Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 8, 2026)

The Court of Appeal holds today that when you want to sue anonymously, you've got to follow the correct procedures; to wit, filing your complaint conditionally and then seeking to proceed as a Jane Doe. By contrast, if you simply file anonymously, the defendant is free to call a press conference and reveal your real names. Not only isn't that illegal doxing, but it's protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, so if you sue the lawyers who revealed your names, you'll have to pay their legal fees.

So be sure to do it correctly. It's a big deal.

Steer v. Town of Los Gatos (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 6, 2026)

Multimillionaire neighbors in Los Gatos using California environmental statutes to delay their neighbor from building a home on a vacant lot next to theirs.

It doesn't work in the trial court, but succeeds in the Court of Appeal today.

It's not going to stop the project. But it will make it more expensive. CEQA review ain't cheap.

Chin v. DoorDash, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 5, 2026)

Plaintiff files a retaliation suit against his employer, DoorDash, but deliberately refrains from making a sexual harassment claim, hoping that the trial court will refuse to compel arbitration on the merits, without applying the California harassment exception. Sadly (for him), the court issues a tentative disagreeing with his position and compelling arbitration. So at the hearing, plaintiff asks (for the first time) to amend and add a harassment claim. Has the plaintiff waived, or forfeited, arbitration by not raising the issue in his original complaint and in his opposition to the motion to compel arbitration?

Justice Scherb authors the majority opinion and says "Yes." Justice Wiley dissents, arguing that while he would be fine with sanctioning plaintiff's lawyer for the manipulation, there's no waiver. (Truthfully, this is more "forfeiture" than "waiver" -- the two concepts are often conflated.)

Two competing views of a strategy that, in all honesty, I don't think anyone should replicate regardless.

People v. Flint (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 2, 2026)

If you kill a police officer -- even one, as here, who's off-duty -- you can rest assured that the authorities will do everything in their power to make sure that you never see the light of day. That's true even if, as here, you are only the lookout, and someone else kills the person. That's also true even if, as here, the off-duty officer is a lower-level employee primarily doing administrative work.

Sentenced to 29 years to life. Not the actual shooter, but petition for resentencing denied. Affirmed.

Passport 420, Inc. v. Starr Indem. & Liab Co. (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 1, 2026)

Bad cases make bad law.

The Court of Appeal holds today that even if the insurance company doesn't ask, you're required sua sponte to tell them anything that might potentially influence their decision regarding whether or not to issue a policy. On that basis, it reverses the jury award in favor of the policyholder below.

Look, I know that everyone hates Michael Avenatti. For good reason. But the insurance company here didn't ask any questions at all about where the money came from to buy the airplane it insured. (Turns out, he embezzled those funds.) Moreover, the policyholder here isn't even Avenatti; it's a different, innocent person that ends up owning the plane, and hence losing $3 million-plus when the insurance company rescinds the policy based on the failure to volunteer information that the insurance company didn't even bother to request.

This just seems like a terrible decision for pretty much every insurance coverage case other than this one. There are legions of facts that might potentially influence an insurance company's decision. I understand that the insurance code requires me to be honest, with full disclosure. But that only applies to things that the insurance company asks. If my health insurance company doesn't feel like asking about my medical history, I don't have to tell them. If my life insurance company doesn't ask about whether I'm occasionally depressed, I don't have to tell them. If my auto insurance company doesn't ask about whether I sometimes exceed the speed limit on the highway, I don't have to tell them.

Until today.

Baker Ranches, Inc. v. Bergum (9th Cir. - Sept. 30, 2026)

I don't know. I see both sides. Judge Owens makes good points for the majority, but the competing view (adopted by Judge Rawlinson in dissent) has a lot going for it as well. I am definitely not as emphatic as Judge Rawlinson on this issue. But maybe his side has the better of the argument?

Back in 1934, a Nevada state court action determined who could take what water from the Baker-Lehman Creeks. An important issue, to be sure. But the federal government, which owned plenty of the underlying land, didn't participate in the lawsuit. For good reason. It was entitled to sovereign immunity, so no way it was going to bind itself to a state court action. So the state court gave respective water rights to everyone, but not to the federal government.

Fast forward. In 1952, Congress didn't like how this whole thing was ending up. In Nevada as elsewhere. It wanted the federal government to start showing up to these things. So Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, which waived sovereign immunity in these types of cases. And the Act was retroactive as well, and bound the federal government to prior "comprehensive" adjudications of water rights.

