Defendant files a Racial Justice Act claim alleging that the Riverside District Attorney disproportionately seeks the death penalty against Black defendants than White defendants. The judge assigned to the case was former ADA with the Riverside DA's office. She didn't participate in the existing prosecution, and was not the responsible district attorney in any of the 28 cases that the defendant is comparing to his for RJA purposes. She was, however, at staff meetings in which the decision to seek the death penalty was discussed, so arguably has some personal knowledge of why that penalty might have been sought in any of those particular cases.
As a result, there's a challenge for cause seeking her recusal. The presiding judge denies the challenge, but the Court of Appeal reverses. "Here, Judge Shouka made recommendations as to filing charges in homicide cases during the relevant period of time involved in the RJA motion, and was present at staffing meetings where decisions were made in other cases as to the charges to be filed. While we do not find that Judge Shouka was actually biased in this case, a person aware of these facts might reasonably entertain a doubt as to whether Judge Shouka could be impartial in determining if the DAO had a pattern of institutional bias, explicit bias, or historical and systematic bias in filing homicide charges, when she was personally involved in these decisions while at the DAO."
You can see the argument, right?
Here's the interesting thing, though. Albeit a twist nowhere discussed in the Court of Appeal's opinion.
The party seeking recusal here isn't the defendant. It's the Riverside DA's office.
In other words, the Riverside DA's office is worried that the judge at issue might have personal knowledge of how death penalty decisions are, in fact, made in that office; in particular, whether they are based upon racial or other illegal grounds. That's information that the DA's office does not want considered.
It would be fairly routine for a defendant to not want a former DA who's now a judge deciding if that DA's office was racist in its charging decisions. That's what you might expect.
It's a bit different when the DA's office itself doesn't want a former DA in that office expressing judgment on that issue.
Interesting twist, eh?
