Baker Ranches, Inc. v. Bergum (9th Cir. - Sept. 30, 2026)

I don't know. I see both sides. Judge Owens makes good points for the majority, but the competing view (adopted by Judge Rawlinson in dissent) has a lot going for it as well. I am definitely not as emphatic as Judge Rawlinson on this issue. But maybe his side has the better of the argument?

Back in 1934, a Nevada state court action determined who could take what water from the Baker-Lehman Creeks. An important issue, to be sure. But the federal government, which owned plenty of the underlying land, didn't participate in the lawsuit. For good reason. It was entitled to sovereign immunity, so no way it was going to bind itself to a state court action. So the state court gave respective water rights to everyone, but not to the federal government.

Fast forward. In 1952, Congress didn't like how this whole thing was ending up. In Nevada as elsewhere. It wanted the federal government to start showing up to these things. So Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, which waived sovereign immunity in these types of cases. And the Act was retroactive as well, and bound the federal government to prior "comprehensive" adjudications of water rights.

Makes sense. Judge Owens cogently explains how all this went down, and why. I learned a lot; thanks for that, honestly.

So is the federal government now bound to the prior 1934 Nevada state court adjudication of the Baker-Lehman Creeks water rights? Judge Owens says "yes" because that proceeding was "comprehensive" (as the McCarran Amendment requires) in that it adjudicated everyone's rights to the water, whereas Judge Rawlinson says "no" because the federal government (understandably) didn't participate and hence (understandably) wasn't awarded at the time any water rights.

I'm slightly leaning to Judge Rawlinson's perspective, I think. It just seems profoundly unfair to me, and contrary to congressional intent, to say that the federal government is bound to a finding in which it (1) did not (for good reason) participate at the time, and (2) accordingly wasn't awarded any water rights, even though it owned tons of the underlying land at issue and certainly would have been awarded water rights had it elected to participate. (Which, again, it made sense not to at the time.) Why would that make sense? Why is that fair or equitable? Why should the other landowners get all the water and the federal parks through which the water flows -- here, the Great Basin National Park -- left to rot in the dust?

I understand Judge Owens' argument that allowing the United States to pop in and exercise water rights at this point would "unsettle" a ton of these prior allocations. Yeah, I admit, that's a pain. But the alternative seems even worse. It would be one thing if the prior allocations reserved some water for the feds (based on their existing land ownership and use) notwithstanding their failure to actively participate. That would indeed, in my view, be a "comprehensive" adjudication, and one to which I might well bind the federal government.

But when, say, the federal government owns 99% of the land, and is using (at the time) 99% of the water, and 1% of the landowners bring a lawsuit and are awarded 100% of the water because the 99% owner (rightly) fails to participate, it makes no sense to me to say: "Oh, well, tough, that was a totally 'comprehensive' prior adjudication because it allocated all the water to all the (relevant) landowners."

No it didn't. It didn't discuss -- or even attempt to address -- the federal government's rights at all. It was not "comprehensive" in that regard. And, as a practical matter, is unfair and socially deleterious to bind everyone to a prior adjudication that we know full well doesn't accurately reflect the relevant ownership and use of the underlying land. Either now or then.

That's my concern with the majority opinion, anyway. I get the arguments. I'm just not entirely sure I'm completely persuaded.

Notwithstanding a really cogent and intelligent opinion by Judge Owens.

State of Washington v. Crown Resources (9th Cir. - Sept. 29, 2026)

Rarely is the Ninth Circuit's reversal of a district court's decision so obviously correct as this one by Judge Fletcher.

Of course there's no privity here. Of course the (self-serving) settlement by the citizen group doesn't bar the contemporaneous related claim by the State of Washington, which didn't even know about, much less approve of, the settlement talks between the other parties.

Totally and completely right.

Medrano v. Acosta (9th Cir. - Sept. 25, 2026)

District Judge Frimpong held that officers were potentially liable if they indeed did what Alex Medrano said they did, so denied their motion for qualified immunity. On appeal, Judges Callahan and Bumatay "conclude[] that it was objectively reasonable for the Officers to aim their guns at Medrano’s head from near point-blank range, as a matter of constitutional law, such that no rational jury could conclude otherwise." (Mr. Medrano had a prior bench warrant for fleeing a traffic stop, and the officers did not know that warrant had been withdrawn.) Judge Paez partially dissents, contending that the majority's "decision is both unnecessary and flawed" since he believes the officer's conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Medrano, would qualify as excessive, but that this right was not clearly established, so qualified immunity exists.

Who do you agree with? Judge Frimpong? Judge Callahan? Judge Paez?

Three different perspectives, to be sure, on when the police are permitted to point loaded guns at your head.

Bandary v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (9th Cir. - Sept. 23, 2026)

I'm stunned by this one. Seriously. Stunned.

A passenger on a Delta Airlines flight allegedly acts suspiciously, so the flight attendants confront him, the situation escalates, and the passenger is ultimately forcibly restrained by both the flight attendants and by an air marshal. He sues Delta, claiming serious personal injuries, and the jury awards him $7.2 million in damages.

The district judge vacates the jury's award and thereafter grants summary judgment to the defendant, and plaintiff appeals. The Ninth Circuit affirms.

I wasn't stunned at the outcome; both the majority opinion and the dissent make good points in favor of their respective positions.

But after reading the opinion, I was interested in discovering what lawyer represented the plaintiff on appeal. There's $7.2 million at stake, after all. Presumably there's a contingency fee at stake, so I was wondering who ultimately lost out on a $2.5 million (or whatever) fee award.

So I looked at the caption, and discovered that the Ninth Circuit appeal was filed and argued by . . . . the Georgetown Law School Appellate Clinic.

What?!

You can't find an appellate attorney who's willing to defend a $7.2 million jury damage award on appeal? Really?!

I was sufficiently surprised to look back at the history of the case. I noticed from the caption that the district court case number began with 17-, so I knew there would be at least some drama.

Drama indeed.

So many different lawyers in the trial court. Plaintiff ultimately representing himself pro se for much of the case. So many motions. Some of which (e.g., the pro se motion to disqualify the district court judge) were not exactly well thought out.

My guess is that, ultimately, no lawyer was willing to deal with the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff was not willing to deal with anyone other than the pro bono counsel at Georgetown who agreed to take the case.

