and dismissed the lawsuit on the pleadings.

The Ninth Circuit reverses.

Thankfully so.

Can you come up with arguments as to why Kaiser shouldn't have to pay the $675,000? Sure. Creative lawyers can indeed do so. They can even, on occasion, be persuasive. As they were initially here.

But it's precisely cases like this one that make many people hate insurance companies. Or Kaiser in particular.

And I absolutely do not blame them.

Just pay the woman her stinking money. It's not yours, Kaiser. Give the dead woman's sister the cash to which she was entitled for her 20-plus years of service.

And if you elect not to do so, don't complain when people think about you the way that many in fact do.

Garcia Morales v. Blanche (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

This is a long (88-page, single spaced) immigration opinion. The majority opinion is written by Judge Paez, and the dissent by Judge Bumatay. So you can probably accurately figure out which way it ends up.

For a very brief description of why the majority ends up where it does, I'll quote two paragraphs of that opinion. First, the opening paragraph of the opinion:

"Lester J. Garcia Morales (“Garcia Morales” or “Petitioner”), Sheyla Monroy Tay, and their three minor children (collectively, “Petitioners”), natives and citizens of Guatemala, sought refuge in the United States after the same gang leader who murdered Garcia Morales’s sister threatened to kill them. Petitioners moved hours away from their home to escape the gang’s threats, but within two weeks, the gang found them, sent them a photo of their new front door, and again threatened to kill them. The police refused to help, offering to intervene only if they caught the gang leader in the act of murdering Garcia Morales. Out of fear for their lives, Petitioners fled Guatemala."

That paragraph accurately states the equities at issue here. As for the underlying doctrinal dispute, it's complicated, but here's the bottom line:

"We are guided by our decisions in East Bay I and East Bay II. The Rule effectively reimposes the restriction we invalidated in East Bay I. We reaffirm our holding that restricting asylum eligibility for noncitizens who enter between ports of entry impermissibly conflicts with § 1158(a) and the broader asylum statute. The agency therefore erred in concluding that Petitioners are ineligible for asylum pursuant to the Rule."

Judge Bumatay's dissent articulates the theme you would expect, and starts with "Once again, the Ninth Circuit fails to understand that the political branches—not judges—set asylum policy for our country." But, perhaps surprisingly, it also contains at least a facial expression of solicitude towards the petitioners, saying (in the midst of the dissent): "We can be sympathetic to the plight of Lester Garcia Morales and his family. We can be sympathetic to the countless other aliens seeking a better life in the United States. But our sympathy is no substitute for following the law."

One other interesting point. Judge Bumatay goes out of his way to note -- repeatedly --- that, unlike what one might perhaps expect, the underlying baseline rule at issue here was issued not under President Trump, but rather under President Biden. For example, here are the second and third paragraphs of that dissent:

"In 2022, the Biden Administration enacted the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (“CLP”) Rule to deal with the mounting crisis on the southwestern border. 88 Fed. Reg. 31314 (May 16, 2023) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.33 and § 1208.33). Illegal entry into the country from Mexico was at “all-time high,” overwhelming the government’s ability to effectively manage and stem the illegal migration. See id. at 31314–16 (May 16, 2023). Instead of being able to quickly remove illegal aliens from the country, the government faced thousands of aliens seeking asylum— hammering immigration courts with mostly non-meritorious asylum applications. Id. at 31315. The result: “those with meritorious claims [had] to wait years for their claims to be granted, while individuals who are ultimately denied protection may spend years in the United States before being issued a final order of removal.” Id.

The CLP Rule tried to alleviate some of that pressure by encouraging illegal aliens to use orderly “pathways” into the United States or to seek asylum in other countries. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 31314, 31317. The CLP Rule established a “rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for asylum” for all aliens “who ente[red] the United States from Mexico at the southwest land border or adjacent coastal borders without documents sufficient for lawful admission.”"

Similarly, later on in the opinion, he repeats: "The Biden Administration sought to stem the exigency of significant crossings of illegal immigrants into the country. It enacted the “Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule.”"

What's interesting about this -- to me, at least -- is that, typically, a core conservative talking point is that Biden did absolutely nothing to stem the passage of undocumented aliens, and that everything bad (from immigration policy to the deficit to inflation) is all his fault. You often see conservative judges reflecting that same sentiment. These comments are somewhat at odds with this overall message.

