Justices on the United States Supreme Court are -- as you know -- increasingly fractious. Dissents are often vitriolic, majority opinions often respond in dismissive (or derisive) terms, etc. It's a very polarized institution, and the opinions amply reflect that fact.
By contrast, California Supreme Court opinions are often unanimous. And even when they aren't, they're often like this one today.
The question presented was when exactly the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 required county welfare department to ask extended family members about whether the child might be a potential Indian child. Some California appellate courts had held that inquiry duty existed whenever the child was placed in temporary custody, whereas others had held that this duty arose only when the child was removed from custody without a warrant. So the California Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict.
After the Court granted review, however, the California Legislature passed a statue that provided that this duty existed whenever the child was placed in custody, regardless of whether there was a warrant. So that resolved the issue, at least going forward.
So the question then became limited to cases arising before the passage of the statute. Which side of the appellate split was right for those, since they were governed by the then-existing statute.
The majority concluded that the same rule governed both cases: that the old statute imposed the same duty (albeit in somewhat less clear terms) than the new statute. And in so holding, Justice Jenkins' majority opinion cited a prior California Supreme Court case that noted that sometimes, a subsequent statutory amendment might give insight into the Legislature's intent regarding the prior statute. Justice Jenkins explained that the majority didn't have to rely on that principle here, since they thought the prior statute was clear enough on its own terms, but note that, hey, for whatever it works, that concept points the same way here.
Justice Liu, joined by Justice Kruger, concurred, and agreed with everything the majority said, including its result, but didn't think that it made sense to rely on the Legislature's subsequent statutory enactment to figure out the meaning of the prior statute. Justice Liu noted -- correctly -- that the majority opinion didn't actually rely on that principle here, so the two sides basically completely agreed on everything, but the concurring justices just wanted to make clear that, as a general principle, they didn't agree with the basic preexisting principle that future statutes may give insight into the meaning of older ones.
That's a difference, of course. But such a minor one in the scheme of things, and articulated on both sides with restraint and respect.
Something you rarely see these days in the federal Supreme Court.
