Defendant is accused of kidnapping his adult fiancée and taking her to Mexico. At his preliminary hearing, he subpoenas to testify in his defense. Presumably to say, inter alia, that she went with him voluntarily and of her own accord, which strikes me as typically a pretty good defense in these types of cases.
The trial court, however, quashes the subpoena and refuses to allow her to testify. Holding that because she's been temporarily institutionalized under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act since she's unable to provide for herself, that finding categorically means she's incompetent to testify.
Unlike most of the cases I discuss, I don't really have anything to say other than what Justice Fields writes in his opinion. But I just wanted to emphasize it, because its truth seems so obviously clear to me.
Just because someone is "unable to provide for [their] basic personal needs of food,
clothing, and/or shelter" -- or even if they're not able to make their own rational medical decisions -- and thus properly appointed a guardian under the LPS Act in no way, shape or form necessarily mean that they are also "incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth" such that they are incompetent to testify under the California Evidence Code.
Far from it. Many people who can't care for themselves, or make critical medical decisions, due to a particular mental disability are nonetheless quite capable of understanding the difference between a truth and a lie. The former is not coextensive with the latter.
It may well be that, at the preliminary hearing, the content or manner of expression of the fiancée's testimony will be found to be uncredible, or disorganized, or subject to impeachment. Indeed, were the trial court to examine the witness and, upon examination, discover that, yes, this particular witness was so mentally challenged that she did not, in fact, know what it means to tell (what she believed to be) the truth, then perhaps that particular disability is so strong that this particular witness is incompetent to testify.
But as a categorical rule? No way.
And, as a general matter, geeze. It's an incredibly serious charge -- kidnapping. I can't fathom that it's not affirmatively critical that the judge (and, ultimately, jury) hear what the alleged victim has to say. Maybe they'll believe her when she says (if she does) that it was consensual. Maybe they won't. Or, maybe, if the disability is super serious, they'll conclude in a particular case that she was so disabled that she wasn't capable of effective consent anyway.
But let her testify.
Before reading today's opinion, I would have thought that would have been clear to everyone.
Given the trial court's contrary ruling, however: Apparently not.
