First, I totally understand why the Court of Appeal releases the appellant, Mr. Cheatham. Does Mr. Cheatham have a mental disorder, one that led (for example) to the "not guilty by reason of insanity" finding in his prior criminal trial? Definitely. He hears voices. He does some strange things. It's fairly clear that his mental condition results in him violating the law on occasion, sometimes in bizarre ways; e.g., in court, trying to "escape" in situations in which a more rational person would totally know that the effort ain't gonna work. But as far as anyone can tell -- and this includes all the evidence presented at his civil commitment trial -- he's not actually a danger to anyone (other than, perhaps, himself). And the statute at issue only lets you be locked up beyond what would otherwise be your term of imprisonment if you "represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others." Nothing that Mr. Cheatham has ever done, it appears, has ever actually harmed anyone else, or resulted in such a risk. Hence the Court of Appeal's ruling that says he's entitled to be released.
At the same time, my strong sense is this: Mr. Cheatham will almost certainly get recommitted. Pretty much to a certainty. He's a bipolar schizophrenic, and has a substance abuse disorder. He's imperfect at best in taking his medications. He still hears voices in his head, albeit at a lower level. And even in the hospital, he "at times stood up during group meetings for no apparent reason, asked other
committees for money, and, for a brief period, smoked cigarettes through his nose." Things are, I strongly suspect, only going to get worse on that front once he's released and no longer under supervision. He'll get put back in. And I can only hope -- and it's a hope, not a certainty -- that it's not for hurting someone.
But, yep, I get it; the statute requires a particular type of evidence, and there wasn't pretty much any type of relevant evidence admitted at his trial.
Which may perhaps dictate the result, but doesn't alleviate my concern.
Second, the Court of Appeal also holds that Mr. Cheatham is entitled to double jeopardy protections -- not as a matter of constitutional law, but rather as a result of the part of the statute that says that in the relevant proceedings, "the person shall be entitled to
the rights guaranteed under the federal and State Constitutions for criminal
proceedings." One of those is the prohibition on double jeopardy. Hence, just like in criminal prosecutions, if the evidence that was submitted against the guy is insufficient, there's not a retrial; there's an acquittal. The guy can't be tried again for the same offense.
You see why the Court of Appeal comes out that way.
That said, I wonder how those principles really apply to prosecutions that, as here, involve "status" charges. The claim is that Mr. Cheatham is a danger to others. Yes, the Court of Appeal holds that the evidence against him at his prior trial was insufficient, so he's entitled to be released. But today's another day. What -- either practically or legally -- stops the prosecution from filing a new complaint that says that as of today he's a danger to others? For basically the exact same reasons as before; only, this time, with a doctor who gives more detail and says the necessary things.
With a criminal case, you're being charged with a particular offense, and you can't be charged with that offense again. With civil commitment, by contrast, you're being charged basically for being who you are, and the threat that you (allegedly) represent. I get that, presumably, the prosecution would need to introduce some fact that wasn't introduced at the prior (insufficient) trial. But that's not likely all that difficult given that pretty much everything one does counts as "evidence" of what type of person you are, and what your mental condition is, at the time.
Seems to me like you can just charge the guy again with basically the exact same thing the next day.
Now, maybe the answer is "Well, okay, but it's gotta be a new proceeding, not merely an extension of his prior commitment." Fair enough.
Though that seems just like it's a different spelling of the same word, no?
