Clearly, I was wrong.
This Ninth Circuit opinion is about the Fourth Amendment validity of a seizure in which the L.A. Department of Animal Services impounded a dozen or so pigeons that a homeless person kept in cages on the street and then euthanized them because they were in really bad shape. (For example: "One
pigeon had a baseball-sized tumor protruding from its
abdomen and extensive feather loss. Another pigeon had
tremors and continually walked in circles. Another pigeon
had a shriveled, non-functional right eye. Still another
pigeon had contorted legs, feather loss, and could not walk
or fly. Some birds had wobbling necks or necks in unusual
positions. Several birds were missing toes or toenails, or had
very long toenails that were curled in circles.")
The constitutional issues are interesting for sure. But there's a particular footnote that I thought to be especially fascinating. And that took me back to those halcyon days of Property.
The text of the opinion says: "Defendants have
agreed for the purposes of this appeal that Recchia had a property interest in his pigeons." At which point Judge Gould drops the following footnote:
"Specifically, defendants have agreed “[f]or the purposes of this
appeal, there is no dispute there can be some property interest in
pigeons.” Accordingly, here we treat Recchia as having a property
interests in the pigeons. However, in a case where the issue was properly
raised for decision, there would be a substantial issue whether a person
can have a property interest in wild animals such as pigeons, raccoons,
or coyotes, to name a few. See Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 173
(1st Cir. 2000); see also Cal. Fish & Game Code § 2000 (prohibiting the
taking of a wild bird except as provided for in the California Fish and
Game Code)."
Dude! It's like it's 1989 and I'm back in Mary Ann Glendon's Property class.
Good times.