It seems to me that Justice Daum reaches the right result here. There's a California statute that says that cities have a ministerial duty to approve applications within (generally) 60 days of filing, and a separate statute that says (generally) that if a city fails to comply with a ministerial duty, an aggrieved person can sue the city for damages. The plaintiff here alleges that he filed an ADU application, the City took three years or so to approve it, and that the plaintiff suffered damage. The trial court sustained a demurrer, but the Court of Appeal disagrees, holding that the statutes mean what they say; in particular, that those who own homes and intend to build auxiliary dwelling units on their property are indeed one of the intended beneficiaries of the statute.
I agree. Makes sense.
What struck me about the opinion, however, is how scared Justice Daum appears to be about relying -- even in part -- on legislative history to support that straightforward conclusion. His opinion repeatedly and expressly says that he's not relying on that history, and that he's instead only setting forth these materials as essentially background -- that the statute is in fact unambiguous, so that legislative history is irrelevant, but he's letting you know what it says just in case (essentially) anyone's interested.
I don't think one needs to be so desperately reticent in using legislative history to support one's result. I get it; there's an increasing dominant strain of statutory jurisprudence these days that poo-poos such evidence and instead seeks the "straightforward" application of purportedly "unambiguous" statutory text. But it's not like Justice Scalia's zombie body is going to rise from the grave and strike you down if you write an opinion that relies in part on -- as here -- pretty darn clear legislative history as an additional basis for one's opinion. With all due respect to that particular former Supreme Court justice, sometimes, legislative history is in fact pretty darn informative. Including but not limited to here.
When that's the case, I don't think one should be reticent to rely on legislative history. Sometimes it helps. When it does, use it. And don't be ashamed in doing so, for feel the need to expressly say that this history is technically irrelevant because the statute is unambiguous. Just say that it all points to the same overriding conclusion, and that, particularly when taken together, the statutory text, legislative history, and legislative purpose all make clear the right result.
Then move on. Unabashedly so.