Makes sense. Judge Owens cogently explains how all this went down, and why. I learned a lot; thanks for that, honestly.

So is the federal government now bound to the prior 1934 Nevada state court adjudication of the Baker-Lehman Creeks water rights? Judge Owens says "yes" because that proceeding was "comprehensive" (as the McCarran Amendment requires) in that it adjudicated everyone's rights to the water, whereas Judge Rawlinson says "no" because the federal government (understandably) didn't participate and hence (understandably) wasn't awarded at the time any water rights.

I'm slightly leaning to Judge Rawlinson's perspective, I think. It just seems profoundly unfair to me, and contrary to congressional intent, to say that the federal government is bound to a finding in which it (1) did not (for good reason) participate at the time, and (2) accordingly wasn't awarded any water rights, even though it owned tons of the underlying land at issue and certainly would have been awarded water rights had it elected to participate. (Which, again, it made sense not to at the time.) Why would that make sense? Why is that fair or equitable? Why should the other landowners get all the water and the federal parks through which the water flows -- here, the Great Basin National Park -- left to rot in the dust?

I understand Judge Owens' argument that allowing the United States to pop in and exercise water rights at this point would "unsettle" a ton of these prior allocations. Yeah, I admit, that's a pain. But the alternative seems even worse. It would be one thing if the prior allocations reserved some water for the feds (based on their existing land ownership and use) notwithstanding their failure to actively participate. That would indeed, in my view, be a "comprehensive" adjudication, and one to which I might well bind the federal government.

But when, say, the federal government owns 99% of the land, and is using (at the time) 99% of the water, and 1% of the landowners bring a lawsuit and are awarded 100% of the water because the 99% owner (rightly) fails to participate, it makes no sense to me to say: "Oh, well, tough, that was a totally 'comprehensive' prior adjudication because it allocated all the water to all the (relevant) landowners."

No it didn't. It didn't discuss -- or even attempt to address -- the federal government's rights at all. It was not "comprehensive" in that regard. And, as a practical matter, is unfair and socially deleterious to bind everyone to a prior adjudication that we know full well doesn't accurately reflect the relevant ownership and use of the underlying land. Either now or then.

That's my concern with the majority opinion, anyway. I get the arguments. I'm just not entirely sure I'm completely persuaded.

Notwithstanding a really cogent and intelligent opinion by Judge Owens.

State of Washington v. Crown Resources (9th Cir. - Sept. 29, 2026)

Rarely is the Ninth Circuit's reversal of a district court's decision so obviously correct as this one by Judge Fletcher.

Of course there's no privity here. Of course the (self-serving) settlement by the citizen group doesn't bar the contemporaneous related claim by the State of Washington, which didn't even know about, much less approve of, the settlement talks between the other parties.

Totally and completely right.

Medrano v. Acosta (9th Cir. - Sept. 25, 2026)

District Judge Frimpong held that officers were potentially liable if they indeed did what Alex Medrano said they did, so denied their motion for qualified immunity. On appeal, Judges Callahan and Bumatay "conclude[] that it was objectively reasonable for the Officers to aim their guns at Medrano’s head from near point-blank range, as a matter of constitutional law, such that no rational jury could conclude otherwise." (Mr. Medrano had a prior bench warrant for fleeing a traffic stop, and the officers did not know that warrant had been withdrawn.) Judge Paez partially dissents, contending that the majority's "decision is both unnecessary and flawed" since he believes the officer's conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Medrano, would qualify as excessive, but that this right was not clearly established, so qualified immunity exists.

Who do you agree with? Judge Frimpong? Judge Callahan? Judge Paez?

Three different perspectives, to be sure, on when the police are permitted to point loaded guns at your head.

Bandary v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (9th Cir. - Sept. 23, 2026)

I'm stunned by this one. Seriously. Stunned.

A passenger on a Delta Airlines flight allegedly acts suspiciously, so the flight attendants confront him, the situation escalates, and the passenger is ultimately forcibly restrained by both the flight attendants and by an air marshal. He sues Delta, claiming serious personal injuries, and the jury awards him $7.2 million in damages.

The district judge vacates the jury's award and thereafter grants summary judgment to the defendant, and plaintiff appeals. The Ninth Circuit affirms.

I wasn't stunned at the outcome; both the majority opinion and the dissent make good points in favor of their respective positions.