Still. Unusual. A case with a $2.5 million fee at stake but no lawyer.

U.S. v. Rivera (9th Cir. - Sept. 23, 2026)

Tip of the day: If you're a convicted felon who's selling methamphetamine, with thousands in cash plus loaded weapons in your home, maybe don't put your meth-contaminated trash bags in your front yard for pickup.

That mistake cost the defendant here 25 years in federal prison.

I also learned some new lingo today. One of his customers apparently sent a text message asking him for "prices on clear and Negra." I knew that "clear" meant methamphetamine; thank you for that, Breaking Bad (even though Walt's meth was famously blue). But I had to look up what "Negra" meant. (Judge Nelson's opinion mentioned that it had something to do with drugs, but not precisely what.)

I get it now. Makes sense. "Negra" is black (which I already knew; thank you, Negra Modelo). So with drugs, it means heroin; specifically, black tar (or brown) heroin.

Now you know too. (If you didn't already.)

Wilson v. Johnson (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 22, 2026)

Maybe I'm overly cynical. But I am not particularly surprised that there are quite a few opinions from the Court of Appeal -- like this one today -- that reverse the trial court's dismissal of a lawsuit for an alleged failure to bring it to trial within the mandatory five-year period.

For example, here, everyone recognizes that the five year deadline is days away from expiring, so the court sets a trial date, calls in prospective jurors to the courtroom, swears them in, and starts examining them for potential excuses. All that happens before the deadline. The lawyers haven't started asking any questions yet, but still, the prospective jurors are sworn. Then, once a couple of days passes and the deadline expires, the defendant says: "Whoa. Too late. The 'trial' hasn't started within five years. So I win regardless; the lawsuit against me is subject to mandatory dismissal."

At that point, the trial court -- facing what's expected to be a 42-day personal injury trial -- grants the motion and dismisses the lawsuit. Thereby avoiding a long, pain-in-the-butt trial.

The Court of Appeal reverses. Holding that the "trial" properly started for purposes of the five-year statute once the prospective jurors were sworn.

Does it surprise you that trial courts are often far more willing than the Court of Appeal to get rid of pending trials on the basis of the five-year rule? Gets 'em out of work, anyway; at least temporarily. Maybe even permanently, either if the Court of Appeal affirms or, even if it doesn't, if one of the parties papers the underlying judge (as presumably many will) on remand -- or if the judge has retired or moved to a different department by then.

Agency costs. They're real. They're pervasive. Even, at times, amongst judges, I suspect.

People v. Centeno (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 21, 2026)

This opinion just gets worse and worse the more you read. Every page details more horrific facts than the last. (And it's 35 pages, so that's saying something.)

Maybe I should have expected that from the introductory paragraph. Which reads as follows:

"Defendant Jose Anthony Centeno appeals his convictions for kidnapping to exact money or valuable things, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, and assault upon a victim under the age of 18 with intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act; he does not challenge his other convictions. He contends the jury was improperly instructed in connection with the kidnapping and assault charges and, to the extent those arguments were waived, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Centeno further asserts insufficient evidence supported the rape, sodomy, and assault charges. We affirm the judgment."

Still. I'm used to reading terrible facts in cases like this one. This one nonetheless struck me as unusual by starting off with bad (but not horrible) facts and then the abuse becoming more and more disturbing and horrific as time went on.

Read the entire thing at your peril.

S.D. v. Reese (9th Cir. - Sept. 17, 2026)

The question is what to do with transgender women in prison: should they be housed separately, in the men's prison, or in the women's prison. The district court held that Oregon could not presumptively house these inmates in the men's prison without an individualized safety assessment and, inter alia, prohibited the prison from housing them with cisgender cellmates with a history of sexual violence.

The Ninth Circuit appeal was assigned to Judges Collins, VanDyke, and Tung. It's hard to imagine a worse panel for the plaintiffs, so I was not surprised in the slightest about how the case came out: reversed, class decertified, mandate issued immediately.

I was, however, somewhat surprised that Judge Tung seems to have deliberately designed his opinion to be offensive.

Here's the first sentence of the opinion, for example:

"The district court in this case issued a class-wide preliminary injunction requiring (among other things) that the State of Oregon presumptively assign more than a hundred “transgender women” prison inmates (male inmates who claim to be female) for placement in the only state-run women’s prison in Oregon."

You'll notice that the term "transgender women" is placed in quotes. On the theory, I assume, that no such thing actually exists. Nor is this an isolated occurrence. The next sentence, for example, describes the plaintiffs as -- and the quotes here are in the original -- "transgender" inmates. That continues throughout the opinion.

You'll also note the description in the first sentence that "transgender" women are "male inmates who claim to be female." That's certainly a value neutral description, right? Definitely gives that party to a litigation the respect they deserve.

I understand that Judge Tung, and presumably the other judges on the panel, has strongly held personal beliefs about transgendered individuals. But the pervasive language of the opinion serves no legitimate purpose other than to offend.

I have my own beliefs, for example, about the qualities of particular member of the judiciary. But I would never say that "Judge" Tung wrote a particular opinion, or describe someone on that bench as an individual who "claims to be a judge."

During the Jim Crow era, segregationists used to use scare quotes like this to describe minorities; they'd refer to a Black "lawyer" or the Black "doctor" as a way of denigrating their status. I am profoundly disappointed to see a similar and entirely unnecessary tactic employed in a Ninth Circuit opinion today.

People v. Ammons (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 16, 2026)

Here's the opening sentence of today's opinion from the Court of Appeal:

"Charles Nelson Ammons appeals his conviction, by jury, of the attempted murder of City of Pismo Beach police officer Christopher Siglin . . . ."

Here are two paragraphs from the opinion that explain what transpired when Officer Siglin pulled over the defendant for making an illegal left turn, almost all of which was confirmed by the officer's body camera:

"Appellant was confrontational and refused to turn off the engine. Siglin opened the driver’s side door and reached into the van to get appellant to step out of the vehicle. Appellant swung his right hand toward Siglin while holding a handgun. Siglin diverted the blow with his left hand and tried to disarm appellant. The two men grappled with each other for a considerable amount of time, at extremely close quarters inside the van. Siglin constantly tried to pry appellant’s fingers from the firearm and press its muzzle away from his head and face. For his part, appellant struggled to maintain control of the firearm and to pry Siglin’s fingers off it. During the struggle, the firearm was about 12 inches away and pointed at Siglin’s face. The pistol “clicked” but did not fire."