Of course, it makes sense for Judge Bumatay to make these points here, since one of his themes (right or wrong) is that liberal judges always side with the things that Biden did but oppose whatever Trump does, even when they're (allegedly) the same thing. Still, I suspect that the current administration would probably not include as part of its own messages: "Hey, on illegal immigration, I'm enacting the same beneficial policies that President Biden did." 

Cabardo v. Patacsil (9th Cir. - Aug. 27, 2026)

My congratulations to Judge Nelson on this opinion.

It's extremely well-written. It flows gracefully. It explains things well. It's careful and refined.

Here are the first several paragraphs:

"Bankruptcy proceedings differ from traditional civil cases we more often hear. Bankruptcy proceedings can be a complex process of reorganizing various financial aspects of debtors’ lives. Because the proceedings can involve so many aspects, an appealable order can fit into two categories. First, district court orders can resolve the entire “umbrella bankruptcy case,” that is, the entire process by which debtors discharge their debt. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020). We clearly have jurisdiction over this set of bankruptcy orders.

But an umbrella bankruptcy case “involves an aggregation of individual controversies, many of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (cleaned up). Thus, Congress provides us with jurisdiction over a second category of appeals. These are appeals of orders which “finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.” Id. (citation omitted). We are asked here to decide whether a discrete dispute is final and appealable.

In this case, a group of creditors appeals an order that rejected one basis for excepting their debt from discharge; a second basis is set for trial. Creditors argue that the appealed order is a final order of a discrete dispute within the larger bankruptcy case, and thus appealable. But the Supreme Court has warned against “slicing the case too thin.” Id. at 502. “An erroneous identification of an interlocutory order as a final decision may yield an appeal over which the appellate forum lacks jurisdiction.” Ritzen, 589 U.S. at 39. Any preliminary issue in a bankruptcy can theoretically be considered a discrete dispute even though it may only decide a portion of the case. See id. at 44. Creditors appeal this type of preliminary step.

Appellants cannot subdivide the dischargeability determination proceeding into a preliminary issue resolving an individual exception from discharge. Because the district court remanded the proceeding to the bankruptcy court for a trial on another exception, it is not a final order as to the discrete proceeding—a dischargeability determination. We thus dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction."

The remainder of the opinion is in the same vein. Nice, meticulous, and always explanatory.

Maybe it's because bankruptcy is an area with which I'm less than intimately familiar, but I very much appreciated both the tone and content of the opinion. And I expect that other readers would feel the same.

People v. Hazlett (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 27, 2026)

I know I say this -- or something like this -- a lot. But it still seems to me like it's a total waste.

The murder here was in 1978. Nearly a half-century ago. Admittedly, it took a while (almost exclusively, DNA evidence) to figure out who committed it, so the conviction and death sentence was only entered in 2003.

It's now 2026. Today's California Supreme Court opinion is 167 pages long. That doesn't even count the dissents; if you add all that in, you're looking at over 200 pages.

We're only at the direct appeal stage. There's still state habeas. Then federal habeas. Then the fact that California doesn't actually impose the death penalty anyway.

The defendant, Larry Hazlett, is 78 years old. 

County of King v. Turner (9th Cir. - Aug. 25, 2026)

This is a really smart and well-written opinion by Judge McKeown.

It's a high-profile case, so I won't say much about the merits; you can read about it elsewhere. Basically it affirms a district court injunction that stops the federal government from cutting off federal funds to local governments that do things the Trump administration doesn't like, whether in the program that's being funded by federal dollars or not. That, Judge McKeown holds, exceeds statutory authorization. You can perhaps tell local governments not to use federal dollars to help transgender persons or undocumented aliens, but you can't pull federal funds just because the locality does things you don't like with their own money and not in the program you're funding. That's the careful balance established by Congress, one over which the current administration runs roughshod.

Judge Bumatay predictably dissents. The difference between the two opinion is pronounced.

It's a testament to the current political and judicial climate that even a cogent and moderate opinion like this one will likely face challenge in both an en banc call and, potentially, in the Supreme Court.

Unfortunate and telling.

U.S. v. Aguilera (9th Cir. - Aug. 24, 2026)

According to this opinion, when a 27-year veteran judge in the Northern District of California, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was told that the federal sentences guidelines allow a defendant to go to trial and yet still ask for a 2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his response was "I didn't realize that." (See page 15.)