But after reading the opinion, I was interested in discovering what lawyer represented the plaintiff on appeal. There's $7.2 million at stake, after all. Presumably there's a contingency fee at stake, so I was wondering who ultimately lost out on a $2.5 million (or whatever) fee award.

So I looked at the caption, and discovered that the Ninth Circuit appeal was filed and argued by . . . . the Georgetown Law School Appellate Clinic.

What?!

You can't find an appellate attorney who's willing to defend a $7.2 million jury damage award on appeal? Really?!

I was sufficiently surprised to look back at the history of the case. I noticed from the caption that the district court case number began with 17-, so I knew there would be at least some drama.

Drama indeed.

So many different lawyers in the trial court. Plaintiff ultimately representing himself pro se for much of the case. So many motions. Some of which (e.g., the pro se motion to disqualify the district court judge) were not exactly well thought out.

My guess is that, ultimately, no lawyer was willing to deal with the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff was not willing to deal with anyone other than the pro bono counsel at Georgetown who agreed to take the case.

Still. Unusual. A case with a $2.5 million fee at stake but no lawyer.

U.S. v. Rivera (9th Cir. - Sept. 23, 2026)

Tip of the day: If you're a convicted felon who's selling methamphetamine, with thousands in cash plus loaded weapons in your home, maybe don't put your meth-contaminated trash bags in your front yard for pickup.

That mistake cost the defendant here 25 years in federal prison.

I also learned some new lingo today. One of his customers apparently sent a text message asking him for "prices on clear and Negra." I knew that "clear" meant methamphetamine; thank you for that, Breaking Bad (even though Walt's meth was famously blue). But I had to look up what "Negra" meant. (Judge Nelson's opinion mentioned that it had something to do with drugs, but not precisely what.)

I get it now. Makes sense. "Negra" is black (which I already knew; thank you, Negra Modelo). So with drugs, it means heroin; specifically, black tar (or brown) heroin.

Now you know too. (If you didn't already.)

Wilson v. Johnson (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 22, 2026)

Maybe I'm overly cynical. But I am not particularly surprised that there are quite a few opinions from the Court of Appeal -- like this one today -- that reverse the trial court's dismissal of a lawsuit for an alleged failure to bring it to trial within the mandatory five-year period.

For example, here, everyone recognizes that the five year deadline is days away from expiring, so the court sets a trial date, calls in prospective jurors to the courtroom, swears them in, and starts examining them for potential excuses. All that happens before the deadline. The lawyers haven't started asking any questions yet, but still, the prospective jurors are sworn. Then, once a couple of days passes and the deadline expires, the defendant says: "Whoa. Too late. The 'trial' hasn't started within five years. So I win regardless; the lawsuit against me is subject to mandatory dismissal."

At that point, the trial court -- facing what's expected to be a 42-day personal injury trial -- grants the motion and dismisses the lawsuit. Thereby avoiding a long, pain-in-the-butt trial.

The Court of Appeal reverses. Holding that the "trial" properly started for purposes of the five-year statute once the prospective jurors were sworn.

Does it surprise you that trial courts are often far more willing than the Court of Appeal to get rid of pending trials on the basis of the five-year rule? Gets 'em out of work, anyway; at least temporarily. Maybe even permanently, either if the Court of Appeal affirms or, even if it doesn't, if one of the parties papers the underlying judge (as presumably many will) on remand -- or if the judge has retired or moved to a different department by then.

Agency costs. They're real. They're pervasive. Even, at times, amongst judges, I suspect.

People v. Centeno (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 21, 2026)

This opinion just gets worse and worse the more you read. Every page details more horrific facts than the last. (And it's 35 pages, so that's saying something.)

Maybe I should have expected that from the introductory paragraph. Which reads as follows:

"Defendant Jose Anthony Centeno appeals his convictions for kidnapping to exact money or valuable things, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, and assault upon a victim under the age of 18 with intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act; he does not challenge his other convictions. He contends the jury was improperly instructed in connection with the kidnapping and assault charges and, to the extent those arguments were waived, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Centeno further asserts insufficient evidence supported the rape, sodomy, and assault charges. We affirm the judgment."

Still. I'm used to reading terrible facts in cases like this one. This one nonetheless struck me as unusual by starting off with bad (but not horrible) facts and then the abuse becoming more and more disturbing and horrific as time went on.

Read the entire thing at your peril.

