Timothy S. v. Sarah H. (Cal. Ct. App. - Nov. 3, 2026)

This opinion is about attorney's fees, and I have no problem with how the Court of Appeal resolves it. But I nonetheless wanted to mention it because of what the trial court did below.

It's a case from Riverside. Sarah's an unmarried teenage mom who has two infant children, and Tom (I made that name up) is the father. When one of the kids was 17 months old, Sarah lost custody, and the baby was raised by Tom's father -- the child's grandfather -- Timothy (alongside his wife, the child's grandmother).

For roughly two years, the grandparents raised the kid. Eventually, Sarah cleaned up her act and regained custody of the child.

Things then seemed to be going fine for a couple of years. But in 2024, Sarah cut off the grandparents from seeking the child -- someone they'd raised for almost as long as the mother. For whatever reason, Sarah didn't want her baby-daddy's parents in her child's life.

At which point the grandparents asked the court for visitation. They wanted one weekend a month, plus two dinnertime visits each month, alongside a weekly video call.

To me, that's not an unreasonable request at all. Maybe I would shorten the requested "weekend" visit to a Saturday or Sunday. But two dinners every month? Seems 100% fine. Particularly for grandparents who voluntarily stepped in to raise a child when the mother lost custody. And the additional weekly video call seems totally reasonable.

What visitation does the trial court permits the grandparents to have, you ask?

"A five-minute phone call with the children once a month."

What?!

This seems incredibly parsimonious to me. Unless the grandparents are monsters, and the mother a paragon in child-rearing, that is quite a bit different than the order that I would have been inclined to enter were I the trial judge.

Not technically relevant to the appeal at issue. But still. It struck me as incredibly harsh.

Srinivasan v. Milestone Financial LLC (9th Cir. - Nov. 4, 2026)

I'm glad that Judge de Alba comes out this way. While I'm sympathetic to people who find themselves in dire financial straits and need to file for bankruptcy, I'm ruthlessly unsympathetic to people who abuse the process. So while I agree with today's opinion that the text of the statute (and precedent) do indeed allow debtors the absolute right to dismiss their bankruptcy petition (as long as they do so timely), it thrills me that the Ninth Circuit simultaneously affirms the district court's decision to bar the appellants here from refiling another bankruptcy petition during the next year.

You can read the full opinion for more details about the particular procedural moves the debtors here employed, but this snippet from page 21 will at least give you a sense:

"Here, the bankruptcy court considered Appellants’ multiple bankruptcy filings, repeated failure to fully prosecute those petitions, and their conduct in the instant case, such as failing to submit necessary documents and failing to appear at hearings. One of the Appellants, though the record is unclear which one, has previously had a 180- day bar against them. Despite their significant history in bankruptcy court, both Appellants failed to appear at the hearing on the motion to bar them from filing. The Court infers that a lack of schedule filings and other documentation in their past bankruptcy cases is due to repeated bad faith filings. Moreover, the Appellants have been living rent/mortgage free in their home for multiple years during the pendency of these proceedings, and they only filed bankruptcy cases—the twelfth and thirteenth cases filed by the Srinivasan family—when the Appellee attempted to evict them from the home by foreclosure or other action. Based on this record, the bankruptcy court reasonably calibrated the refiling bar to Appellants’ specific history in bankruptcy court."

Oh yeah. Indeed, had I been the judge, they'd have been barred from refiling for much longer than a year.

SEIU v. DOJ (9th Cir. - Nov. 3, 2026)

Luck of the draw.

The Department of Justice threatens to arrest state officials if they count ballots from people the DOJ lists as potentially ineligible to vote. The district court concludes that the purported list is terrible and that the federal government has no authority here and enters a TRO enjoining the threats. The DOJ asks the Ninth Circuit for an immediate stay.

The panel draw is Chief Judge Murguia (an Obama appointee), Judge Callahan (a Bush appointee), and senior Judge Bea (a 92-year old Bush appointee). The two Republican appointees agree to stay the district court's order, and the Democratic appointee dissents.

The Ninth Circuit then pretty much immediately vote to take the case en banc and vacate the panel's opinion. No draw; every active judge gets a vote on that one.

But then there's another draw for the 11-member en banc panel. Chief Judge Murguia is automatically on it, and although Judge Bea is senior, so ordinarily wouldn't be eligible, since he was on the panel, his name goes into the hopper as well.

The ultimate draw: 6-5 in favor of Republican appointees. Including senior Judge Bea.

So, today, the en banc panel votes to reinstate the prior panel's opinion (and stay).

To reiterate: Luck of the draw. (Or, depending on your perspective, lack thereof.)

Johnson v. Adgar (9th Cir. - Nov. 2, 2026)

The jury found that during the George Floyd protests in San Jose, Officer Adgar fired his weapon into a crowd of largely peaceful protesters, thereby injuring an innocent bystander, rather than firing at someone in particular who allegedly threw a bottle.

The majority opinion (by Judge Tallman, joined by Judge Bennett) concludes that this constitutes unlawful excessive force, but holds that this right was not clearly established. Judge Paez dissents in part, arguing that this right was indeed clearly established. (The majority also certifies a pendent state law claim to the California Supreme Court for clarification of the relevant state law standard.)

Neither the majority nor dissent mention it, but since the dispute is about whether a particular right is clearly established, I thought it might be worth noting that this is far from the only time a state officer has indiscriminately fired his weapon into a largely peaceful protest and thereby injured innocent bystanders. One of these events was well-known even before the founding our our Republic, and one might even argue instrumental in its founding. I'm pretty sure it was well-established even then that this was no good, and in derogation of our natural liberties. Another indiscriminate firing into a group of largely peaceful protesters transpired somewhat more recently, and the reaction thereto was similarly fairly uniform.

I understand that the relevant issue is the level of generality; how "specific" does a holding have to be before state officers are expected to realize that certain conduct is excessive. But, with respect, as to this particular issue -- firing your weapon indiscriminately into a group of largely peaceful protesters -- my own view is that everyone knows full well that this isn't allowed.

From the 1770 to the present day.

Hanna Carroll Restaurant v. Hagestad (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 29, 2026)

Lest there be any doubt that some people in Orange County have lives far different from mine, this opinion puts that uncertainty to rest.

Here are its facts, with my contemporary reaction in brackets:

"The Hanna Group operates a high-end restaurant in Orange County. Hagestad and his wife (collectively, the Hagestads) were apparently so impressed with their dining experience there in March 2022, that they contacted the Hanna Group’s chief operating officer, Dave Hanna, after their meal. [I do not generally eat at high-end restaurants, and definitely have never contacted a restaurant's COO after my meal.]

They told Dave Hanna that their son would be competing at the Masters the next month in Augusta, Georgia. [My children are quite far from being sufficiently good at golf to qualify for, say, the Masters.] They asked the Hanna Group to provide meals for their family and friends for the entire week of the Masters. [I generally do not provide meals for my entire friend group for an entire week; perhaps I am a poor host?]

The Hagestads and Dave Hanna corresponded as the Masters approached. The Hagestads expected between 20 to 30 people for each meal. [I do not even have that many friends, much less that would I decide to feed that many people for a week.] Dave Hanna sent them a proposed menu that included breakfast and dinner for seven days, which the Hagestads approved. The parties did not sign a written contract. Nor did they ever discuss the price of the requested food and services. [I'm a lawyer; I most assuredly would not make a similar mistake.]

At the Masters, the Hanna Group provided the Hagestads with breakfast, dinner, and a full bar for five days, serving an average of 25 guests per meal. The Hagestads praised the Hanna Group’s food and service. They sent Dave Hanna a text message after the Masters saying, “We just want to thank you for everything this week. The staff, the food, everything was perfect.” Then the bill came. The Hanna Group sent Hagestad an invoice for $74,960, which included a $5,000 discount. Hagestad balked at the amount." [Okay, on this one, I'll admit, I would have balked too. Seventy five grand for a week? Wow.]

The case goes to trial. (The parties really couldn't find a middle ground in this one?!) The jury awards the restaurant a little over $60,000. The resulting appeal is about some RFAs and some taxed reporter costs, and the Court of Appeal ends up affirming.

I clearly am not in the same league as these people. By my calculations, even at $60,000, and even at the maximum 25 people for 7 days for breakfast and dinner, that's $171/meal. For dinner; okay, maybe, I guess. But for breakfast?! That's a lot, no?

Admittedly, there was also an open bar. I suspect that added a fair piece to the total.

Still. I love my friends. But not at sixty grand a week.

One last thing. I noticed that Justice Moore's opinion drops a footnote that reads: "While the proposed menu included meals for seven days, the record indicates that the Hagestads unexpectedly left the Masters two days early." (Which, by the way, means that the average meal actually cost around $240 per person.) The word "unexpectedly" struck me as unusual, but it wasn't hard to figure out what this really referred to. The Hagestads presumably left because -- though the opinion doesn't mention it -- their son shot a 160 during the first two days, thereby missing the cut by a solid 12 strokes. On that front, I'm fully with the Hagestads; I ain't sticking around the Masters after my kid's out of the thing either.

Regardless: Different worlds.

Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta (9th Cir. - Oct. 29, 2026)

An employer has a First Amendment right to force its employees to attend a mandatory three hour meeting at which it extols the virtues of President Trump -- or Gavin Newsom, take your pick -- and vociferously exhorts his virtues and strongly suggests that its employees vote for that person at the next election. The employees aren't a "captive audience" because they're free to quit their private sector jobs.

