Monday, September 28, 2015

People v. Leeds (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 28, 2015)

Here's the first paragraph of this opinion:

"A defendant accused of murder pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. He claims that his delusional state caused him to believe that he was acting in self-defense. Here we hold that an instruction on self-defense in the sanity phase must inform the jury that a defendant's delusion caused him to believe that he was in danger of great bodily injury or death that required the use of deadly force and that he would be legally justified in doing so."

That last sentence seems like it's missing something, doesn't it?  Like a verb or a dependent clause or something like that.

I'm pretty sure that Justice Perren means to say that an instruction at the sanity phase "must inform the jury that a defendant[ is legally insane if] a defendant's delusion caused him to believe that he was in danger of great bodily injury or death that required the use of deadly force and that he would be legally justified in doing so."  Or at least that something like the omitted clause was initially in the opinion before the last sentenced was edited.  Because you don't instruct the jury that a defendant's delusion caused him to believe X or Y.  You instruct the jury that it's a defense (or whatever) if the defendant's delusion caused him to believe X or Y.  And that "defense" part is what seems to be omitted here.

Later in the opinion, Justice Perren makes clear what he's trying to say.  Stating, correctly, that "A person suffering from a delusion that causes him to fear that another is attempting to take his life is legally insane if the facts perceived as the product of his delusion would legally justify his acting in self defense. (People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732, quoting M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 211 [8 Eng.Rep. 718] [killer who "'labours under . . . partial delusion . . . must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real'"].) Here we are concerned with whether Leeds understood whether his conduct was legally wrong: As a consequence of his delusion, did Leeds believe that he was in imminent peril of great bodily injury or death? "'For example, if under the influence of his delusion [the defendant] supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.'""

Justice Perren just needs to say that same thing more cleanly in the first paragraph.  Then we'll all be good.