If I'm honest, I probably don't feel as strongly about the refusal to stay this death penalty case (to allow the addition of a Racial Justice Act claim, rather than having it raised in a separate habeas proceeding) than Justices Evans and Liu. Yes, the habeas route almost guarantees massive delay. But it's a death penalty case; it's not like the guy's itching to have the sentence carried out, and it's California, no it's practically not going to happen anyway. The only way it would potentially matter is to the guilt phase. And the guy here is pretty much definitely guilty, and of a heinous crime: he bludgeoned a random woman who was on a lunchtime walk to death with an iron bar and then viciously raped her, his DNA was all over her, there were numerous eyewitnesses to him in the area, all of this plus his incriminating statements to multiple roommate. He's definitely getting convicted on any possible retrial anyway, so I'm not sure that delay as a practical matter means much.
Personally, I'm more interested in the very last thing Justice Evans touches on her dissent: the fact that the trial court denied the defendant's repeated (and unequivocal) requests to represent himself at the outset of his penalty phase. The Court holds that's too late, and that the defendant wasn't really objecting to the ends of the representation (not getting sentenced to death) as opposed to the means of getting there (tactics).
But the reason he wanted to defend himself is because he didn't want his lawyer to say at the penalty phase that his uncle molested him -- an allegation that the defendant insisted was factually untrue. To me, it's a pretty hugely deal to formally accuse someone at trial of molesting you as a child, particularly when (if the defendant is to be believed) that the allegation is false.
Especially when, as here, you're pretty sure you're going to be sentenced to death anyway, since the crime is so heinous -- and that, since it's California, the sentence probably won't be carried out in any event -- if I was a capital defendant, I could definitely see caring more deeply that my relative not be falsely accused of child molestation at my trial than whatever marginal (and/or entirely theoretical) benefit such a claim might (but in fact didn't) have at my upcoming penalty phase. And if my lawyer disagreed with that call, well, that's fine, but then I'd just as soon represent myself, thank you very much.
There's got to at least be some leeway there, right?
P.S. - While Justice Evans concludes her opinion by calling this a "Hobson's choice," I'm not actually sure that's the right terminology, at least in this particular case. A Hobson's choice isn't really a choice at all; it's a take-it-or-leave-it situation, with merely an illusory choice. I get that in some cases, telling a defendant that they can only represent themselves if they do it at the outset of the trial (rather than asking for such relief at the penalty phase) is a total nonstarter, because there's no way a non-lawyer can possibly defend a capital case on the merits. But, honestly, here, I think Mr. Frazier was getting convicted regardless; the evidence against him was simply too strong, and at least as far as I can see, there pretty much was no plausible defense available anyway. So, here, I actually would have found it quite plausible for the guy to represent himself at the outset. I'm confident the result wouldn't have been any different than it was.