So holds the Ninth Circuit, in a panel consisting of Judges Paez, Tallman and Bennett.

Add this to the list of areas -- like unlimited campaign contributions -- in which private economic power can substantially affect (or, if you prefer, distort) the marketplace of ideas.

People v. Hall (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Oct. 26, 2026)

There are two things about this California Supreme Court opinion that are seriously confusing to me.

First, I cannot figure out why the Court decided to take the case. It's a unanimous opinion, so it's not an exceptionally difficult case, but that's not particularly unusual. It also reaches the correct result; but, again, that's not surprising either. The statute itself basically answers the sole question; as the Court itself begins its opinion:

"Penal Code section 417.3 makes it a felony to brandish a firearm in a threatening manner in the presence of a motor vehicle occupant 'in such a way as to cause a reasonable person apprehension or fear of bodily harm.' Does this brandishing offense require proof of both objective and subjective apprehension or fear? We conclude the statute requires only objective fear — i.e., that the brandishing would cause a reasonable person apprehension or fear, regardless of whether a particular victim actually experienced such fear."

Yeah. When the statute says "reasonable person," it means . . . reasonable person. Not the subjective belief of the particular victim here. Duh.

So the Court took up the case because the lower court opinion was obviously erroneous, right?

Nope. The Court of Appeal said the exact same thing, and the California Supreme Court unanimously affirms. So no need to displace the existing appellate opinion.

So it must be that there's a split in the lower courts? Nope. This is the only appellate opinion on the issue. The California Supreme Court's opinion doesn't disapprove of any other case.

So, for the life of me, I can't figure out why the Court thought it was important to take this one up. Maybe it's got a lot of free time these days? No idea.

Second, I would have sworn that I wrote something about the Court of Appeal's opinion at the time. I definitely remember reading it, and thinking that it was spot on right. I was absolutely confident that I posted something about the case on the day it was published. But I searched my posts; nope, nothing.

I even checked with a.i., which insisted that I had written something about it, and then described -- in exhaustive detail -- what I wrote, and yes, what it said sounded exactly like my thoughts at the time. Which caused me to check yet again. Nope. Seriously. I didn't write a thing.

Now, I recognize full well that I'm getting old, and hence perhaps more likely than ever to confabulate false thoughts about things I thought I had written down but actually hadn't.

But having artificial intelligence insist that I had written them down, and then setting forth precisely what I thought I had written; well, that's freaking me out a bit.

Because I definitely don't want that thing reading my mind.

I'm confident that, in fact, the a.i. agents are just hallucinating things (again) and doing so in a style that sounds like me.

Still. Weird.

Anyway, here's another unanimous California Supreme Court opinion that's definitely correct.

Even though I can't for the life of me figure out why they thought they needed to say so.

Trona Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Trustees (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 26, 2026)

Are we really doing this?! Seriously?

State law says that teacher salaries have to be uniform once education and experience are taken into account, but a union can nonetheless negotiate an agreement that departs from this in part. The Trona Unified School District negotiated a deal that paid all its teachers $2000/year extra if the teacher had a master's degree. The deal was also retroactive; teachers were paid the extra amounts for the two years prior to the finalization of the deal.

Fair enough. No problem.

But the school district refused to pay six particular teachers with master's degrees who had quit by the time the deal was ratified. They sued, saying that this violated state law, since they were then paid less than equally qualified and experienced teachers who taught during those same years.

What's at stake? "If applied to the Former Teachers retroactively, the CBA would have resulted in additional pay for each of the Former Teachers in amounts ranging from about $5,000 to $9,000."

Six total teachers. Roughly seven grand each. So you're looking at $40,000 or so total.

But no. Rather than pay the teachers for the good work they did, the District (1) defends the lawsuit (and prevails), and then (2) defends the appeal -- and loses.

Which undoubtedly resulted in spending far more on lawyers then the teachers were ever asking for the in the first place.

Now, I'm a lawyer. I love it when lawyers get paid more than teachers. I think that society would be much better off if virtually all of the money paid to teachers was instead paid to lawyers tasked with making sure that teachers got paid as little as humanly possible.

(Sarcasm alert)

Just pay the six teachers the seven grand or so. Why, why, why waste the money on a lawsuit? Even if you're right -- and, here, you're actually wrong -- it's still not a beneficial allocation of resources.

To the six former teachers at Trona who prevailed and learned today that they'll get the extra money -- Michael Lane, Valerie Gennrich, Yesenia Goins, Tyson LoPresti, Cindy Winks, and Joseph Wolfe -- here's what I have to say:

Kudos to you. Thanks for all the great work you've done on behalf of the kids in the district. Enjoy the extra couple of bucks. You deserve it.

Shi v. City of Palos Verdes (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 23, 2026)

It seems to me that Justice Daum reaches the right result here. There's a California statute that says that cities have a ministerial duty to approve applications within (generally) 60 days of filing, and a separate statute that says (generally) that if a city fails to comply with a ministerial duty, an aggrieved person can sue the city for damages. The plaintiff here alleges that he filed an ADU application, the City took three years or so to approve it, and that the plaintiff suffered damage. The trial court sustained a demurrer, but the Court of Appeal disagrees, holding that the statutes mean what they say; in particular, that those who own homes and intend to build auxiliary dwelling units on their property are indeed one of the intended beneficiaries of the statute.

I agree. Makes sense.

What struck me about the opinion, however, is how scared Justice Daum appears to be about relying -- even in part -- on legislative history to support that straightforward conclusion. His opinion repeatedly and expressly says that he's not relying on that history, and that he's instead only setting forth these materials as essentially background -- that the statute is in fact unambiguous, so that legislative history is irrelevant, but he's letting you know what it says just in case (essentially) anyone's interested.

I don't think one needs to be so desperately reticent in using legislative history to support one's result. I get it; there's an increasing dominant strain of statutory jurisprudence these days that poo-poos such evidence and instead seeks the "straightforward" application of purportedly "unambiguous" statutory text. But it's not like Justice Scalia's zombie body is going to rise from the grave and strike you down if you write an opinion that relies in part on -- as here -- pretty darn clear legislative history as an additional basis for one's opinion. With all due respect to that particular former Supreme Court justice, sometimes, legislative history is in fact pretty darn informative. Including but not limited to here.

When that's the case, I don't think one should be reticent to rely on legislative history. Sometimes it helps. When it does, use it. And don't be ashamed in doing so, for feel the need to expressly say that this history is technically irrelevant because the statute is unambiguous. Just say that it all points to the same overriding conclusion, and that, particularly when taken together, the statutory text, legislative history, and legislative purpose all make clear the right result.

Then move on. Unabashedly so.

U.S. v. Mumma (9th Cir. - Oct. 20, 2026)

Put a hidden camera in your stepdaughter's room to capture pictures of her undressing? Spend the rest of your life in federal prison, even for a first offense. (The defendant here is 61, and was sentenced to 21 years in prison. He's very unlikely to be alive when released.)

One more thing. You also forfeit your house. Since it's the location, and hence an instrumentality, of the crime.

So even if you're utterly amoral: Not a good decision.

People v. Perkins (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 19, 2026)

With respect, I think that Justice Cody beats Justice Yegan in this one.

Everyone agrees that one judge generally can't reconsider the decisions of a different judge. In criminal cases (like this one) or any others.

Justice Yegan, in dissent, thinks that's dispositive here. But Justice Cody says that the prosecution forfeited this argument by not brining it up in the trial court, and I agree.

Justice Yegan says (repeatedly) that as a result of today's holding, "[t]he judge shopping lamp has now been lit." I think not. The unique thing that happened here was that once the issue was raised in front of the second judge -- here, whether or not to strike a prior strike under Romero -- the prosecutor didn't argue that the second judge had no authority to reconsider the first judge's decision not to strike the strike. The prosecutor instead argued that the first judge's decision was persuasive, not that it was binding.

That's a strategic choice. The first judge had expressly said that the issue was "very, very close," so there was a definite chance that the first judge might end up reconsidering. The prosecutor apparently did not want to take that risk, and instead argued the merits with the second judge. That's fine. The prosecutor might well have thought that the second judge was more likely to agree with the prosecutor's argument than the first.

But having made that call, after the second judge decides against you, you can't then argue that the second judge had no jurisdiction to make the call in the first place. Forfeiture doctrines are expressly designed to prevent such strategic election.

Indeed, to me, the "judge shopping lamp" is more applicable to the rule articulated by the dissent, rather than the majority. Under the majority's rule, all that the prosecutor has to say is (accurately) "Your honor, you have no jurisdiction to reconsider the prior judge's ruling." Easily done, and quickly turns off the purported judge shopping lamp. Whereas under Justice Yegan's principle, the prosecution (or the defense, if the tables are turned) can successfully judge shop with the second judge, hoping to prevail if the issue is decided their way and, if unsuccessful, then arguing that the first judge is the only one who can make that call.

Everyone agrees that judge shopping should be avoided. But I think that the majority opinion here is actually the best way to stop it.

People v. Lackey-Garcia (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 19, 2026)

I completely understand why Justice Feinberg comes out this way. Her analysis of precedent is coherent and thoughtful. I appreciated it.

But unlike Justice Feinberg, I think that Justice King's dissent in 2010 got it right. My view is that a defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own criminal competency hearing. Yes, his lawyer didn't think it was a good idea for his client to testify. But the client wanted to. That's a critical right, and one we should respect.