S.D. v. Reese (9th Cir. - Sept. 17, 2026)

The question is what to do with transgender women in prison: should they be housed separately, in the men's prison, or in the women's prison. The district court held that Oregon could not presumptively house these inmates in the men's prison without an individualized safety assessment and, inter alia, prohibited the prison from housing them with cisgender cellmates with a history of sexual violence.

The Ninth Circuit appeal was assigned to Judges Collins, VanDyke, and Tung. It's hard to imagine a worse panel for the plaintiffs, so I was not surprised in the slightest about how the case came out: reversed, class decertified, mandate issued immediately.

I was, however, somewhat surprised that Judge Tung seems to have deliberately designed his opinion to be offensive.

Here's the first sentence of the opinion, for example:

"The district court in this case issued a class-wide preliminary injunction requiring (among other things) that the State of Oregon presumptively assign more than a hundred “transgender women” prison inmates (male inmates who claim to be female) for placement in the only state-run women’s prison in Oregon."

You'll notice that the term "transgender women" is placed in quotes. On the theory, I assume, that no such thing actually exists. Nor is this an isolated occurrence. The next sentence, for example, describes the plaintiffs as -- and the quotes here are in the original -- "transgender" inmates. That continues throughout the opinion.

You'll also note the description in the first sentence that "transgender" women are "male inmates who claim to be female." That's certainly a value neutral description, right? Definitely gives that party to a litigation the respect they deserve.

I understand that Judge Tung, and presumably the other judges on the panel, has strongly held personal beliefs about transgendered individuals. But the pervasive language of the opinion serves no legitimate purpose other than to offend.

I have my own beliefs, for example, about the qualities of particular member of the judiciary. But I would never say that "Judge" Tung wrote a particular opinion, or describe someone on that bench as an individual who "claims to be a judge."

During the Jim Crow era, segregationists used to use scare quotes like this to describe minorities; they'd refer to a Black "lawyer" or the Black "doctor" as a way of denigrating their status. I am profoundly disappointed to see a similar and entirely unnecessary tactic employed in a Ninth Circuit opinion today.

People v. Ammons (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 16, 2026)

Here's the opening sentence of today's opinion from the Court of Appeal:

"Charles Nelson Ammons appeals his conviction, by jury, of the attempted murder of City of Pismo Beach police officer Christopher Siglin . . . ."

Here are two paragraphs from the opinion that explain what transpired when Officer Siglin pulled over the defendant for making an illegal left turn, almost all of which was confirmed by the officer's body camera:

"Appellant was confrontational and refused to turn off the engine. Siglin opened the driver’s side door and reached into the van to get appellant to step out of the vehicle. Appellant swung his right hand toward Siglin while holding a handgun. Siglin diverted the blow with his left hand and tried to disarm appellant. The two men grappled with each other for a considerable amount of time, at extremely close quarters inside the van. Siglin constantly tried to pry appellant’s fingers from the firearm and press its muzzle away from his head and face. For his part, appellant struggled to maintain control of the firearm and to pry Siglin’s fingers off it. During the struggle, the firearm was about 12 inches away and pointed at Siglin’s face. The pistol “clicked” but did not fire."

Here are the final two paragraphs of the opinion's statement of facts, alongside the footnote therein:

"Siglin’s body camera documented a “clicking” sound that occurred when appellant pulled the trigger. An examination of the firearm, a .40 caliber Beretta semi-automatic 96 pistol explained the “clicking” but not the firing: the bullets in the magazine clip were loaded backwards. Had the firearm been properly loaded, it would have fired. [Footnote]

After his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital. A screening test determined his blood alcohol content was .21.

[Footnote] - We parenthetically comment on appellant’s lack of even a rudimentary knowledge of firearms. The fact that he loaded the magazine with bullets facing backwards is the only reason Siglin was not murdered."

Given those contents, you can probably figure how the Court of Appeal came out here, right?

Conviction affirmed. 

Meehan v. Aguirre (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 15, 2026)

Plaintiff collides with a semi-trailer while biking in the bike lane and sues. She makes a section 998 settlement offer for $1 million in 2021, and the same offer again in 2022 and 2023. All of those offers were rejected.

Then, in April 2023, six months before trial, she makes a new section 998 offer. For $2 million. Also rejected.

So goes to trial and is awarded damages of $1.06 million.

She then seeks $993,000+ of costs as the prevailing party, including over $600,000 in interest and expert fees, claiming that her $1.06 million recovery was greater than her initial 2021 offer.

