I'm always a little bit worried when a court decides to reject the positions of both parties in a case. There's a danger in such settings that the tribunal is doing something without adequate briefing or consideration.
But here, the California Supreme Court's disposition seems not only entirely reasonable, but equitable as well. (I also love that Justice Corrigan's introductory paragraphs almost entirely spell out both the issue as well as the ultimate resolution.)
The first three paragraphs of the opinion tell you all you need to know:
"We are once again called upon to consider “the intersection of [the] statutory scheme of plea bargaining and the retroactivity rule of [In re] Estrada [(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.]” [Cite] Defendant Sunee Lynn Mitchell accepted a plea bargain, entered the standard waivers, and agreed to an upper term sentence on one felony count of a multicount information. While her case was pending on appeal the Legislature amended Penal Code1 section 1170, which governs California’s determinate sentencing law. The amendment now requires that the facts used to justify an upper term be stipulated to or proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial. [Cite] The parties agree this statutory amendment applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments under Estrada. Mitchell’s further assertion that the plea bargain, as constituted, did not satisfy the current statutory requirements is likewise not contested by the Attorney General.
The parties’ point of disagreement centers on the effect, if any, of section 1170(b)’s provisions on the negotiated disposition. Mitchell argues she should continue to have the benefits of her plea bargain, including the dismissal of counts and insulation from exposure to a substantially higher sentence. However, she urges the upper term sentence she agreed to should be reduced to the middle term. The Attorney General argues the agreement should be enforced in its entirety because the trial court did not impose a sentence under the provisions of section 1170(b), but rather upon the terms of the bargain.
We reject both positions. We hold that defendants like Mitchell, who agreed to an upper term sentence as part of a plea bargain, may seek the retroactive benefit of section 1170(b)’s amended provisions to their nonfinal judgments. We reverse the Court of Appeal’s contrary holding and direct that the matter be returned to the trial court in a manner similar to the approach adopted in People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps). On remand, Mitchell may either waive or invoke section 1170(b)’s requirements. If she reaffirms her acceptance of the plea bargain and waives the rights now conferred under section 1170(b), the court shall reinstate the original sentence as negotiated by the parties. If she declines to enter that waiver, in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify the existing plea bargain and accept a midterm base sentence on count 4, then seek the court’s approval of that downward departure. Absent a modified agreement and approval, Mitchell’s remedy is to withdraw her assent to the bargain, in which case Mitchell’s plea will be set aside and the parties returned to a pre-plea posture. At that point they would remain free to renegotiate further if they choose or to proceed to trial."
I totally agree.
A deal's a deal. But if circumstances then materially change, the deal gets reconsidered. If both sides still want to go through with it, great. But if either side wants to back out, that's fine too.
Hurrah.