People have a right (obviously) to testify in their own defense at a criminal trial. The same should be true in the competency aspect of a criminal trial. If the client wants to take the stand and provide evidence that he's not competent, great. We'll evaluate that evidence. Ditto if he wants to take the stand and claim that he is competent, even though his lawyer (and perhaps the doctors) insist he's not. That's great too. The judge will hear him out and make a decision one way or the other.

There's a serious dignitary interest at stake. Particularly when, as here, the competency determination is likely to be the dispositive one -- everyone admits here, for example, that the defendant in fact stabbed the various people he stabbed (very likely in a psychotic state). If a guy wants to testify, let him testify. Even if his lawyer thinks it's a bad idea. It's the client's life at stake, after all, not the lawyer's. And letting the client testify will only enhance, rather than retard, the search for truth. If I am the judge trying to decide whether a particular defendant is competent or not, I can't fathom not wanting to hear him testify if he's so inclined. That'll help me immensely, I suspect, in deciding whether or not the guy's in fact competent to understand or assist with his defense.

There's no binding California Supreme Court case going the other way, so that's the way I would rule if I was on the Court of Appeal. And were I the California Supreme Court, I would take this case up and hold the defendants have a right to testify at their competency hearing if they want. Full stop.

U.S. v. California (9th Cir. - Oct. 14, 2026)

California can make its own police officers wear uniforms and provide identification, but it can't make the federal government do the same. Even within California. 

That's different than traffic laws. Traffic laws apply to everyone, so California can (maybe) require that federal officials comply with them. It's true that the California No Vigilantes Act applies to all officers too (including California officers), but since it "targets" federal officers, it's barred by the Supremacy Clause.

So holds the Ninth Circuit, which now reverses the lower court's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction. (A decision it has already stayed, so the handwriting was already clearly on the wall on this one.)

People v. Superior Court (Garcia) (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 13, 2026)

I agree with Justice Chavez that the writ here should be granted, but if it were me, I would add one important caveat to the opinion.

I'm on board for the Court of Appeal's holding that the prosecution can file a timely 170.6 challenge to a judge who's acting as a "master calendar department" in a criminal case when that judge indicates that they're going to provide an indicated sentence, rather than just refer the matter out to a department for trial. Once a judge decides that they're going to resolve a disputed issue themselves -- here, whether to strike priors as part of the sentence -- then they're no longer acting in a purely ministerial function (e.g., simply assigning courtrooms), and a 170.6 challenge is timely and appropriate at that point. Agreed.

But the opinion here reads as if the reason the challenge here was timely was because the relevant "disputed issue" was the actual acceptance of the plea, rather than issuance of the indicated sentence. I understand that reasoning: the "indicated" sentence is essentially a conditional prediction, since the defendant hasn't yet pled guilty. Hence the opinion's focus on the actual acceptance of the plea, which takes place only after the indicated sentence (and, even then, only if the defendant accepts the "offer").

But that focus seems rife for abuse.

To me, the 170.6 time period would run from when the judge stated that they intended to provide an indicated sentence, rather than serving merely as a master calendar department. At that point, the judge has indicated their intention to decide a disputed issue of law or fact. So that's when the 10- (or 15-) day clock starts ticking. The later dates -- either when the indicated sentence is pronounced, or when the guilty plea is ultimately accepted (and/or formal sentence imposed) -- aren't the relevant dates. Just like when you get a judge assigned for all purposes, it's the date of the assignment that starts the 170.6 clock, not the date on which the judge ultimately makes any rulings.

The distinction matters. Here, the prosecution made a 170.6 challenge three days after the trial judge indicated they were going to provide an indicated sentence. Great. That's timely. I agree. And, three days later, the court denied the challenge (wrongly), issued the indicated sentence, took the plea, and entered the sentence. That's not okay. A different judge should have been assigned. Spot on.

But imagine a slightly different temporal setting. Let's say the judge indicates that they're going to issue an indicated sentence three weeks later, and the prosecution does nothing. Then, on the appointed date, the judge indicates a particular sentence that the prosecution doesn't like, and only then does the prosecutor file a 170.6 challenge. Before the actual sentence -- the purported "determination of fact or law" under today's Court of Appeal opinion -- but after the indicated sentence.

That would be untimely, in my opinion. Can't do that. You have to file your challenge before, not after, the indicated sentence. The clock starts upon assignment, not the indicated (or ultimate) sentence.

So I would make that clear in the opinion. It's an important caveat.

Martinez v. Contreras (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 9, 2026)

We presumably won't see any published opinions today since it's a holiday (for some), so I wanted to briefly mention this opinion from late Friday.

It's unusual. You don't see many Court of Appeal opinions that find it to be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant a new trial based on juror misconduct. You similarly don't see many cases in which the jury, as here, allegedly awards insufficient damages; instead, the problem (if any) is typically awards that are too high, rather than too low.

So the opinion is worth a read, if only as a statistical outlier.

It's also worthwhile because it involves a factual setting that I imagine is not uncommon in motor vehicle accident cases; namely, the jurors (allegedly) wondering why the plaintiff is suing the driver himself rather than the insurance company, and purportedly not wanting to award damages against an individual.

You would have thought that jurors would understand, either through instructions or otherwise, what's really going on in this setting, but apparently -- and perhaps not surprisingly -- not.

Fanuc Corp. v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 9, 2026)

I'm grading midterm examinations in my civil procedure class right now, and the essay portion of that exam entirely revolves around the "relatedness" requirement of specific personal jurisdiction after the Supreme Court's holding in Ford Motor Co. Which is precisely the dispositive issue in this interlocutory writ proceeding in the Court of Appeal.

So, needless to say, I was interested.

I'll not go into the particular merits here; ultimately, the Court of Appeal holds that, on this record, there's no personal jurisdiction over the Japanese manufacturer of a robot that injured someone in California.

I'll just say this:

This opinion shows, in my view, why it's so important to have someone who deeply knows this stuff during the initial law-and-motion proceedings, not just on appeal.

Because I'm fairly confident that if the plaintiffs had known at the time what they had to prove, they could have done so. Potentially easily.

Because I think that personal jurisdiction in fact exists here. Even though the appellate records amassed by the plaintiff on appeal may well not show it.

Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 8, 2026)

The Court of Appeal holds today that when you want to sue anonymously, you've got to follow the correct procedures; to wit, filing your complaint conditionally and then seeking to proceed as a Jane Doe. By contrast, if you simply file anonymously, the defendant is free to call a press conference and reveal your real names. Not only isn't that illegal doxing, but it's protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, so if you sue the lawyers who revealed your names, you'll have to pay their legal fees.

So be sure to do it correctly. It's a big deal.

Steer v. Town of Los Gatos (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 6, 2026)

Multimillionaire neighbors in Los Gatos using California environmental statutes to delay their neighbor from building a home on a vacant lot next to theirs.

It doesn't work in the trial court, but succeeds in the Court of Appeal today.

It's not going to stop the project. But it will make it more expensive. CEQA review ain't cheap.

Chin v. DoorDash, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 5, 2026)

Plaintiff files a retaliation suit against his employer, DoorDash, but deliberately refrains from making a sexual harassment claim, hoping that the trial court will refuse to compel arbitration on the merits, without applying the California harassment exception. Sadly (for him), the court issues a tentative disagreeing with his position and compelling arbitration. So at the hearing, plaintiff asks (for the first time) to amend and add a harassment claim. Has the plaintiff waived, or forfeited, arbitration by not raising the issue in his original complaint and in his opposition to the motion to compel arbitration?

Justice Scherb authors the majority opinion and says "Yes." Justice Wiley dissents, arguing that while he would be fine with sanctioning plaintiff's lawyer for the manipulation, there's no waiver. (Truthfully, this is more "forfeiture" than "waiver" -- the two concepts are often conflated.)

Two competing views of a strategy that, in all honesty, I don't think anyone should replicate regardless.

People v. Flint (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 2, 2026)

If you kill a police officer -- even one, as here, who's off-duty -- you can rest assured that the authorities will do everything in their power to make sure that you never see the light of day. That's true even if, as here, you are only the lookout, and someone else kills the person. That's also true even if, as here, the off-duty officer is a lower-level employee primarily doing administrative work.

Sentenced to 29 years to life. Not the actual shooter, but petition for resentencing denied. Affirmed.

Passport 420, Inc. v. Starr Indem. & Liab Co. (Cal. Ct. App. - Oct. 1, 2026)

Bad cases make bad law.

The Court of Appeal holds today that even if the insurance company doesn't ask, you're required sua sponte to tell them anything that might potentially influence their decision regarding whether or not to issue a policy. On that basis, it reverses the jury award in favor of the policyholder below.

Look, I know that everyone hates Michael Avenatti. For good reason. But the insurance company here didn't ask any questions at all about where the money came from to buy the airplane it insured. (Turns out, he embezzled those funds.) Moreover, the policyholder here isn't even Avenatti; it's a different, innocent person that ends up owning the plane, and hence losing $3 million-plus when the insurance company rescinds the policy based on the failure to volunteer information that the insurance company didn't even bother to request.

This just seems like a terrible decision for pretty much every insurance coverage case other than this one. There are legions of facts that might potentially influence an insurance company's decision. I understand that the insurance code requires me to be honest, with full disclosure. But that only applies to things that the insurance company asks. If my health insurance company doesn't feel like asking about my medical history, I don't have to tell them. If my life insurance company doesn't ask about whether I'm occasionally depressed, I don't have to tell them. If my auto insurance company doesn't ask about whether I sometimes exceed the speed limit on the highway, I don't have to tell them.