She doesn't get that, and appeals, but the Court of Appeal affirms. Only the last section 998 offer controls; that one was for $2 million, and she didn't do better than that at trial.

It seems absolutely crazy to me that plaintiff's counsel made the final $2 million offer. A massive strategic error, for utterly no point. There was already an expired offer, two years earlier, for $1 million. Why make another 998 offer, at a higher price point?

Zero reason to do so. If you want to indicate that you're only willing to settle for double what you asked for before, go ahead. Just don't make it a 998 offer.

Doing so here cost the client dearly. Over half a million bucks.

People v. Singh (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 14, 2026)

Particularly after the Supreme Court's 2026 opinion in Ellingburg v. United States, it's far from frivolous to argue that restitution payments are penalties and hence criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial on that issue. The Supreme Court basically held precisely that in Ellingberg, at least as applied to the federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.

But if you're going to make that claim, as a tactical matter, it's probably best not to do so -- as here -- in the context of a conviction for forcible rape of a college freshman.

The Court of Appeal unanimously rejects that challenge.

In re Kia Hyundai Vehicle Theft Cases (9th Cir. - Sept. 14, 2026)

The Ninth Circuit unanimously reverses the district court's holding that Hyundai and Kia are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California for a lawsuit by insurers alleging that these manufacturer's vehicles were defective because they were way-too-easily stolen.

Judge Miller, and the rest of the panel, are right. The district court judge, Judge Selna, was wrong. A good opinion and a good result.

Fairly straightforward, in my view.

Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 9, 2026)

The Universal Shopping Plaza owns a shopping mall in San Gabriel. Piong Hong owns the Five Star Restaurant, a seafood place in that shopping mall. Hong and the restaurant pays a huge amount of rent; over $60,000 every month. During COVID, Hong says that the office manager at Universal reduced his rent by ten percent to compensate him for the closures during that period. So in January 2023, Hong deducts $65,989 from his rent, to correspond to the ten percent discount during 2022.

Universal doesn't appear to agree with the discount, but doesn't appear to do anything in response. After deducting the $65,989 in early 2023, Hong then continues to pay his full monthly rent. For all of the rest of 2023. For all of 2024. For 23 straight months.

In February 2025, Hong again pays his full monthly rent. But now, Universal tells him that's not good enough. They issue a 3-day notice, saying that Hong didn't pay the full amount two years ago, in January 2023, so he's got to pay up. Hong disagrees, and responds that not only was he promised the discount, but that in any event, there's a specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 1161) that prohibits three-day notices that are filed more than a year after the alleged nonpayment of rent. But Universal says that because the lease agreement says that all rental payments are applied first to any overdue rent, Hong was "constantly" overdue, including in 2025, so the notice is timely.

The case goes to a three day bench trial. Hong represents himself, and does so through a Mandarin interpreter. He loses. The trial court evicts the restaurant from the mall, and orders Hong to pay around $190,000.

Hong then appeals, and represents himself pro per.

And wins.

If you're the law firm that represents Universal, it's not exactly a career highlight to lose to a pro per litigant.

In any event, I was somewhat rooting for Hong. Maybe he shouldn't have unilaterally decided to deduct the alleged ten percent discount from his rent. But if Universal had a problem with that, it should have sued initially. Not waited two years, retaining the full amount of rent for that entire period, and then file suit. That's exactly what Section 1161 was designed to prevent.

And because of all this, Hong gets evicted from the mall, and his restaurant there closed down. Events that are not suddenly reversed notwithstanding his success on appeal.

Though he seems to perhaps reopened his restaurant inside the Hilton in San Gabriel. Good for him.

(Though those Yelp reviews aren't exactly stellar, TBH.)

Adom v. California DOC (9th Cir. - Sept. 8, 2026)

The majority (Judges Paez and Forrest) and dissent (Judge Bea) disagree on whether the California Department of Corrections may have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act when it took away adult diapers from a 57-year old prisoner with spinal damage (alongside a prior stroke) who uses a wheelchair and who suffers from incontinence -- both Nos. 1 and 2. The majority says "Yes" whereas the dissent says "No."

At its core, Judge Bea's dissent relies on the fact that staff at the prison "reviewed [the patient's] medical records" and "were unable to find any evidence to sustain [his] claim that the [] incontinence supplies were medically necessary." It's an "adequate investigation," he says, to review some documents and to conclude therefrom that someone does not, in fact, involuntarily pee and poo in their bed. (Why someone would purportedly fake incontinence to obtain adult diapers -- hardly your typical prison currency -- is left unexplained.)