Here are the final two paragraphs of the opinion's statement of facts, alongside the footnote therein:

"Siglin’s body camera documented a “clicking” sound that occurred when appellant pulled the trigger. An examination of the firearm, a .40 caliber Beretta semi-automatic 96 pistol explained the “clicking” but not the firing: the bullets in the magazine clip were loaded backwards. Had the firearm been properly loaded, it would have fired. [Footnote]

After his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital. A screening test determined his blood alcohol content was .21.

[Footnote] - We parenthetically comment on appellant’s lack of even a rudimentary knowledge of firearms. The fact that he loaded the magazine with bullets facing backwards is the only reason Siglin was not murdered."

Given those contents, you can probably figure how the Court of Appeal came out here, right?

Conviction affirmed. 

Meehan v. Aguirre (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 15, 2026)

Plaintiff collides with a semi-trailer while biking in the bike lane and sues. She makes a section 998 settlement offer for $1 million in 2021, and the same offer again in 2022 and 2023. All of those offers were rejected.

Then, in April 2023, six months before trial, she makes a new section 998 offer. For $2 million. Also rejected.

So goes to trial and is awarded damages of $1.06 million.

She then seeks $993,000+ of costs as the prevailing party, including over $600,000 in interest and expert fees, claiming that her $1.06 million recovery was greater than her initial 2021 offer.

She doesn't get that, and appeals, but the Court of Appeal affirms. Only the last section 998 offer controls; that one was for $2 million, and she didn't do better than that at trial.

It seems absolutely crazy to me that plaintiff's counsel made the final $2 million offer. A massive strategic error, for utterly no point. There was already an expired offer, two years earlier, for $1 million. Why make another 998 offer, at a higher price point?

Zero reason to do so. If you want to indicate that you're only willing to settle for double what you asked for before, go ahead. Just don't make it a 998 offer.

Doing so here cost the client dearly. Over half a million bucks.

People v. Singh (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 14, 2026)

Particularly after the Supreme Court's 2026 opinion in Ellingburg v. United States, it's far from frivolous to argue that restitution payments are penalties and hence criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial on that issue. The Supreme Court basically held precisely that in Ellingberg, at least as applied to the federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.

But if you're going to make that claim, as a tactical matter, it's probably best not to do so -- as here -- in the context of a conviction for forcible rape of a college freshman.

The Court of Appeal unanimously rejects that challenge.

In re Kia Hyundai Vehicle Theft Cases (9th Cir. - Sept. 14, 2026)

The Ninth Circuit unanimously reverses the district court's holding that Hyundai and Kia are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California for a lawsuit by insurers alleging that these manufacturer's vehicles were defective because they were way-too-easily stolen.

Judge Miller, and the rest of the panel, are right. The district court judge, Judge Selna, was wrong. A good opinion and a good result.

Fairly straightforward, in my view.

Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 9, 2026)

The Universal Shopping Plaza owns a shopping mall in San Gabriel. Piong Hong owns the Five Star Restaurant, a seafood place in that shopping mall. Hong and the restaurant pays a huge amount of rent; over $60,000 every month. During COVID, Hong says that the office manager at Universal reduced his rent by ten percent to compensate him for the closures during that period. So in January 2023, Hong deducts $65,989 from his rent, to correspond to the ten percent discount during 2022.

Universal doesn't appear to agree with the discount, but doesn't appear to do anything in response. After deducting the $65,989 in early 2023, Hong then continues to pay his full monthly rent. For all of the rest of 2023. For all of 2024. For 23 straight months.

In February 2025, Hong again pays his full monthly rent. But now, Universal tells him that's not good enough. They issue a 3-day notice, saying that Hong didn't pay the full amount two years ago, in January 2023, so he's got to pay up. Hong disagrees, and responds that not only was he promised the discount, but that in any event, there's a specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 1161) that prohibits three-day notices that are filed more than a year after the alleged nonpayment of rent. But Universal says that because the lease agreement says that all rental payments are applied first to any overdue rent, Hong was "constantly" overdue, including in 2025, so the notice is timely.

The case goes to a three day bench trial. Hong represents himself, and does so through a Mandarin interpreter. He loses. The trial court evicts the restaurant from the mall, and orders Hong to pay around $190,000.

Hong then appeals, and represents himself pro per.

And wins.

If you're the law firm that represents Universal, it's not exactly a career highlight to lose to a pro per litigant.

In any event, I was somewhat rooting for Hong. Maybe he shouldn't have unilaterally decided to deduct the alleged ten percent discount from his rent. But if Universal had a problem with that, it should have sued initially. Not waited two years, retaining the full amount of rent for that entire period, and then file suit. That's exactly what Section 1161 was designed to prevent.

And because of all this, Hong gets evicted from the mall, and his restaurant there closed down. Events that are not suddenly reversed notwithstanding his success on appeal.

Though he seems to perhaps reopened his restaurant inside the Hilton in San Gabriel. Good for him.

(Though those Yelp reviews aren't exactly stellar, TBH.)

Adom v. California DOC (9th Cir. - Sept. 8, 2026)

The majority (Judges Paez and Forrest) and dissent (Judge Bea) disagree on whether the California Department of Corrections may have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act when it took away adult diapers from a 57-year old prisoner with spinal damage (alongside a prior stroke) who uses a wheelchair and who suffers from incontinence -- both Nos. 1 and 2. The majority says "Yes" whereas the dissent says "No."

At its core, Judge Bea's dissent relies on the fact that staff at the prison "reviewed [the patient's] medical records" and "were unable to find any evidence to sustain [his] claim that the [] incontinence supplies were medically necessary." It's an "adequate investigation," he says, to review some documents and to conclude therefrom that someone does not, in fact, involuntarily pee and poo in their bed. (Why someone would purportedly fake incontinence to obtain adult diapers -- hardly your typical prison currency -- is left unexplained.)

I assume that there are indeed some medical conditions that can be viewed on a CT or MRI or the like that may cause someone to become incontinent. But I doubt that every reason for incontinence can be so easily objectively verified. I would assume that the most powerful evidence of incontinence is the pee and/or poo in someone's bed, no?