Surprising.

Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchos Water (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 24, 2026)

I will take issue neither with the holding of this California Supreme Court opinion nor with its rationale. It's unanimous, after all. Far be it from me to register any dissent.

I will instead limit myself to merely a parenthetical note -- one that strongly came to mind after reading the first two paragraphs of Justice Kruger's opinion. Those paragraphs read:

"Under California’s Eminent Domain Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1230.010 et seq.), a public entity’s right to take private property for public use depends, broadly speaking, on whether the taking is necessary to serve the public interest. As a general rule, public necessity is a matter for the public entity to decide, subject to limited judicial review: Ordinarily, when a public entity has adopted the statutorily required “resolution of necessity,” the relevant public necessity requirements are “conclusively establishe[d]” unless a court finds that the public entity has grossly abused its discretion in adopting the resolution. (Id., §§ 1245.250, subd. (a), 1245.255, subd. (b).)

In 1992, however, the Legislature created special rules for the taking of privately owned public utility property. Under those rules, even after adopting a resolution of necessity, a public entity’s decision to take over a privately owned electric, gas, or water public utility does not conclusively establish the propriety of the taking, but merely creates a “rebuttable presumption” that the statutory requirements for taking the property are met. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.250, subd. (b), added by Stats. 1992, ch. 812, § 3, p. 3846; see id., § 1240.650, subd. (c), added by Stats. 1992, ch. 812, § 2, p. 3846.)"

Hmmm. I wonder why the Legislature elected to pass much more favorable rules for privately owned utilities, as opposed to every single other type of property ownership? I'm sure it had nothing at all to do with the lobbying efforts or campaign contributions made by these large privately owned utilities? No, it would be a huge distortion of the democratic system to give wealthy institutions more favorable treatment under the law than everyone else. So I'm confident things like that never happen.

1 Community Compact v. City of Fresno (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 21, 2026)

Can you figure out from the very first paragraph the twists and turns that likely -- and in fact -- occurred in this case?

Here's the opening paragraph:

"Emphasizing the “profound impact” of Mexican-American labor leader and civil rights activist Cesar Chavez “on the people of Fresno” and concluding the renaming of a downtown thoroughfare in his honor would “provide a source of pride and community recognition,” the Fresno City Council (City Council) adopted Resolution No. 2023-056, which facilitated the renaming of the “East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, and West California Avenue alignment” (collectively, the Alignment)1 to Cesar Chavez Boulevard."

So in 2023, Fresno changed the street name to Cesar Chavez Boulevard. Plaintiffs didn't like that, and filed suit to change it back.

You can guess what happened next, right?

The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and in 2025, plaintiffs appealed. But then, as you likely know, Cesar Chavez got cancelled. So in 2026, Fresno reverses course, and changes the street names back.

The City then, predictably, moves to dismiss the appeal as moot.

The Court of Appeal (1) agrees that the appeal is moot, but (2) decides to resolve it anyway, and affirms. The dissent, Justice Meehan, agrees that it's moot, and wouldn't decide the merits.

Maybe you wouldn't have necessarily predicted the disagreement between the majority and dissent. (I did not.) But that the appeal got mooted by subsequent events; yeah, once you saw that it was Cesar Chavez, you probably figured out what was eventually going to happen.

Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB (9th Cir. - Aug. 20, 2026)

I'm not a Ninth Circuit judge, so I don't know the answer to this question. But I wonder how it feels when you write an opinion -- in this case, one by Judge Hawkins, in 2020 -- with a particular holding, and then six years later (i.e., today), your colleagues take a case en banc and unanimously say that you were wrong.

Maybe your reaction is: "Well, I decided my case, and thought I was right, and if some future case goes the other way, no big deal." Or maybe you instead feel a bit miffed. Either at your colleagues, at yourself, at your law clerk, or at some combination of all three.

Nothing you can do about it either way, of course.

Just wondering.

P.S. - Can the Ninth Circuit website please stop posting the same opinion multiple times for cases that are consolidated? Yes, I know, they're different case numbers, but it's the exact same opinion. Just put it up there once. Ever since the new website went up a month or so ago, you've often got to scroll through the day's opinions to screen out the duplicates (which sometimes, like today, have different captions). It's a slight -- but extant -- pain the butt.