Two points. Very quickly. Only the first is about the opinion itself. And neither, quite frankly, is critical (or perhaps even important).
The core question is whether the evidence suggested that Mr. Lara was sufficiently disabled such that the regional center for the developmentally disabled was required to evaluate him. The Court of Appeal holds that he was.
In the middle of the opinion, Justice Snauffer says:
"Dr. Longwith also administered the Competence Assessment for Standing Trial (CAST-MR), which is designed to assess competency to stand trial in individuals with intellectual disability. This assessment consisted of 50 questions in three sections. The first section tests the defendant’s understanding of basic legal terms, the second tests their ability to assist in their own defense, and the third section involves open-ended questions about the defendant’s specific case. “The Mean cut-off Raw Scores for persons who are intellectually disabled and competent to stand trial are:” 18.3 for the first section, 10.7 for the second, and 8.0 for the third. “The mean total score for MR-Competency is 37.0.” Lara’s raw scores on the three sections, respectively, were 17, 10, and 7, for a total raw score of 34. . . . Dr. Longwith’s report . . . showed scores below the competence cutoff on all three parts of the CAST-MR." (emphasis added)
I'm genuinely confused. Are those really the mean cutoff scores for persons who are "intellectual disabled and competent to stand trial?" So if you get a 18.3, that means you're probably competent? Because that's not what the rest of the opinion seems to suggest. Are we sure that's not the mean scores for people who are incompetent?
Plus, isn't it inapt, in either event, to talk about "mean" scores? That's not really the test, is it? Say, for example, you've got five defendants, all of whom are competent. One's a genius (150 IQ), one's smart (120), two are normal (100), and one's a bit slow (80). The mean IQ of the "competent" group is 110. But that doesn't equate to a "cutoff" for competence at 110; i.e., that people below 110 are incompetent. It's a mean, not a cutoff.
It works the other way too. Say you've got five people who are disabled and incompetent. One's very slow (70 IQ), one's severely disabled (40 IQ), and three are so disabled that they're virtually comatose (5 IQ). The "mean" of those who are disabled is 25. But that doesn't mean -- at all -- that the "cutoff" for being incompetent is 25.
I would think that the only appropriate use of means -- if one exists -- would be as a one-way rachet. So, for example, in our hypothetical, if you were OVER 110 (the "competence" mean), you were probably competent. Similarly, if you were UNDER 25 -- the incompetence mean -- you were likely incompetent. That leaves the largest group, those with IQs between 25 to 110, as indeterminate; the means don't help there.
So the only way I see the "mean" in today's opinion making sense is if the mean cutoff score of 18.3 was for the people who are not competent to stand trial (rather than "competent"). Then, if you're lower than 18.3 (like Lara), we presume you're incompetent. Even though a score above that same mean does not mean that you're presumptively competent.
Anyway, I just wonder if there should actually be at least two more characters ("in") as part of that particular sentence.
Second, and very parenthetically, I noticed that the appointed defense counsel for Mr. Lara, in this first-degree-murder-sentenced-to-25-years-to-life dispute, was a lawyer who's admitted to the California bar but who currently writes appellate briefs from her home in Bath, New York. I'd never heard of that place, so looked it up. Rural. Very green. Village has a population of a little over 5,000. And where you can get a very nice looking 3800+ square foot home for under $400,000.
Nicely done. California salary with east coast living (and costs).