So when -- as seemingly undisputed here -- someone is regularly soiling one's sheets, it seems very hard to me to argue that a doctor can legitimately say "Sorry, you don't actually need diapers, because I can't find any physical evidence that explains why you're doing what you're doing." If a doctor said that to a federal judge, for example, I'm fairly confident that the judge wouldn't say "Oh, okay then. I guess I'll just keep crapping my pants. Thanks for the help."

I would think that a fairly fundamental component of human decency is not being forced to wake up with pee and/or poop coating one's person. No?

People v. Stammers (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 4, 2026)

Be careful of the memes you share with your friends.

The Court of Appeal provides graphic details about what happened on this particular date, after the two met on a dating website. The victim went to his house, the (alleged) perpetrator made dinner, they shared some wine, they got in his hot tub, they made out, they went to his couch and watched television, and then: [Warning -- This is where it gets graphic]

"While on the couch, they touched one another and had consensual vaginal sex. Defendant stopped after a few minutes. Doe was “confused” when he stopped and “was questioning why.” Defendant testified that he and Doe attempted to have vaginal sex but stopped because he was unable to maintain a sufficient erection.

Defendant positioned himself behind Doe on the couch and touched her anus with his finger. After she told him to stop and pulled his hand away from her anus, he told her, “It’s okay, just relax.” Doe described what happened next: “After that it’s just all of a sudden I felt a big pressure pull me down and my face was facing the TV, then became facing down to the pillow, and a huge force on me and I couldn’t move. And there was enormous pain just came to something was in my butt. It was really, really painful and I was so scared. And first I couldn’t breathe at the beginning because my face was in the middle of pillow and I had to struggle to – to get to breathe first, and then – then trying to get him off of me.” She believed defendant’s penis was inside her anus because she did not think the “enormous pain” she felt could have been caused by a finger. Doe struggled and screamed, but defendant continued for several minutes.

Doe eventually got away and went into the bathroom. Her anus was bleeding. (A forensic examination conducted later that night revealed tearing in Doe’s perianal area.) Doe then stood outside the bathroom, attempting to get defendant’s attention, but he did not notice her. After gathering her belongings, she approached defendant and told him she was bleeding. Doe asked defendant, “you don’t understand what no means?” She left the house and called 911 from the driveway."

Defendant gets tried for forcible digital penetration, is convicted, and is sentenced to three years in prison. (The opinion doesn't mention this, but from the Megan's Law website, seems like he's already served his entire sentence at this point.)

The Court of Appeal reverses the conviction. At trial, there was a ton of evidence introduced regarding memes that the defendant had forwarded to his friends. As Justice Grover explains: "The challenged evidence conveyed to the jury that defendant is crude, sexist, and racist. And therein lies the problem. With two possible exceptions, the evidence of defendant’s communications has no legal relevance to the legitimate issues of his truthfulness, use of force, or intent to commit sexual assault. The communications as a whole reflect defendant’s apparent enthusiasm for sharing demeaning jokes about women and people of certain races, but they shed no light on the issues being tried."

It would be interesting to see what happens on remand. (Though I doubt I'll ever actually find out.) The defendant has already done his time in prison. So you might think both sides might be fine if he simply pleaded guilty at this point, since it doesn't really doesn't matter. But he's also a registered sex offender, and I'm sure he doesn't want that, so maybe he takes a shot at getting an acquittal at a retrial? But that'll cost him attorney's fees, etc. The state, meanwhile, has gotten its pound of flesh, but might want to both save money (and hence not re-prosecute) and yet simultaneously probably wants to keep the defendant on the sex offender registry. And the victim? Does she want to go through yet another trial?

Maybe he pleads down to a lesser offense at this point? Who knows.

Regardless, one lesson remains: Be careful what you send to others. Even your friends. Even if you trust them, there's always the possibility that someone else will get a hold of them.

Including but not limited to the authorities.

(Of course, the appropriate lesson might also be not to send racist and sexist memes in the first place.)

Sandford v. Sandford (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 3, 2026)

Sometimes it pays to (allegedly) steal hundreds of thousands of dollars from your siblings.

U.S. v. Nasri (9th Cir. - Sept. 2, 2026)

Do you long for those halcyon days of first-year (and/or advanced) Civil Procedure? Do you feel compelled to get a daily dose of Pennoyer v. Neff, the intricacies of in rem jurisdiction, and the complex principles of territorial sovereignty?

If so, these 127 single-spaced pages are for you.

The opinion is by Judge Desai. Judge Bybee authors a concurrence. Judge Desai writes a concurrence of her own. Then Judge Bennett writes a dissent.

It is a civil procedure professor's dream.

And an ordinary litigant's nightmare.

Even more so when you add in, as here, complexities involving waiver, fugitive disentitlement, and the party presentation doctrine.

Overall, a roller coaster ride of procedure.

People v. Espinosa (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 31, 2026)

Here's a line you don't see that often:

"Defendant was 75 years old when he committed his crimes in September 2009. . . ."

You wouldn't think that'd be a murder or anything like that, and it's not. "Defendant was convicted on three counts: (A) one count of engaging in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child who is 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); and (B) two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child who is younger than 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a))." Ooof.

According to the opinion, Mr. Espinosa is still confined, albeit in "a privately owned, noncustodial, long-term care facility (the Facility)." The question is whether he should be granted compassionate relief, as he is 92 years old at this point and functionally immobile.

You might think that the issue is about "compassion" or something like that, but not really. It's instead simply who pays. Right now, the Department of Corrections is paying for his facility, since he's still "in prison." The Department wants him to apply for Medi-Cal so someone else -- e.g., the federal government -- pays.

For Mr. Espinosa, it probably matters little. Except that maybe he gets transferred to a worse facility.

Sometimes "prison" is better.

U.S. v. Morgovsky (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

Judge Bea begins this opinion with:

"For years, Naum Morgovsky smuggled components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes into Russia and laundered the proceeds of his illicit enterprise through a network of offshore banks. But federal investigators eventually got Morgovsky in their sights."

Get it?

Liu v. Kaiser Permanente (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

It's a standard sentiment, held by a nontrivial number of people, and succinctly summarized by the phrase: "F***ing Kaiser." (For a slightly longer diatribe with additional obscenities, see here. Thank you, Helen Hunt.)