Until today.

Baker Ranches, Inc. v. Bergum (9th Cir. - Sept. 30, 2026)

I don't know. I see both sides. Judge Owens makes good points for the majority, but the competing view (adopted by Judge Rawlinson in dissent) has a lot going for it as well. I am definitely not as emphatic as Judge Rawlinson on this issue. But maybe his side has the better of the argument?

Back in 1934, a Nevada state court action determined who could take what water from the Baker-Lehman Creeks. An important issue, to be sure. But the federal government, which owned plenty of the underlying land, didn't participate in the lawsuit. For good reason. It was entitled to sovereign immunity, so no way it was going to bind itself to a state court action. So the state court gave respective water rights to everyone, but not to the federal government.

Fast forward. In 1952, Congress didn't like how this whole thing was ending up. In Nevada as elsewhere. It wanted the federal government to start showing up to these things. So Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, which waived sovereign immunity in these types of cases. And the Act was retroactive as well, and bound the federal government to prior "comprehensive" adjudications of water rights.

Makes sense. Judge Owens cogently explains how all this went down, and why. I learned a lot; thanks for that, honestly.

So is the federal government now bound to the prior 1934 Nevada state court adjudication of the Baker-Lehman Creeks water rights? Judge Owens says "yes" because that proceeding was "comprehensive" (as the McCarran Amendment requires) in that it adjudicated everyone's rights to the water, whereas Judge Rawlinson says "no" because the federal government (understandably) didn't participate and hence (understandably) wasn't awarded at the time any water rights.

I'm slightly leaning to Judge Rawlinson's perspective, I think. It just seems profoundly unfair to me, and contrary to congressional intent, to say that the federal government is bound to a finding in which it (1) did not (for good reason) participate at the time, and (2) accordingly wasn't awarded any water rights, even though it owned tons of the underlying land at issue and certainly would have been awarded water rights had it elected to participate. (Which, again, it made sense not to at the time.) Why would that make sense? Why is that fair or equitable? Why should the other landowners get all the water and the federal parks through which the water flows -- here, the Great Basin National Park -- left to rot in the dust?

I understand Judge Owens' argument that allowing the United States to pop in and exercise water rights at this point would "unsettle" a ton of these prior allocations. Yeah, I admit, that's a pain. But the alternative seems even worse. It would be one thing if the prior allocations reserved some water for the feds (based on their existing land ownership and use) notwithstanding their failure to actively participate. That would indeed, in my view, be a "comprehensive" adjudication, and one to which I might well bind the federal government.

But when, say, the federal government owns 99% of the land, and is using (at the time) 99% of the water, and 1% of the landowners bring a lawsuit and are awarded 100% of the water because the 99% owner (rightly) fails to participate, it makes no sense to me to say: "Oh, well, tough, that was a totally 'comprehensive' prior adjudication because it allocated all the water to all the (relevant) landowners."

No it didn't. It didn't discuss -- or even attempt to address -- the federal government's rights at all. It was not "comprehensive" in that regard. And, as a practical matter, is unfair and socially deleterious to bind everyone to a prior adjudication that we know full well doesn't accurately reflect the relevant ownership and use of the underlying land. Either now or then.

That's my concern with the majority opinion, anyway. I get the arguments. I'm just not entirely sure I'm completely persuaded.

Notwithstanding a really cogent and intelligent opinion by Judge Owens.

State of Washington v. Crown Resources (9th Cir. - Sept. 29, 2026)

Rarely is the Ninth Circuit's reversal of a district court's decision so obviously correct as this one by Judge Fletcher.

Of course there's no privity here. Of course the (self-serving) settlement by the citizen group doesn't bar the contemporaneous related claim by the State of Washington, which didn't even know about, much less approve of, the settlement talks between the other parties.

Totally and completely right.

Medrano v. Acosta (9th Cir. - Sept. 25, 2026)

District Judge Frimpong held that officers were potentially liable if they indeed did what Alex Medrano said they did, so denied their motion for qualified immunity. On appeal, Judges Callahan and Bumatay "conclude[] that it was objectively reasonable for the Officers to aim their guns at Medrano’s head from near point-blank range, as a matter of constitutional law, such that no rational jury could conclude otherwise." (Mr. Medrano had a prior bench warrant for fleeing a traffic stop, and the officers did not know that warrant had been withdrawn.) Judge Paez partially dissents, contending that the majority's "decision is both unnecessary and flawed" since he believes the officer's conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Medrano, would qualify as excessive, but that this right was not clearly established, so qualified immunity exists.

Who do you agree with? Judge Frimpong? Judge Callahan? Judge Paez?

Three different perspectives, to be sure, on when the police are permitted to point loaded guns at your head.

Bandary v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (9th Cir. - Sept. 23, 2026)

I'm stunned by this one. Seriously. Stunned.

A passenger on a Delta Airlines flight allegedly acts suspiciously, so the flight attendants confront him, the situation escalates, and the passenger is ultimately forcibly restrained by both the flight attendants and by an air marshal. He sues Delta, claiming serious personal injuries, and the jury awards him $7.2 million in damages.

The district judge vacates the jury's award and thereafter grants summary judgment to the defendant, and plaintiff appeals. The Ninth Circuit affirms.

I wasn't stunned at the outcome; both the majority opinion and the dissent make good points in favor of their respective positions.

But after reading the opinion, I was interested in discovering what lawyer represented the plaintiff on appeal. There's $7.2 million at stake, after all. Presumably there's a contingency fee at stake, so I was wondering who ultimately lost out on a $2.5 million (or whatever) fee award.

So I looked at the caption, and discovered that the Ninth Circuit appeal was filed and argued by . . . . the Georgetown Law School Appellate Clinic.

What?!

You can't find an appellate attorney who's willing to defend a $7.2 million jury damage award on appeal? Really?!

I was sufficiently surprised to look back at the history of the case. I noticed from the caption that the district court case number began with 17-, so I knew there would be at least some drama.

Drama indeed.

So many different lawyers in the trial court. Plaintiff ultimately representing himself pro se for much of the case. So many motions. Some of which (e.g., the pro se motion to disqualify the district court judge) were not exactly well thought out.

My guess is that, ultimately, no lawyer was willing to deal with the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff was not willing to deal with anyone other than the pro bono counsel at Georgetown who agreed to take the case.

Still. Unusual. A case with a $2.5 million fee at stake but no lawyer.

U.S. v. Rivera (9th Cir. - Sept. 23, 2026)

Tip of the day: If you're a convicted felon who's selling methamphetamine, with thousands in cash plus loaded weapons in your home, maybe don't put your meth-contaminated trash bags in your front yard for pickup.

That mistake cost the defendant here 25 years in federal prison.

I also learned some new lingo today. One of his customers apparently sent a text message asking him for "prices on clear and Negra." I knew that "clear" meant methamphetamine; thank you for that, Breaking Bad (even though Walt's meth was famously blue). But I had to look up what "Negra" meant. (Judge Nelson's opinion mentioned that it had something to do with drugs, but not precisely what.)

I get it now. Makes sense. "Negra" is black (which I already knew; thank you, Negra Modelo). So with drugs, it means heroin; specifically, black tar (or brown) heroin.

Now you know too. (If you didn't already.)

Wilson v. Johnson (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 22, 2026)

Maybe I'm overly cynical. But I am not particularly surprised that there are quite a few opinions from the Court of Appeal -- like this one today -- that reverse the trial court's dismissal of a lawsuit for an alleged failure to bring it to trial within the mandatory five-year period.

For example, here, everyone recognizes that the five year deadline is days away from expiring, so the court sets a trial date, calls in prospective jurors to the courtroom, swears them in, and starts examining them for potential excuses. All that happens before the deadline. The lawyers haven't started asking any questions yet, but still, the prospective jurors are sworn. Then, once a couple of days passes and the deadline expires, the defendant says: "Whoa. Too late. The 'trial' hasn't started within five years. So I win regardless; the lawsuit against me is subject to mandatory dismissal."

At that point, the trial court -- facing what's expected to be a 42-day personal injury trial -- grants the motion and dismisses the lawsuit. Thereby avoiding a long, pain-in-the-butt trial.

The Court of Appeal reverses. Holding that the "trial" properly started for purposes of the five-year statute once the prospective jurors were sworn.

Does it surprise you that trial courts are often far more willing than the Court of Appeal to get rid of pending trials on the basis of the five-year rule? Gets 'em out of work, anyway; at least temporarily. Maybe even permanently, either if the Court of Appeal affirms or, even if it doesn't, if one of the parties papers the underlying judge (as presumably many will) on remand -- or if the judge has retired or moved to a different department by then.

Agency costs. They're real. They're pervasive. Even, at times, amongst judges, I suspect.

People v. Centeno (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 21, 2026)

This opinion just gets worse and worse the more you read. Every page details more horrific facts than the last. (And it's 35 pages, so that's saying something.)

Maybe I should have expected that from the introductory paragraph. Which reads as follows:

"Defendant Jose Anthony Centeno appeals his convictions for kidnapping to exact money or valuable things, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, and assault upon a victim under the age of 18 with intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act; he does not challenge his other convictions. He contends the jury was improperly instructed in connection with the kidnapping and assault charges and, to the extent those arguments were waived, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Centeno further asserts insufficient evidence supported the rape, sodomy, and assault charges. We affirm the judgment."

