People v. J.S. (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 26, 2014)

I'll not comment on the substance of this opinion, other than to articulate my view that the Court of Appeal's opinion is absolutely right, and that it'd have been a travesty if the relevant procedural rule was the one advanced by the Attorney General.  For exactly the reasons Justice Hollenhorst identifies.

I'll instead share a paragraph from the middle of the opinion.  Which for some reason made me break out in a visible smile:

"The Attorney General makes much of several decisions infelicitously referring to petitions pursuant to section 2966, subdivision (b), as being 'rendered technically moot' by the expiration of the initial commitment period. (Merfield, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1075) The Merfield court, however, like the cases it cites, acknowledges even where the initial commitment term is over, the initial certification an offender qualifies as an MDO has continuing ramifications where the offender is subject to recertification. (Ibid.) In other words, 'technically moot' means, apparently, not moot at all, if by 'moot' we mean having no further practical impact."

Too funny.