That feeling typically arises out of a view that Kaiser -- alongside other HMOs, or insurance companies in general -- often put profits over people, and withhold benefits even when they are obviously due. For an HMO like Kaiser, the most common setting in this regard is when they refuse to provide necessary medical care to a subscriber even when it is obviously (or at least allegedly) due.

Today's Ninth Circuit opinion arises in a different setting, but very much to the same effect.

Ya-Xia Liu worked for Kaiser for over two decades. She got cancer in 2021. She took a leave of absence from work, and battled the disease for a year. But in 2022, she began to lose the fight, and was admitted to Kaiser as a patient on March 19. She was dying, needed 24-hour care, and ultimately succumbed to the disease on March 29, 2022.

Because she worked for Kaiser for 20-plus years, she had a 401(k) plan that was worth over $675,000. She was entitled to roll that over as a lump sum, and on March 26, 2022, she submitted an online request that Kaiser send the entire $675,000+ to E*Trade, and naming her sister (Sherry Liu) as her beneficiary. Ya-Xia knew she was about to die. She wanted her sister to have her money. She did everything she needed to do to make sure that happened.

Unbeknownst to Ya-Xia, however -- or any other employee outside of the benefits office, for that matter -- Kaiser had an internal policy that it always sought to "confirm" any request for a rollover. Although Kaiser admitted that Ya-Xia filled out her request properly, Kaiser refused to pay, saying that because Ya-Xia died before she could "confirm" the rollover request, the sister wasn't entitled to the $675,000+.

The sister sued, and Kaiser still refused to pay. The district court -- Judge Martínez-Olguín, in the Northern District of California -- agreed with Kaiser, and dismissed the lawsuit on the pleadings.

The Ninth Circuit reverses.

Thankfully so.

Can you come up with arguments as to why Kaiser shouldn't have to pay the $675,000? Sure. Creative lawyers can indeed do so. They can even, on occasion, be persuasive. As they were initially here.

But it's precisely cases like this one that make many people hate insurance companies. Or Kaiser in particular.

And I absolutely do not blame them.

Just pay the woman her stinking money. It's not yours, Kaiser. Give the dead woman's sister the cash to which she was entitled for her 20-plus years of service.

And if you elect not to do so, don't complain when people think about you the way that many in fact do.

Garcia Morales v. Blanche (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

This is a long (88-page, single spaced) immigration opinion. The majority opinion is written by Judge Paez, and the dissent by Judge Bumatay. So you can probably accurately figure out which way it ends up.

For a very brief description of why the majority ends up where it does, I'll quote two paragraphs of that opinion. First, the opening paragraph of the opinion:

"Lester J. Garcia Morales (“Garcia Morales” or “Petitioner”), Sheyla Monroy Tay, and their three minor children (collectively, “Petitioners”), natives and citizens of Guatemala, sought refuge in the United States after the same gang leader who murdered Garcia Morales’s sister threatened to kill them. Petitioners moved hours away from their home to escape the gang’s threats, but within two weeks, the gang found them, sent them a photo of their new front door, and again threatened to kill them. The police refused to help, offering to intervene only if they caught the gang leader in the act of murdering Garcia Morales. Out of fear for their lives, Petitioners fled Guatemala."

That paragraph accurately states the equities at issue here. As for the underlying doctrinal dispute, it's complicated, but here's the bottom line:

"We are guided by our decisions in East Bay I and East Bay II. The Rule effectively reimposes the restriction we invalidated in East Bay I. We reaffirm our holding that restricting asylum eligibility for noncitizens who enter between ports of entry impermissibly conflicts with § 1158(a) and the broader asylum statute. The agency therefore erred in concluding that Petitioners are ineligible for asylum pursuant to the Rule."

Judge Bumatay's dissent articulates the theme you would expect, and starts with "Once again, the Ninth Circuit fails to understand that the political branches—not judges—set asylum policy for our country." But, perhaps surprisingly, it also contains at least a facial expression of solicitude towards the petitioners, saying (in the midst of the dissent): "We can be sympathetic to the plight of Lester Garcia Morales and his family. We can be sympathetic to the countless other aliens seeking a better life in the United States. But our sympathy is no substitute for following the law."

One other interesting point. Judge Bumatay goes out of his way to note -- repeatedly --- that, unlike what one might perhaps expect, the underlying baseline rule at issue here was issued not under President Trump, but rather under President Biden. For example, here are the second and third paragraphs of that dissent:

"In 2022, the Biden Administration enacted the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (“CLP”) Rule to deal with the mounting crisis on the southwestern border. 88 Fed. Reg. 31314 (May 16, 2023) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.33 and § 1208.33). Illegal entry into the country from Mexico was at “all-time high,” overwhelming the government’s ability to effectively manage and stem the illegal migration. See id. at 31314–16 (May 16, 2023). Instead of being able to quickly remove illegal aliens from the country, the government faced thousands of aliens seeking asylum— hammering immigration courts with mostly non-meritorious asylum applications. Id. at 31315. The result: “those with meritorious claims [had] to wait years for their claims to be granted, while individuals who are ultimately denied protection may spend years in the United States before being issued a final order of removal.” Id.

The CLP Rule tried to alleviate some of that pressure by encouraging illegal aliens to use orderly “pathways” into the United States or to seek asylum in other countries. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 31314, 31317. The CLP Rule established a “rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for asylum” for all aliens “who ente[red] the United States from Mexico at the southwest land border or adjacent coastal borders without documents sufficient for lawful admission.”"

Similarly, later on in the opinion, he repeats: "The Biden Administration sought to stem the exigency of significant crossings of illegal immigrants into the country. It enacted the “Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule.”"

What's interesting about this -- to me, at least -- is that, typically, a core conservative talking point is that Biden did absolutely nothing to stem the passage of undocumented aliens, and that everything bad (from immigration policy to the deficit to inflation) is all his fault. You often see conservative judges reflecting that same sentiment. These comments are somewhat at odds with this overall message.

Of course, it makes sense for Judge Bumatay to make these points here, since one of his themes (right or wrong) is that liberal judges always side with the things that Biden did but oppose whatever Trump does, even when they're (allegedly) the same thing. Still, I suspect that the current administration would probably not include as part of its own messages: "Hey, on illegal immigration, I'm enacting the same beneficial policies that President Biden did." 