Still. I'm used to reading terrible facts in cases like this one. This one nonetheless struck me as unusual by starting off with bad (but not horrible) facts and then the abuse becoming more and more disturbing and horrific as time went on.

Read the entire thing at your peril.

S.D. v. Reese (9th Cir. - Sept. 17, 2026)

The question is what to do with transgender women in prison: should they be housed separately, in the men's prison, or in the women's prison. The district court held that Oregon could not presumptively house these inmates in the men's prison without an individualized safety assessment and, inter alia, prohibited the prison from housing them with cisgender cellmates with a history of sexual violence.

The Ninth Circuit appeal was assigned to Judges Collins, VanDyke, and Tung. It's hard to imagine a worse panel for the plaintiffs, so I was not surprised in the slightest about how the case came out: reversed, class decertified, mandate issued immediately.

I was, however, somewhat surprised that Judge Tung seems to have deliberately designed his opinion to be offensive.

Here's the first sentence of the opinion, for example:

"The district court in this case issued a class-wide preliminary injunction requiring (among other things) that the State of Oregon presumptively assign more than a hundred “transgender women” prison inmates (male inmates who claim to be female) for placement in the only state-run women’s prison in Oregon."

You'll notice that the term "transgender women" is placed in quotes. On the theory, I assume, that no such thing actually exists. Nor is this an isolated occurrence. The next sentence, for example, describes the plaintiffs as -- and the quotes here are in the original -- "transgender" inmates. That continues throughout the opinion.

You'll also note the description in the first sentence that "transgender" women are "male inmates who claim to be female." That's certainly a value neutral description, right? Definitely gives that party to a litigation the respect they deserve.

I understand that Judge Tung, and presumably the other judges on the panel, has strongly held personal beliefs about transgendered individuals. But the pervasive language of the opinion serves no legitimate purpose other than to offend.

I have my own beliefs, for example, about the qualities of particular member of the judiciary. But I would never say that "Judge" Tung wrote a particular opinion, or describe someone on that bench as an individual who "claims to be a judge."

During the Jim Crow era, segregationists used to use scare quotes like this to describe minorities; they'd refer to a Black "lawyer" or the Black "doctor" as a way of denigrating their status. I am profoundly disappointed to see a similar and entirely unnecessary tactic employed in a Ninth Circuit opinion today.

People v. Ammons (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 16, 2026)

Here's the opening sentence of today's opinion from the Court of Appeal:

"Charles Nelson Ammons appeals his conviction, by jury, of the attempted murder of City of Pismo Beach police officer Christopher Siglin . . . ."

Here are two paragraphs from the opinion that explain what transpired when Officer Siglin pulled over the defendant for making an illegal left turn, almost all of which was confirmed by the officer's body camera:

"Appellant was confrontational and refused to turn off the engine. Siglin opened the driver’s side door and reached into the van to get appellant to step out of the vehicle. Appellant swung his right hand toward Siglin while holding a handgun. Siglin diverted the blow with his left hand and tried to disarm appellant. The two men grappled with each other for a considerable amount of time, at extremely close quarters inside the van. Siglin constantly tried to pry appellant’s fingers from the firearm and press its muzzle away from his head and face. For his part, appellant struggled to maintain control of the firearm and to pry Siglin’s fingers off it. During the struggle, the firearm was about 12 inches away and pointed at Siglin’s face. The pistol “clicked” but did not fire."

Here are the final two paragraphs of the opinion's statement of facts, alongside the footnote therein:

"Siglin’s body camera documented a “clicking” sound that occurred when appellant pulled the trigger. An examination of the firearm, a .40 caliber Beretta semi-automatic 96 pistol explained the “clicking” but not the firing: the bullets in the magazine clip were loaded backwards. Had the firearm been properly loaded, it would have fired. [Footnote]

After his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital. A screening test determined his blood alcohol content was .21.

[Footnote] - We parenthetically comment on appellant’s lack of even a rudimentary knowledge of firearms. The fact that he loaded the magazine with bullets facing backwards is the only reason Siglin was not murdered."

Given those contents, you can probably figure how the Court of Appeal came out here, right?

Conviction affirmed. 

Meehan v. Aguirre (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 15, 2026)

Plaintiff collides with a semi-trailer while biking in the bike lane and sues. She makes a section 998 settlement offer for $1 million in 2021, and the same offer again in 2022 and 2023. All of those offers were rejected.

Then, in April 2023, six months before trial, she makes a new section 998 offer. For $2 million. Also rejected.

So goes to trial and is awarded damages of $1.06 million.

She then seeks $993,000+ of costs as the prevailing party, including over $600,000 in interest and expert fees, claiming that her $1.06 million recovery was greater than her initial 2021 offer.

She doesn't get that, and appeals, but the Court of Appeal affirms. Only the last section 998 offer controls; that one was for $2 million, and she didn't do better than that at trial.

It seems absolutely crazy to me that plaintiff's counsel made the final $2 million offer. A massive strategic error, for utterly no point. There was already an expired offer, two years earlier, for $1 million. Why make another 998 offer, at a higher price point?

Zero reason to do so. If you want to indicate that you're only willing to settle for double what you asked for before, go ahead. Just don't make it a 998 offer.

Doing so here cost the client dearly. Over half a million bucks.

People v. Singh (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 14, 2026)

Particularly after the Supreme Court's 2026 opinion in Ellingburg v. United States, it's far from frivolous to argue that restitution payments are penalties and hence criminal defendants have a right to a jury trial on that issue. The Supreme Court basically held precisely that in Ellingberg, at least as applied to the federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.

But if you're going to make that claim, as a tactical matter, it's probably best not to do so -- as here -- in the context of a conviction for forcible rape of a college freshman.

The Court of Appeal unanimously rejects that challenge.

In re Kia Hyundai Vehicle Theft Cases (9th Cir. - Sept. 14, 2026)

The Ninth Circuit unanimously reverses the district court's holding that Hyundai and Kia are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California for a lawsuit by insurers alleging that these manufacturer's vehicles were defective because they were way-too-easily stolen.

Judge Miller, and the rest of the panel, are right. The district court judge, Judge Selna, was wrong. A good opinion and a good result.

Fairly straightforward, in my view.

Universal Shopping Plaza v. Hong (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 9, 2026)

The Universal Shopping Plaza owns a shopping mall in San Gabriel. Piong Hong owns the Five Star Restaurant, a seafood place in that shopping mall. Hong and the restaurant pays a huge amount of rent; over $60,000 every month. During COVID, Hong says that the office manager at Universal reduced his rent by ten percent to compensate him for the closures during that period. So in January 2023, Hong deducts $65,989 from his rent, to correspond to the ten percent discount during 2022.

Universal doesn't appear to agree with the discount, but doesn't appear to do anything in response. After deducting the $65,989 in early 2023, Hong then continues to pay his full monthly rent. For all of the rest of 2023. For all of 2024. For 23 straight months.

In February 2025, Hong again pays his full monthly rent. But now, Universal tells him that's not good enough. They issue a 3-day notice, saying that Hong didn't pay the full amount two years ago, in January 2023, so he's got to pay up. Hong disagrees, and responds that not only was he promised the discount, but that in any event, there's a specific provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 1161) that prohibits three-day notices that are filed more than a year after the alleged nonpayment of rent. But Universal says that because the lease agreement says that all rental payments are applied first to any overdue rent, Hong was "constantly" overdue, including in 2025, so the notice is timely.

The case goes to a three day bench trial. Hong represents himself, and does so through a Mandarin interpreter. He loses. The trial court evicts the restaurant from the mall, and orders Hong to pay around $190,000.

Hong then appeals, and represents himself pro per.

And wins.

If you're the law firm that represents Universal, it's not exactly a career highlight to lose to a pro per litigant.

In any event, I was somewhat rooting for Hong. Maybe he shouldn't have unilaterally decided to deduct the alleged ten percent discount from his rent. But if Universal had a problem with that, it should have sued initially. Not waited two years, retaining the full amount of rent for that entire period, and then file suit. That's exactly what Section 1161 was designed to prevent.

And because of all this, Hong gets evicted from the mall, and his restaurant there closed down. Events that are not suddenly reversed notwithstanding his success on appeal.

Though he seems to perhaps reopened his restaurant inside the Hilton in San Gabriel. Good for him.

(Though those Yelp reviews aren't exactly stellar, TBH.)

Adom v. California DOC (9th Cir. - Sept. 8, 2026)

The majority (Judges Paez and Forrest) and dissent (Judge Bea) disagree on whether the California Department of Corrections may have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act when it took away adult diapers from a 57-year old prisoner with spinal damage (alongside a prior stroke) who uses a wheelchair and who suffers from incontinence -- both Nos. 1 and 2. The majority says "Yes" whereas the dissent says "No."

At its core, Judge Bea's dissent relies on the fact that staff at the prison "reviewed [the patient's] medical records" and "were unable to find any evidence to sustain [his] claim that the [] incontinence supplies were medically necessary." It's an "adequate investigation," he says, to review some documents and to conclude therefrom that someone does not, in fact, involuntarily pee and poo in their bed. (Why someone would purportedly fake incontinence to obtain adult diapers -- hardly your typical prison currency -- is left unexplained.)

I assume that there are indeed some medical conditions that can be viewed on a CT or MRI or the like that may cause someone to become incontinent. But I doubt that every reason for incontinence can be so easily objectively verified. I would assume that the most powerful evidence of incontinence is the pee and/or poo in someone's bed, no?

