I understand why the defendants here did what they did, as well as why they felt they had to appeal the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. But if there was ever a case in which I thought that the plaintiff was indeed obviously entitled to issuance of an injunction against false advertising, this one's it.
Plaintiff and defendant both make garbage disposals, and prominently (and understandably) market them with horsepower designations: 1/2 horsepower, 3/4 horsepower, 1 horsepower, etc. Plaintiff pioneered the market and defendant is a low-cost competitor who entered the U.S. market in 2005. Defendant's strategy is to market and label the horsepower of its products not on the output power of the actual disposal's grinding motor, but rather on how much "input horsepower" the device has as a whole; i.e., how much electric power is used by the system as a whole.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the defendant's labelling was false. That seems spot on -- indeed, obviously -- right. How much horsepower a motor has is a description of how much output power the motor has, not how much total electric power it takes in. I want (and expect) my one horsepower motor to put out one horsepower of grinding, turning, or whatever. A motor isn't a one horsepower motor just because it sucks in 1 horsepower of current but inefficiently utilizes that power and cranks out only a quarter (or whatever) horsepower in output.
So I'm super pleased that the district court granted the injunction and that the Ninth Circuit affirms.
Many false advertising claims are tough ones. This one isn't.
(Or, as Lionel Hutz put it, "I've never seen a more blatant case of false advertising since my lawsuit against The Neverending Story."