Cabardo v. Patacsil (9th Cir. - Aug. 27, 2026)

My congratulations to Judge Nelson on this opinion.

It's extremely well-written. It flows gracefully. It explains things well. It's careful and refined.

Here are the first several paragraphs:

"Bankruptcy proceedings differ from traditional civil cases we more often hear. Bankruptcy proceedings can be a complex process of reorganizing various financial aspects of debtors’ lives. Because the proceedings can involve so many aspects, an appealable order can fit into two categories. First, district court orders can resolve the entire “umbrella bankruptcy case,” that is, the entire process by which debtors discharge their debt. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020). We clearly have jurisdiction over this set of bankruptcy orders.

But an umbrella bankruptcy case “involves an aggregation of individual controversies, many of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (cleaned up). Thus, Congress provides us with jurisdiction over a second category of appeals. These are appeals of orders which “finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.” Id. (citation omitted). We are asked here to decide whether a discrete dispute is final and appealable.

In this case, a group of creditors appeals an order that rejected one basis for excepting their debt from discharge; a second basis is set for trial. Creditors argue that the appealed order is a final order of a discrete dispute within the larger bankruptcy case, and thus appealable. But the Supreme Court has warned against “slicing the case too thin.” Id. at 502. “An erroneous identification of an interlocutory order as a final decision may yield an appeal over which the appellate forum lacks jurisdiction.” Ritzen, 589 U.S. at 39. Any preliminary issue in a bankruptcy can theoretically be considered a discrete dispute even though it may only decide a portion of the case. See id. at 44. Creditors appeal this type of preliminary step.

Appellants cannot subdivide the dischargeability determination proceeding into a preliminary issue resolving an individual exception from discharge. Because the district court remanded the proceeding to the bankruptcy court for a trial on another exception, it is not a final order as to the discrete proceeding—a dischargeability determination. We thus dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction."

The remainder of the opinion is in the same vein. Nice, meticulous, and always explanatory.

Maybe it's because bankruptcy is an area with which I'm less than intimately familiar, but I very much appreciated both the tone and content of the opinion. And I expect that other readers would feel the same.

People v. Hazlett (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 27, 2026)

I know I say this -- or something like this -- a lot. But it still seems to me like it's a total waste.

The murder here was in 1978. Nearly a half-century ago. Admittedly, it took a while (almost exclusively, DNA evidence) to figure out who committed it, so the conviction and death sentence was only entered in 2003.

It's now 2026. Today's California Supreme Court opinion is 167 pages long. That doesn't even count the dissents; if you add all that in, you're looking at over 200 pages.

We're only at the direct appeal stage. There's still state habeas. Then federal habeas. Then the fact that California doesn't actually impose the death penalty anyway.

The defendant, Larry Hazlett, is 78 years old. 

County of King v. Turner (9th Cir. - Aug. 25, 2026)

This is a really smart and well-written opinion by Judge McKeown.

It's a high-profile case, so I won't say much about the merits; you can read about it elsewhere. Basically it affirms a district court injunction that stops the federal government from cutting off federal funds to local governments that do things the Trump administration doesn't like, whether in the program that's being funded by federal dollars or not. That, Judge McKeown holds, exceeds statutory authorization. You can perhaps tell local governments not to use federal dollars to help transgender persons or undocumented aliens, but you can't pull federal funds just because the locality does things you don't like with their own money and not in the program you're funding. That's the careful balance established by Congress, one over which the current administration runs roughshod.

Judge Bumatay predictably dissents. The difference between the two opinion is pronounced.

It's a testament to the current political and judicial climate that even a cogent and moderate opinion like this one will likely face challenge in both an en banc call and, potentially, in the Supreme Court.

Unfortunate and telling.

U.S. v. Aguilera (9th Cir. - Aug. 24, 2026)

According to this opinion, when a 27-year veteran judge in the Northern District of California, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was told that the federal sentences guidelines allow a defendant to go to trial and yet still ask for a 2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his response was "I didn't realize that." (See page 15.)

Surprising.

Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchos Water (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 24, 2026)

I will take issue neither with the holding of this California Supreme Court opinion nor with its rationale. It's unanimous, after all. Far be it from me to register any dissent.

I will instead limit myself to merely a parenthetical note -- one that strongly came to mind after reading the first two paragraphs of Justice Kruger's opinion. Those paragraphs read:

"Under California’s Eminent Domain Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1230.010 et seq.), a public entity’s right to take private property for public use depends, broadly speaking, on whether the taking is necessary to serve the public interest. As a general rule, public necessity is a matter for the public entity to decide, subject to limited judicial review: Ordinarily, when a public entity has adopted the statutorily required “resolution of necessity,” the relevant public necessity requirements are “conclusively establishe[d]” unless a court finds that the public entity has grossly abused its discretion in adopting the resolution. (Id., §§ 1245.250, subd. (a), 1245.255, subd. (b).)

In 1992, however, the Legislature created special rules for the taking of privately owned public utility property. Under those rules, even after adopting a resolution of necessity, a public entity’s decision to take over a privately owned electric, gas, or water public utility does not conclusively establish the propriety of the taking, but merely creates a “rebuttable presumption” that the statutory requirements for taking the property are met. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.250, subd. (b), added by Stats. 1992, ch. 812, § 3, p. 3846; see id., § 1240.650, subd. (c), added by Stats. 1992, ch. 812, § 2, p. 3846.)"

Hmmm. I wonder why the Legislature elected to pass much more favorable rules for privately owned utilities, as opposed to every single other type of property ownership? I'm sure it had nothing at all to do with the lobbying efforts or campaign contributions made by these large privately owned utilities? No, it would be a huge distortion of the democratic system to give wealthy institutions more favorable treatment under the law than everyone else. So I'm confident things like that never happen.

1 Community Compact v. City of Fresno (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 21, 2026)

Can you figure out from the very first paragraph the twists and turns that likely -- and in fact -- occurred in this case?