So when -- as seemingly undisputed here -- someone is regularly soiling one's sheets, it seems very hard to me to argue that a doctor can legitimately say "Sorry, you don't actually need diapers, because I can't find any physical evidence that explains why you're doing what you're doing." If a doctor said that to a federal judge, for example, I'm fairly confident that the judge wouldn't say "Oh, okay then. I guess I'll just keep crapping my pants. Thanks for the help."

I would think that a fairly fundamental component of human decency is not being forced to wake up with pee and/or poop coating one's person. No?

People v. Stammers (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 4, 2026)

Be careful of the memes you share with your friends.

The Court of Appeal provides graphic details about what happened on this particular date, after the two met on a dating website. The victim went to his house, the (alleged) perpetrator made dinner, they shared some wine, they got in his hot tub, they made out, they went to his couch and watched television, and then: [Warning -- This is where it gets graphic]

"While on the couch, they touched one another and had consensual vaginal sex. Defendant stopped after a few minutes. Doe was “confused” when he stopped and “was questioning why.” Defendant testified that he and Doe attempted to have vaginal sex but stopped because he was unable to maintain a sufficient erection.

Defendant positioned himself behind Doe on the couch and touched her anus with his finger. After she told him to stop and pulled his hand away from her anus, he told her, “It’s okay, just relax.” Doe described what happened next: “After that it’s just all of a sudden I felt a big pressure pull me down and my face was facing the TV, then became facing down to the pillow, and a huge force on me and I couldn’t move. And there was enormous pain just came to something was in my butt. It was really, really painful and I was so scared. And first I couldn’t breathe at the beginning because my face was in the middle of pillow and I had to struggle to – to get to breathe first, and then – then trying to get him off of me.” She believed defendant’s penis was inside her anus because she did not think the “enormous pain” she felt could have been caused by a finger. Doe struggled and screamed, but defendant continued for several minutes.

Doe eventually got away and went into the bathroom. Her anus was bleeding. (A forensic examination conducted later that night revealed tearing in Doe’s perianal area.) Doe then stood outside the bathroom, attempting to get defendant’s attention, but he did not notice her. After gathering her belongings, she approached defendant and told him she was bleeding. Doe asked defendant, “you don’t understand what no means?” She left the house and called 911 from the driveway."

Defendant gets tried for forcible digital penetration, is convicted, and is sentenced to three years in prison. (The opinion doesn't mention this, but from the Megan's Law website, seems like he's already served his entire sentence at this point.)

The Court of Appeal reverses the conviction. At trial, there was a ton of evidence introduced regarding memes that the defendant had forwarded to his friends. As Justice Grover explains: "The challenged evidence conveyed to the jury that defendant is crude, sexist, and racist. And therein lies the problem. With two possible exceptions, the evidence of defendant’s communications has no legal relevance to the legitimate issues of his truthfulness, use of force, or intent to commit sexual assault. The communications as a whole reflect defendant’s apparent enthusiasm for sharing demeaning jokes about women and people of certain races, but they shed no light on the issues being tried."

It would be interesting to see what happens on remand. (Though I doubt I'll ever actually find out.) The defendant has already done his time in prison. So you might think both sides might be fine if he simply pleaded guilty at this point, since it doesn't really doesn't matter. But he's also a registered sex offender, and I'm sure he doesn't want that, so maybe he takes a shot at getting an acquittal at a retrial? But that'll cost him attorney's fees, etc. The state, meanwhile, has gotten its pound of flesh, but might want to both save money (and hence not re-prosecute) and yet simultaneously probably wants to keep the defendant on the sex offender registry. And the victim? Does she want to go through yet another trial?

Maybe he pleads down to a lesser offense at this point? Who knows.

Regardless, one lesson remains: Be careful what you send to others. Even your friends. Even if you trust them, there's always the possibility that someone else will get a hold of them.

Including but not limited to the authorities.

(Of course, the appropriate lesson might also be not to send racist and sexist memes in the first place.)

Sandford v. Sandford (Cal. Ct. App. - Sept. 3, 2026)

Sometimes it pays to (allegedly) steal hundreds of thousands of dollars from your siblings.

U.S. v. Nasri (9th Cir. - Sept. 2, 2026)

Do you long for those halcyon days of first-year (and/or advanced) Civil Procedure? Do you feel compelled to get a daily dose of Pennoyer v. Neff, the intricacies of in rem jurisdiction, and the complex principles of territorial sovereignty?

If so, these 127 single-spaced pages are for you.

The opinion is by Judge Desai. Judge Bybee authors a concurrence. Judge Desai writes a concurrence of her own. Then Judge Bennett writes a dissent.

It is a civil procedure professor's dream.

And an ordinary litigant's nightmare.

Even more so when you add in, as here, complexities involving waiver, fugitive disentitlement, and the party presentation doctrine.

Overall, a roller coaster ride of procedure.

People v. Espinosa (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 31, 2026)

Here's a line you don't see that often:

"Defendant was 75 years old when he committed his crimes in September 2009. . . ."

You wouldn't think that'd be a murder or anything like that, and it's not. "Defendant was convicted on three counts: (A) one count of engaging in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child who is 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); and (B) two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child who is younger than 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a))." Ooof.

According to the opinion, Mr. Espinosa is still confined, albeit in "a privately owned, noncustodial, long-term care facility (the Facility)." The question is whether he should be granted compassionate relief, as he is 92 years old at this point and functionally immobile.

You might think that the issue is about "compassion" or something like that, but not really. It's instead simply who pays. Right now, the Department of Corrections is paying for his facility, since he's still "in prison." The Department wants him to apply for Medi-Cal so someone else -- e.g., the federal government -- pays.

For Mr. Espinosa, it probably matters little. Except that maybe he gets transferred to a worse facility.

Sometimes "prison" is better.

U.S. v. Morgovsky (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

Judge Bea begins this opinion with:

"For years, Naum Morgovsky smuggled components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes into Russia and laundered the proceeds of his illicit enterprise through a network of offshore banks. But federal investigators eventually got Morgovsky in their sights."

Get it?

Liu v. Kaiser Permanente (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

It's a standard sentiment, held by a nontrivial number of people, and succinctly summarized by the phrase: "F***ing Kaiser." (For a slightly longer diatribe with additional obscenities, see here. Thank you, Helen Hunt.)

That feeling typically arises out of a view that Kaiser -- alongside other HMOs, or insurance companies in general -- often put profits over people, and withhold benefits even when they are obviously due. For an HMO like Kaiser, the most common setting in this regard is when they refuse to provide necessary medical care to a subscriber even when it is obviously (or at least allegedly) due.

Today's Ninth Circuit opinion arises in a different setting, but very much to the same effect.

Ya-Xia Liu worked for Kaiser for over two decades. She got cancer in 2021. She took a leave of absence from work, and battled the disease for a year. But in 2022, she began to lose the fight, and was admitted to Kaiser as a patient on March 19. She was dying, needed 24-hour care, and ultimately succumbed to the disease on March 29, 2022.

Because she worked for Kaiser for 20-plus years, she had a 401(k) plan that was worth over $675,000. She was entitled to roll that over as a lump sum, and on March 26, 2022, she submitted an online request that Kaiser send the entire $675,000+ to E*Trade, and naming her sister (Sherry Liu) as her beneficiary. Ya-Xia knew she was about to die. She wanted her sister to have her money. She did everything she needed to do to make sure that happened.

Unbeknownst to Ya-Xia, however -- or any other employee outside of the benefits office, for that matter -- Kaiser had an internal policy that it always sought to "confirm" any request for a rollover. Although Kaiser admitted that Ya-Xia filled out her request properly, Kaiser refused to pay, saying that because Ya-Xia died before she could "confirm" the rollover request, the sister wasn't entitled to the $675,000+.

The sister sued, and Kaiser still refused to pay. The district court -- Judge Martínez-Olguín, in the Northern District of California -- agreed with Kaiser, and dismissed the lawsuit on the pleadings.

The Ninth Circuit reverses.

Thankfully so.

Can you come up with arguments as to why Kaiser shouldn't have to pay the $675,000? Sure. Creative lawyers can indeed do so. They can even, on occasion, be persuasive. As they were initially here.

But it's precisely cases like this one that make many people hate insurance companies. Or Kaiser in particular.

And I absolutely do not blame them.

Just pay the woman her stinking money. It's not yours, Kaiser. Give the dead woman's sister the cash to which she was entitled for her 20-plus years of service.

And if you elect not to do so, don't complain when people think about you the way that many in fact do.

Garcia Morales v. Blanche (9th Cir. - Aug. 31, 2026)

This is a long (88-page, single spaced) immigration opinion. The majority opinion is written by Judge Paez, and the dissent by Judge Bumatay. So you can probably accurately figure out which way it ends up.

For a very brief description of why the majority ends up where it does, I'll quote two paragraphs of that opinion. First, the opening paragraph of the opinion:

"Lester J. Garcia Morales (“Garcia Morales” or “Petitioner”), Sheyla Monroy Tay, and their three minor children (collectively, “Petitioners”), natives and citizens of Guatemala, sought refuge in the United States after the same gang leader who murdered Garcia Morales’s sister threatened to kill them. Petitioners moved hours away from their home to escape the gang’s threats, but within two weeks, the gang found them, sent them a photo of their new front door, and again threatened to kill them. The police refused to help, offering to intervene only if they caught the gang leader in the act of murdering Garcia Morales. Out of fear for their lives, Petitioners fled Guatemala."

