A statute requires CalTrans to sell “commercial real property acquired for the construction of a state highway, but no longer required for that purpose."
You'll notice that the statute only applies to "commercial" real property. So if the property was residential when CalTrans acquired it, and is currently residential -- e.g., CalTrans is currently leasing it to someone who uses it as residential property -- clearly the statute doesn't require CalTrans to sell it.
Conversely, if the property was commercial when CalTrans acquired it, and is currently utilized for commercial purposes (e.g., by the lessee), then, yes, CalTrans has to sell it.
But what this opinion resolves is: What if the property was non-commercial (e.g., vacant) when CalTrans acquired it, but is currently commercial (i.e., used by the lessee commercially). Does the statute apply?
The question is accordingly one of tense. "Acquired" is past tense. What does that past tense word modify? Does it mean that the property had to be commercial in the past -- when acquired? Or does the statute simply mean that the property needs to be commercial now for a sale to be acquired?
The trial court thought it meant one thing. The Court of Appeal concludes the opposite, and reverses.
What do you think?
It's at least facially a simple grammar question. So, arguably, there's a "clearly right" answer.
And that's indeed what the Court of Appeal concludes. Its opinion is replete with statements to the effect that there's only one possible interpretation of that statute that might even conceivably be true. It says the language "clearly indicates the Legislature’s intent." That the "plain reading" of the statute permits only one conclusion -- a phrase the opinion often repeats. And that the statute's unambiguous, and hence the court need not resort to legislative history.
I'm not going to quibble with ultimate result reached by the Court of Appeal. That result is plausible, for sure.
(Notice how I'm deliberately keeping you in suspense as to which way the Court of Appeal comes out?)
My only quibble is that I definitely do not think the answer is "clear" -- or that the text has a "plain" meaning that admit of only one result. Nah. Either result is plausible to me. One might perhaps be preferable -- and the one that I think is correct. But there's no way that I believe that there's one and only one way to interpret the sheer text that the Legislature passed. Sorry. Language is often complex, and its meaning somewhat indeterminate. As here.
When the text is indeed crystal clear, sure, go ahead and follow it; that's definitely our job. But there are lots of circumstances in which the text is not, in fact, crystal clear.
When that's true -- as here -- I don't think it's helpful to stretch and pretend that there's a single "plain meaning" that obviates the need to resort to all the helpful textual and analytical tools in our arsenal. I know we're in a "focus on the text" jurisprudential regime lately. But that can go way too far, and claim as "clear" certain statutory language that's, in fact, far from it.
And I think this is a good example of that.
As proof: Are you really sure that the way you come out on this one is the same as the Court of Appeal, when all you have is the ostensibly "clear" text?
Go ahead and read the opinion to find out if you're right.