Here's the opening paragraph:

"Emphasizing the “profound impact” of Mexican-American labor leader and civil rights activist Cesar Chavez “on the people of Fresno” and concluding the renaming of a downtown thoroughfare in his honor would “provide a source of pride and community recognition,” the Fresno City Council (City Council) adopted Resolution No. 2023-056, which facilitated the renaming of the “East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, and West California Avenue alignment” (collectively, the Alignment)1 to Cesar Chavez Boulevard."

So in 2023, Fresno changed the street name to Cesar Chavez Boulevard. Plaintiffs didn't like that, and filed suit to change it back.

You can guess what happened next, right?

The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and in 2025, plaintiffs appealed. But then, as you likely know, Cesar Chavez got cancelled. So in 2026, Fresno reverses course, and changes the street names back.

The City then, predictably, moves to dismiss the appeal as moot.

The Court of Appeal (1) agrees that the appeal is moot, but (2) decides to resolve it anyway, and affirms. The dissent, Justice Meehan, agrees that it's moot, and wouldn't decide the merits.

Maybe you wouldn't have necessarily predicted the disagreement between the majority and dissent. (I did not.) But that the appeal got mooted by subsequent events; yeah, once you saw that it was Cesar Chavez, you probably figured out what was eventually going to happen.

Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB (9th Cir. - Aug. 20, 2026)

I'm not a Ninth Circuit judge, so I don't know the answer to this question. But I wonder how it feels when you write an opinion -- in this case, one by Judge Hawkins, in 2020 -- with a particular holding, and then six years later (i.e., today), your colleagues take a case en banc and unanimously say that you were wrong.

Maybe your reaction is: "Well, I decided my case, and thought I was right, and if some future case goes the other way, no big deal." Or maybe you instead feel a bit miffed. Either at your colleagues, at yourself, at your law clerk, or at some combination of all three.

Nothing you can do about it either way, of course.

Just wondering.

P.S. - Can the Ninth Circuit website please stop posting the same opinion multiple times for cases that are consolidated? Yes, I know, they're different case numbers, but it's the exact same opinion. Just put it up there once. Ever since the new website went up a month or so ago, you've often got to scroll through the day's opinions to screen out the duplicates (which sometimes, like today, have different captions). It's a slight -- but extant -- pain the butt. 

People v. Lightsay (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 17, 2026)

The California Supreme Court issued two death penalty opinions today. 

In one of those cases, it unanimously affirmed the re-imposition of a death sentence after a prior reversal. The underlying facts of that murder, which occurred in 1998, are so graphically horrific that I will say no more about it.

In the other case, the Court reversed (yet again) a death sentence that it had previously conditionally reversed for a determination of whether the defendant was competent when he represented himself at trial. As a result of today's opinion -- which involved only competence issues, not didn't involve the underlying events, so there's nothing about the actual crime -- the defendant will get a full retrial (assuming that he's now competent to stand trial). Presumably with an actual lawyer.

Though the funny part is that according to the California Department of Corrections, the defendant is now . . . 73 years old. Putting a 73-year old on trial for murder; in a death penalty case, no less.

You don't see that every day.

U.S. v. Jackson (9th Cir. - Aug. 17, 2026)

Sometimes it's sufficient to state the facts; the ultimate result is obvious.

This is one of those cases.

"These cases present the question whether the Attorney General can make someone an Acting United States Attorney—bypassing the usual requirement that a U.S. Attorney be confirmed by the Senate—by designating that person as the first assistant to an already-vacant office of U.S. Attorney. We hold that the Attorney General cannot do so. Although the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA) provides that a first assistant automatically succeeds to a vacant office, that rule of automatic succession applies only to a first assistant who held that position at the time the vacancy arose; it does not apply to a first assistant who never served under a validly appointed official. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). Nor can the Attorney General create a de facto Acting U.S. Attorney by delegating all of the functions and duties of the U.S. Attorney to someone else. The FVRA is “the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties of any office,” so it prohibits a complete delegation of all of the U.S. Attorney’s powers to a single person. Id. § 3347.

Applying those principles, we affirm the district court’s order disqualifying Sigal Chattah, the putative Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada, from supervising the prosecutions of the defendants in these cases. . . .

On January 17, 2025, Jason Frierson resigned as the U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada. At that time, First Assistant U.S. Attorney Sue Fahami became the Acting U.S. Attorney by operation of the FVRA, which provides that upon the resignation of a Senate-confirmed officer, “the first assistant to the office of such officer shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting capacity.” 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1).

Two months later, the Attorney General invoked 28 U.S.C. § 546 to appoint Sigal Chattah as the interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada, effective April 1. That statute permits the Attorney General to appoint an interim U.S. Attorney when the position of U.S. Attorney is vacant, id. § 546(a), but limits the service of an interim U.S. Attorney to a term of 120 days, id. § 546(c)(2). Chattah’s 120-day term would have expired on July 30.

On July 28, Chattah resigned as the interim U.S. Attorney. In her resignation letter, she stated that she “look[ed] forward to continuing to lead the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nevada.” The same day, the Attorney General designated Chattah as the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada. In the designation order, the Attorney General asserted that “[a]s First Assistant United States Attorney, Ms. Chattah will have authority to serve as Acting United States Attorney upon a vacancy in that office” by operation of the FVRA. At the same time, the Attorney General also appointed Chattah “as a Special Attorney to the United States Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 515” and authorized her “to conduct in the District of Nevada, any kind of legal proceedings, civil or criminal, . . . which United States Attorneys are authorized to conduct.” . . . .

The maneuvers used to extend Chattah’s time atop the U.S. Attorney’s Office are not unique to the District of Nevada. The Attorney General has employed similar— though not always identical—tactics to extend the service of other temporary appointees who have not been confirmed by the Senate. The district court’s reasoning was consistent with that of the other courts to consider those tactics, every one of which has concluded that they violate the limits imposed by the FVRA. See United States v. Giraud, 160 F.4th 390, 400– 01 (3d Cir. 2025); United States v. Ramirez, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2025); United States v. James, 810 F. Supp. 3d 752, 762–63 (E.D. Va. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-4673 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025); United States v. Comey, 810 F. Supp. 3d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-4674 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas to Off. of N.Y. State Att’y Gen., 814 F. Supp. 3d 284, 292 (N.D.N.Y. 2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-156 (2d Cir. argued May 4, 2026); United States v. RamirezMartinez, No. 22-cr-01721, 2026 WL 113431, at *15 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2026)."