That paragraph accurately states the equities at issue here. As for the underlying doctrinal dispute, it's complicated, but here's the bottom line:

"We are guided by our decisions in East Bay I and East Bay II. The Rule effectively reimposes the restriction we invalidated in East Bay I. We reaffirm our holding that restricting asylum eligibility for noncitizens who enter between ports of entry impermissibly conflicts with § 1158(a) and the broader asylum statute. The agency therefore erred in concluding that Petitioners are ineligible for asylum pursuant to the Rule."

Judge Bumatay's dissent articulates the theme you would expect, and starts with "Once again, the Ninth Circuit fails to understand that the political branches—not judges—set asylum policy for our country." But, perhaps surprisingly, it also contains at least a facial expression of solicitude towards the petitioners, saying (in the midst of the dissent): "We can be sympathetic to the plight of Lester Garcia Morales and his family. We can be sympathetic to the countless other aliens seeking a better life in the United States. But our sympathy is no substitute for following the law."

One other interesting point. Judge Bumatay goes out of his way to note -- repeatedly --- that, unlike what one might perhaps expect, the underlying baseline rule at issue here was issued not under President Trump, but rather under President Biden. For example, here are the second and third paragraphs of that dissent:

"In 2022, the Biden Administration enacted the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (“CLP”) Rule to deal with the mounting crisis on the southwestern border. 88 Fed. Reg. 31314 (May 16, 2023) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.33 and § 1208.33). Illegal entry into the country from Mexico was at “all-time high,” overwhelming the government’s ability to effectively manage and stem the illegal migration. See id. at 31314–16 (May 16, 2023). Instead of being able to quickly remove illegal aliens from the country, the government faced thousands of aliens seeking asylum— hammering immigration courts with mostly non-meritorious asylum applications. Id. at 31315. The result: “those with meritorious claims [had] to wait years for their claims to be granted, while individuals who are ultimately denied protection may spend years in the United States before being issued a final order of removal.” Id.

The CLP Rule tried to alleviate some of that pressure by encouraging illegal aliens to use orderly “pathways” into the United States or to seek asylum in other countries. See 88 Fed. Reg. at 31314, 31317. The CLP Rule established a “rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for asylum” for all aliens “who ente[red] the United States from Mexico at the southwest land border or adjacent coastal borders without documents sufficient for lawful admission.”"

Similarly, later on in the opinion, he repeats: "The Biden Administration sought to stem the exigency of significant crossings of illegal immigrants into the country. It enacted the “Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule.”"

What's interesting about this -- to me, at least -- is that, typically, a core conservative talking point is that Biden did absolutely nothing to stem the passage of undocumented aliens, and that everything bad (from immigration policy to the deficit to inflation) is all his fault. You often see conservative judges reflecting that same sentiment. These comments are somewhat at odds with this overall message.

Of course, it makes sense for Judge Bumatay to make these points here, since one of his themes (right or wrong) is that liberal judges always side with the things that Biden did but oppose whatever Trump does, even when they're (allegedly) the same thing. Still, I suspect that the current administration would probably not include as part of its own messages: "Hey, on illegal immigration, I'm enacting the same beneficial policies that President Biden did." 

Cabardo v. Patacsil (9th Cir. - Aug. 27, 2026)

My congratulations to Judge Nelson on this opinion.

It's extremely well-written. It flows gracefully. It explains things well. It's careful and refined.

Here are the first several paragraphs:

"Bankruptcy proceedings differ from traditional civil cases we more often hear. Bankruptcy proceedings can be a complex process of reorganizing various financial aspects of debtors’ lives. Because the proceedings can involve so many aspects, an appealable order can fit into two categories. First, district court orders can resolve the entire “umbrella bankruptcy case,” that is, the entire process by which debtors discharge their debt. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020). We clearly have jurisdiction over this set of bankruptcy orders.

But an umbrella bankruptcy case “involves an aggregation of individual controversies, many of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (cleaned up). Thus, Congress provides us with jurisdiction over a second category of appeals. These are appeals of orders which “finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.” Id. (citation omitted). We are asked here to decide whether a discrete dispute is final and appealable.

In this case, a group of creditors appeals an order that rejected one basis for excepting their debt from discharge; a second basis is set for trial. Creditors argue that the appealed order is a final order of a discrete dispute within the larger bankruptcy case, and thus appealable. But the Supreme Court has warned against “slicing the case too thin.” Id. at 502. “An erroneous identification of an interlocutory order as a final decision may yield an appeal over which the appellate forum lacks jurisdiction.” Ritzen, 589 U.S. at 39. Any preliminary issue in a bankruptcy can theoretically be considered a discrete dispute even though it may only decide a portion of the case. See id. at 44. Creditors appeal this type of preliminary step.

Appellants cannot subdivide the dischargeability determination proceeding into a preliminary issue resolving an individual exception from discharge. Because the district court remanded the proceeding to the bankruptcy court for a trial on another exception, it is not a final order as to the discrete proceeding—a dischargeability determination. We thus dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction."

The remainder of the opinion is in the same vein. Nice, meticulous, and always explanatory.

Maybe it's because bankruptcy is an area with which I'm less than intimately familiar, but I very much appreciated both the tone and content of the opinion. And I expect that other readers would feel the same.

People v. Hazlett (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 27, 2026)

I know I say this -- or something like this -- a lot. But it still seems to me like it's a total waste.

The murder here was in 1978. Nearly a half-century ago. Admittedly, it took a while (almost exclusively, DNA evidence) to figure out who committed it, so the conviction and death sentence was only entered in 2003.

It's now 2026. Today's California Supreme Court opinion is 167 pages long. That doesn't even count the dissents; if you add all that in, you're looking at over 200 pages.

We're only at the direct appeal stage. There's still state habeas. Then federal habeas. Then the fact that California doesn't actually impose the death penalty anyway.

The defendant, Larry Hazlett, is 78 years old. 

County of King v. Turner (9th Cir. - Aug. 25, 2026)

This is a really smart and well-written opinion by Judge McKeown.

It's a high-profile case, so I won't say much about the merits; you can read about it elsewhere. Basically it affirms a district court injunction that stops the federal government from cutting off federal funds to local governments that do things the Trump administration doesn't like, whether in the program that's being funded by federal dollars or not. That, Judge McKeown holds, exceeds statutory authorization. You can perhaps tell local governments not to use federal dollars to help transgender persons or undocumented aliens, but you can't pull federal funds just because the locality does things you don't like with their own money and not in the program you're funding. That's the careful balance established by Congress, one over which the current administration runs roughshod.

Judge Bumatay predictably dissents. The difference between the two opinion is pronounced.

It's a testament to the current political and judicial climate that even a cogent and moderate opinion like this one will likely face challenge in both an en banc call and, potentially, in the Supreme Court.

Unfortunate and telling.

U.S. v. Aguilera (9th Cir. - Aug. 24, 2026)

According to this opinion, when a 27-year veteran judge in the Northern District of California, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was told that the federal sentences guidelines allow a defendant to go to trial and yet still ask for a 2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his response was "I didn't realize that." (See page 15.)

Surprising.

Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchos Water (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 24, 2026)

I will take issue neither with the holding of this California Supreme Court opinion nor with its rationale. It's unanimous, after all. Far be it from me to register any dissent.

I will instead limit myself to merely a parenthetical note -- one that strongly came to mind after reading the first two paragraphs of Justice Kruger's opinion. Those paragraphs read:

"Under California’s Eminent Domain Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1230.010 et seq.), a public entity’s right to take private property for public use depends, broadly speaking, on whether the taking is necessary to serve the public interest. As a general rule, public necessity is a matter for the public entity to decide, subject to limited judicial review: Ordinarily, when a public entity has adopted the statutorily required “resolution of necessity,” the relevant public necessity requirements are “conclusively establishe[d]” unless a court finds that the public entity has grossly abused its discretion in adopting the resolution. (Id., §§ 1245.250, subd. (a), 1245.255, subd. (b).)

In 1992, however, the Legislature created special rules for the taking of privately owned public utility property. Under those rules, even after adopting a resolution of necessity, a public entity’s decision to take over a privately owned electric, gas, or water public utility does not conclusively establish the propriety of the taking, but merely creates a “rebuttable presumption” that the statutory requirements for taking the property are met. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.250, subd. (b), added by Stats. 1992, ch. 812, § 3, p. 3846; see id., § 1240.650, subd. (c), added by Stats. 1992, ch. 812, § 2, p. 3846.)"

Hmmm. I wonder why the Legislature elected to pass much more favorable rules for privately owned utilities, as opposed to every single other type of property ownership? I'm sure it had nothing at all to do with the lobbying efforts or campaign contributions made by these large privately owned utilities? No, it would be a huge distortion of the democratic system to give wealthy institutions more favorable treatment under the law than everyone else. So I'm confident things like that never happen.

1 Community Compact v. City of Fresno (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 21, 2026)

Can you figure out from the very first paragraph the twists and turns that likely -- and in fact -- occurred in this case?

Here's the opening paragraph:

"Emphasizing the “profound impact” of Mexican-American labor leader and civil rights activist Cesar Chavez “on the people of Fresno” and concluding the renaming of a downtown thoroughfare in his honor would “provide a source of pride and community recognition,” the Fresno City Council (City Council) adopted Resolution No. 2023-056, which facilitated the renaming of the “East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, and West California Avenue alignment” (collectively, the Alignment)1 to Cesar Chavez Boulevard."

