I get it. You've got to say that a statute is "ambiguous" before you can do what makes sense. Because everyone's persuaded by the contemporary mantra that if the text of a law is clear, you've got to follow it. So Justice Weingart says that the meaning of this statute is unclear, and hence does what he thinks makes the most sense in this context.
But, with all due respect, the words of the statute seem pretty darn clear to me. Even though I'm on board with what Justice Weingart ends up doing.
There's a really rich guy -- someone who makes $2 to $3 million a year -- who's got a very disabled 34-year old son (with autism) who's incapable of supporting himself. The son gets around $12,000 every year in disability benefits, but that's hardly enough to live on -- and, in any event, he's not capable of living on his own. So he lives with his mother.
Mom and Dad are divorced. Normally, once a child reaches a certain age, he's on his own. But Section 3910 of the Family Code (understandably) makes the parents of an adult child “who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means” financially responsible for maintaining that child “to the extent of their abilit[ies].”
So, normally, Dad would fairly clearly be required to support the son (at least in part), because he clearly has the "ability" to do so given his wealth.
But there's this other statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350. A statute that contains an express exception to Section 3910 of the Family Code. Recall that the son gets certain disability benefits from the state. Here's what Section 12350 says:
“No relative shall be held legally liable to support or to contribute to the support of any applicant for or recipient of [such] aid.”
It repeats this same exception later in that same statute:
“Notwithstanding [s]ection[ ] 3910 . . . of the Family Code, . . . no demand shall be made upon any relative to support or contribute toward the support of any applicant for or recipient of [such] aid.”
There's zero doubt that the son is the recipient of such aid. Similarly, there's zero doubt that Dad is a "relative" and that there's a demand here that Dad contribute to the support of the son.
So, under the clear and express words of the statute, Section 12350 is a defense.
The Court of Appeal nonetheless holds that it's not. The purpose of the statute, it says, is to make sure that the government doesn't provide aid to someone disabled and then go after the relative to reimburse it for the resulting aid.
And I completely agree. That's the point of the thing.
But that's not what it says. It says that NO ONE can demand that the relative "contribute to the support" of such a person. Including but not limited a demand under Section 3910 of the Family Code, which is undeniably the basis of the request here.
So under the clear and -- in my mind -- 100% nonambiguous command of the statute, Dad can't be ordered to contribute to the support of the child if he doesn't want to do so.
(Now, of course, I think he should morally be willing to do so, but that's a different issue. Dad likely is willing to contribute something, and has made various settlement offers in the litigation. The question is whether Dad can be compelled by the state to contribute amounts that he's unwilling to pay.)
The text of the statute is not ambiguous. The text clearly commands a single result: Dad wins. So if it's required that we find the statute textually ambiguous to hold otherwise, well, sorry, that's just not the case. Even if we might want it to be.
To reiterate, I'm persuaded by Justice Weingart that the purpose of the statute was to stop only the government from demanding reimbursement. But that's not what it says. The Court of Appeal's efforts to find textual language that makes the otherwise-clear statutory provisions "uncertain" are, in my mind, totally unpersuasive. The actual WORDS of the statute are clear.
Now, to me, that's not the end of the thing. I'm fine, in particular cases, to conclude that the Legislature used loose language -- by "loose," I mean inaccurate, not unclear -- and interpret those provisions in line with what I think the Legislature intended.
But that's Old School. It's not what we almost uniformly purport to do in the modern era. Thank you, Justice Scalia et al.
Even though I think we might still, in fact, do so. Including here. Because saying that there's an ambiguity allows us to do the right thing. The thing that both was intended and that's better for the universe. But since we're required to say that the statute is ambiguous before we do that; well, okay, so we'll say the statute is ambiguous.
Even when it's not.