Yep. Obvious. 

People v. Shove (Cal. Supreme Court - Aug. 13, 2026)

I won't opine about the 5-2 dispute between the majority and the dissent about whether there was a Batson error here. You can read the entire 139-page thing on that point if you would like.

I will only say that this is one of those cases where even someone like me might want to sentence the defendant to death. Not the only one, for sure. But one.

Because Theodore Shove III does indeed seem like an affirmatively evil person.

Regardless, Shove is now 74 years old. He's going to die in prison. As a practical matter vis-a-vis his sentence, no big deal either way.

Turrey v. Vervent (9th Cir. - Aug. 12, 2026)

This is an opinion about accrual dates for RICO violations, but what's somewhat (very marginally) strange about it is that it seems like Judge Mendoza is deliberately writing the opinion to be extremely accessible to the general public.

Check it out for yourself. The language and analysis just seems . . . simple. To be clear: Not simplistic, but instead, pitched to a low-level audience. Explaining basic concepts using simple words and ideas.

That's not necessarily a bad thing, of course. It's just that your typical Ninth Circuit opinion involves complex issues and gets discussed in a complex fashion. This one just reads different to me.

That might not be unusual for a high-profile opinion that's potentially going to be read by lots of people in the general public. But it's not like normal people commonly pick up opinions about when injuries accrue for statute of limitations purposes in federal RICO statutes, right?

I put Judge Mendoza's text into a couple of online analysis websites and they all say the writing is at around a 12th grade level. That's not simple, of course. But it's a lot lower, I suspect, than a lot of Ninth Circuit opinions that are written for what I suspect is a more graduate-school audience.

Just unusual. Not bad. Different.

Something that jumped out at me that I thought I would point out.

Simerley v. Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Trans. Dist. (Cal. Ct. App. - August 11, 2026)

Maritime law. You know it. You love it. That's what today's Court of Appeal opinion is all about.

Loss of consortium claims aren't available under the Jones Act. So the wife of an injured seaman -- he worked on a ferryboat -- can't sue.

Sorry about that. But the law is the law. Demurrer sustained and affirmed.

Family Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 10, 2026)

I have no problem with today's opinion by the California Supreme Court, which holds that indigent litigants are entitled to have their hearings officially recorded on tape -- notwithstanding a statute that expressly precludes it -- if they can't afford a private court reporter. Indeed, that seems a very salutary holding, and I applaud it.

I'll nonetheless mention that the most critical part of the opinion, if my view, is the third footnote, so I want to make sure everyone reads it. The Court expressly holds that we're not just talking about in forma pauperis litigants; instead, this right applies to anyone who can't afford a court reporter. Here's what that footnote says:

"Although our discussion primarily refers to indigent litigants, we do not suggest some absolute standard of indigency. Instead, the right to proceed in forma pauperis extends to any litigant who cannot reasonably afford the costs necessary to access the judicial process. In this case, the litigants at issue include all litigants who cannot afford to hire a private court reporter to provide an official verbatim record of their proceeding. Because the costs involved in hiring a private court reporter can be significant, the population of litigants who cannot afford to hire a private court reporter, but who can afford to pay routine court fees and costs, may be large. Courts should be flexible in assessing a litigant’s ability to pay. We have previously rejected the contention that “a formal in forma pauperis application is required before relief can be granted.” (Conover, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 852.)"

As a result, I expect that a lot -- indeed, perhaps the majority of -- civil litigants will be entitled to ask for a tape recording under today's decision. With no formal IFP motion required.

I would expect to shortly see a massive increase in standardized recording in state courts.

U.S. v. Doyle (9th Cir. - Aug. 8, 2026)

This opinion is strangely sanitized.

Patrick Edward Doyle hooks up with a minor on a dating app -- she allegedly showed him a fake i.d. that showed that she was an adult -- and has explicit pictures of their hookup on his phone. He gets prosecuted and convicted on one count of possessing child pornography, and is sentenced to the statutory maximum of 10 years by Judge Battaglia (down here in San Diego) notwithstanding "his limited criminal history, his family support, and his numerous letters of support." The Ninth Circuit affirms.

It's a lengthy sentence. I would like to know more. Did the victim, or anyone else, deny showing Doyle a fake identification? How old was she? (I believe she's a teenager, since otherwise the statutory maximum would be 20 years, but not sure if she's 17, 13, or somewhere in between.) Was this Doyle first offense? (I know it's his first child porn conviction, since, again, the maximum would be higher otherwise, and know that he has "limited" criminal history, but are there other non-pornography convictions?) There's reference in the opinion to pictures of "[the victim] and other unidentified girls engaged in explicit sexual conduct" beyond the pictures of Doyle and the victim. Does that mean that there are pictures of Doyle having sex with other underage girls, or the victim having sex with other underage girls, or just other underage girls solo? (That matters, I think; if they are indeed pictures of Doyle and other girls, that shows an even larger scope of predation.) The opinion by Judge Brown, sitting by designation from the Southern District of Texas, leaves all of this unexplored.

One might perhaps think that Judge Brown leaves out these details in order to avoid mentioning sensitive subjects or potentially traumatizing the reader. Yet I am fairly confident that's not the reason, if only given one of the paragraphs that Judge Brown includes later in the opinion. Trigger warning: Stop reading this paragraph and skip to the next one if you don't want to read some really graphic stuff. Ready? Here's what I am talking about (from the opinion): "The videos and photographs of MV here are “abhorrent” and “reprehensible” to the extreme. Id. One eighteen-second video shows MV “performing fellatio on what we believe to be the defendant and [sic] his bed, in his house.” Another video shows an “unknown minor female” as she “anally penetrates herself with a razor, the handle end of a razor, where she then pulls the razor in and out. And there is apparent feces on the razor. At one point in time she licks the razor.”"

Oh my God.

The opinion hold that the district judge committed error by not reviewing these clips before showing them to a jury, but that the error was harmless, notwithstanding the fact that -- and this is incredibly unusual, I believe -- "'one of the jurors broke down crying' after seeing the child-pornography videos and a different juror requested counseling the day after the trial ended."

Intense material indeed.

So, on the one hand, I ended the opinion simultaneously wanting more information and yet wishing that I had perhaps been told less.