So in 2023, Fresno changed the street name to Cesar Chavez Boulevard. Plaintiffs didn't like that, and filed suit to change it back.

You can guess what happened next, right?

The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and in 2025, plaintiffs appealed. But then, as you likely know, Cesar Chavez got cancelled. So in 2026, Fresno reverses course, and changes the street names back.

The City then, predictably, moves to dismiss the appeal as moot.

The Court of Appeal (1) agrees that the appeal is moot, but (2) decides to resolve it anyway, and affirms. The dissent, Justice Meehan, agrees that it's moot, and wouldn't decide the merits.

Maybe you wouldn't have necessarily predicted the disagreement between the majority and dissent. (I did not.) But that the appeal got mooted by subsequent events; yeah, once you saw that it was Cesar Chavez, you probably figured out what was eventually going to happen.

Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB (9th Cir. - Aug. 20, 2026)

I'm not a Ninth Circuit judge, so I don't know the answer to this question. But I wonder how it feels when you write an opinion -- in this case, one by Judge Hawkins, in 2020 -- with a particular holding, and then six years later (i.e., today), your colleagues take a case en banc and unanimously say that you were wrong.

Maybe your reaction is: "Well, I decided my case, and thought I was right, and if some future case goes the other way, no big deal." Or maybe you instead feel a bit miffed. Either at your colleagues, at yourself, at your law clerk, or at some combination of all three.

Nothing you can do about it either way, of course.

Just wondering.

P.S. - Can the Ninth Circuit website please stop posting the same opinion multiple times for cases that are consolidated? Yes, I know, they're different case numbers, but it's the exact same opinion. Just put it up there once. Ever since the new website went up a month or so ago, you've often got to scroll through the day's opinions to screen out the duplicates (which sometimes, like today, have different captions). It's a slight -- but extant -- pain the butt. 

People v. Lightsay (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 17, 2026)

The California Supreme Court issued two death penalty opinions today. 

In one of those cases, it unanimously affirmed the re-imposition of a death sentence after a prior reversal. The underlying facts of that murder, which occurred in 1998, are so graphically horrific that I will say no more about it.

In the other case, the Court reversed (yet again) a death sentence that it had previously conditionally reversed for a determination of whether the defendant was competent when he represented himself at trial. As a result of today's opinion -- which involved only competence issues, not didn't involve the underlying events, so there's nothing about the actual crime -- the defendant will get a full retrial (assuming that he's now competent to stand trial). Presumably with an actual lawyer.

Though the funny part is that according to the California Department of Corrections, the defendant is now . . . 73 years old. Putting a 73-year old on trial for murder; in a death penalty case, no less.

You don't see that every day.

U.S. v. Jackson (9th Cir. - Aug. 17, 2026)

Sometimes it's sufficient to state the facts; the ultimate result is obvious.

This is one of those cases.

"These cases present the question whether the Attorney General can make someone an Acting United States Attorney—bypassing the usual requirement that a U.S. Attorney be confirmed by the Senate—by designating that person as the first assistant to an already-vacant office of U.S. Attorney. We hold that the Attorney General cannot do so. Although the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA) provides that a first assistant automatically succeeds to a vacant office, that rule of automatic succession applies only to a first assistant who held that position at the time the vacancy arose; it does not apply to a first assistant who never served under a validly appointed official. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). Nor can the Attorney General create a de facto Acting U.S. Attorney by delegating all of the functions and duties of the U.S. Attorney to someone else. The FVRA is “the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties of any office,” so it prohibits a complete delegation of all of the U.S. Attorney’s powers to a single person. Id. § 3347.

Applying those principles, we affirm the district court’s order disqualifying Sigal Chattah, the putative Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada, from supervising the prosecutions of the defendants in these cases. . . .

On January 17, 2025, Jason Frierson resigned as the U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada. At that time, First Assistant U.S. Attorney Sue Fahami became the Acting U.S. Attorney by operation of the FVRA, which provides that upon the resignation of a Senate-confirmed officer, “the first assistant to the office of such officer shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting capacity.” 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1).

Two months later, the Attorney General invoked 28 U.S.C. § 546 to appoint Sigal Chattah as the interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada, effective April 1. That statute permits the Attorney General to appoint an interim U.S. Attorney when the position of U.S. Attorney is vacant, id. § 546(a), but limits the service of an interim U.S. Attorney to a term of 120 days, id. § 546(c)(2). Chattah’s 120-day term would have expired on July 30.

On July 28, Chattah resigned as the interim U.S. Attorney. In her resignation letter, she stated that she “look[ed] forward to continuing to lead the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nevada.” The same day, the Attorney General designated Chattah as the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Nevada. In the designation order, the Attorney General asserted that “[a]s First Assistant United States Attorney, Ms. Chattah will have authority to serve as Acting United States Attorney upon a vacancy in that office” by operation of the FVRA. At the same time, the Attorney General also appointed Chattah “as a Special Attorney to the United States Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 515” and authorized her “to conduct in the District of Nevada, any kind of legal proceedings, civil or criminal, . . . which United States Attorneys are authorized to conduct.” . . . .

The maneuvers used to extend Chattah’s time atop the U.S. Attorney’s Office are not unique to the District of Nevada. The Attorney General has employed similar— though not always identical—tactics to extend the service of other temporary appointees who have not been confirmed by the Senate. The district court’s reasoning was consistent with that of the other courts to consider those tactics, every one of which has concluded that they violate the limits imposed by the FVRA. See United States v. Giraud, 160 F.4th 390, 400– 01 (3d Cir. 2025); United States v. Ramirez, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2025); United States v. James, 810 F. Supp. 3d 752, 762–63 (E.D. Va. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-4673 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025); United States v. Comey, 810 F. Supp. 3d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-4674 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas to Off. of N.Y. State Att’y Gen., 814 F. Supp. 3d 284, 292 (N.D.N.Y. 2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-156 (2d Cir. argued May 4, 2026); United States v. RamirezMartinez, No. 22-cr-01721, 2026 WL 113431, at *15 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2026)."

Yep. Obvious. 

People v. Shove (Cal. Supreme Court - Aug. 13, 2026)

I won't opine about the 5-2 dispute between the majority and the dissent about whether there was a Batson error here. You can read the entire 139-page thing on that point if you would like.

I will only say that this is one of those cases where even someone like me might want to sentence the defendant to death. Not the only one, for sure. But one.

Because Theodore Shove III does indeed seem like an affirmatively evil person.

Regardless, Shove is now 74 years old. He's going to die in prison. As a practical matter vis-a-vis his sentence, no big deal either way.

Turrey v. Vervent (9th Cir. - Aug. 12, 2026)

This is an opinion about accrual dates for RICO violations, but what's somewhat (very marginally) strange about it is that it seems like Judge Mendoza is deliberately writing the opinion to be extremely accessible to the general public.

Check it out for yourself. The language and analysis just seems . . . simple. To be clear: Not simplistic, but instead, pitched to a low-level audience. Explaining basic concepts using simple words and ideas.

That's not necessarily a bad thing, of course. It's just that your typical Ninth Circuit opinion involves complex issues and gets discussed in a complex fashion. This one just reads different to me.

That might not be unusual for a high-profile opinion that's potentially going to be read by lots of people in the general public. But it's not like normal people commonly pick up opinions about when injuries accrue for statute of limitations purposes in federal RICO statutes, right?

I put Judge Mendoza's text into a couple of online analysis websites and they all say the writing is at around a 12th grade level. That's not simple, of course. But it's a lot lower, I suspect, than a lot of Ninth Circuit opinions that are written for what I suspect is a more graduate-school audience.

Just unusual. Not bad. Different.

Something that jumped out at me that I thought I would point out.

Simerley v. Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Trans. Dist. (Cal. Ct. App. - August 11, 2026)

Maritime law. You know it. You love it. That's what today's Court of Appeal opinion is all about.

Loss of consortium claims aren't available under the Jones Act. So the wife of an injured seaman -- he worked on a ferryboat -- can't sue.

Sorry about that. But the law is the law. Demurrer sustained and affirmed.

Family Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 10, 2026)

I have no problem with today's opinion by the California Supreme Court, which holds that indigent litigants are entitled to have their hearings officially recorded on tape -- notwithstanding a statute that expressly precludes it -- if they can't afford a private court reporter. Indeed, that seems a very salutary holding, and I applaud it.

I'll nonetheless mention that the most critical part of the opinion, if my view, is the third footnote, so I want to make sure everyone reads it. The Court expressly holds that we're not just talking about in forma pauperis litigants; instead, this right applies to anyone who can't afford a court reporter. Here's what that footnote says:

"Although our discussion primarily refers to indigent litigants, we do not suggest some absolute standard of indigency. Instead, the right to proceed in forma pauperis extends to any litigant who cannot reasonably afford the costs necessary to access the judicial process. In this case, the litigants at issue include all litigants who cannot afford to hire a private court reporter to provide an official verbatim record of their proceeding. Because the costs involved in hiring a private court reporter can be significant, the population of litigants who cannot afford to hire a private court reporter, but who can afford to pay routine court fees and costs, may be large. Courts should be flexible in assessing a litigant’s ability to pay. We have previously rejected the contention that “a formal in forma pauperis application is required before relief can be granted.” (Conover, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 852.)"

As a result, I expect that a lot -- indeed, perhaps the majority of -- civil litigants will be entitled to ask for a tape recording under today's decision. With no formal IFP motion required.

I would expect to shortly see a massive increase in standardized recording in state courts.