I assume that there are indeed some medical conditions that can be viewed on a CT or MRI or the like that may cause someone to become incontinent. But I doubt that every reason for incontinence can be so easily objectively verified. I would assume that the most powerful evidence of incontinence is the pee and/or poo in someone's bed, no?

So when -- as seemingly undisputed here -- someone is regularly soiling one's sheets, it seems very hard to me to argue that a doctor can legitimately say "Sorry, you don't actually need diapers, because I can't find any physical evidence that explains why you're doing what you're doing." If a doctor said that to a federal judge, for example, I'm fairly confident that the judge wouldn't say "Oh, okay then. I guess I'll just keep crapping my pants. Thanks for the help."

I would think that a fairly fundamental component of human decency is not being forced to wake up with pee and/or poop coating one's person. No?

People v. Stammers (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 4, 2026)

Be careful of the memes you share with your friends.

The Court of Appeal provides graphic details about what happened on this particular date, after the two met on a dating website. The victim went to his house, the (alleged) perpetrator made dinner, they shared some wine, they got in his hot tub, they made out, they went to his couch and watched television, and then: [Warning -- This is where it gets graphic]

"While on the couch, they touched one another and had consensual vaginal sex. Defendant stopped after a few minutes. Doe was “confused” when he stopped and “was questioning why.” Defendant testified that he and Doe attempted to have vaginal sex but stopped because he was unable to maintain a sufficient erection.

Defendant positioned himself behind Doe on the couch and touched her anus with his finger. After she told him to stop and pulled his hand away from her anus, he told her, “It’s okay, just relax.” Doe described what happened next: “After that it’s just all of a sudden I felt a big pressure pull me down and my face was facing the TV, then became facing down to the pillow, and a huge force on me and I couldn’t move. And there was enormous pain just came to something was in my butt. It was really, really painful and I was so scared. And first I couldn’t breathe at the beginning because my face was in the middle of pillow and I had to struggle to – to get to breathe first, and then – then trying to get him off of me.” She believed defendant’s penis was inside her anus because she did not think the “enormous pain” she felt could have been caused by a finger. Doe struggled and screamed, but defendant continued for several minutes.

Doe eventually got away and went into the bathroom. Her anus was bleeding. (A forensic examination conducted later that night revealed tearing in Doe’s perianal area.) Doe then stood outside the bathroom, attempting to get defendant’s attention, but he did not notice her. After gathering her belongings, she approached defendant and told him she was bleeding. Doe asked defendant, “you don’t understand what no means?” She left the house and called 911 from the driveway."

Defendant gets tried for forcible digital penetration, is convicted, and is sentenced to three years in prison. (The opinion doesn't mention this, but from the Megan's Law website, seems like he's already served his entire sentence at this point.)

The Court of Appeal reverses the conviction. At trial, there was a ton of evidence introduced regarding memes that the defendant had forwarded to his friends. As Justice Grover explains: "The challenged evidence conveyed to the jury that defendant is crude, sexist, and racist. And therein lies the problem. With two possible exceptions, the evidence of defendant’s communications has no legal relevance to the legitimate issues of his truthfulness, use of force, or intent to commit sexual assault. The communications as a whole reflect defendant’s apparent enthusiasm for sharing demeaning jokes about women and people of certain races, but they shed no light on the issues being tried."

It would be interesting to see what happens on remand. (Though I doubt I'll ever actually find out.) The defendant has already done his time in prison. So you might think both sides might be fine if he simply pleaded guilty at this point, since it doesn't really doesn't matter. But he's also a registered sex offender, and I'm sure he doesn't want that, so maybe he takes a shot at getting an acquittal at a retrial? But that'll cost him attorney's fees, etc. The state, meanwhile, has gotten its pound of flesh, but might want to both save money (and hence not re-prosecute) and yet simultaneously probably wants to keep the defendant on the sex offender registry. And the victim? Does she want to go through yet another trial?

Maybe he pleads down to a lesser offense at this point? Who knows.

Regardless, one lesson remains: Be careful what you send to others. Even your friends. Even if you trust them, there's always the possibility that someone else will get a hold of them.

Including but not limited to the authorities.

(Of course, the appropriate lesson might also be not to send racist and sexist memes in the first place.)