Eid v. Alaska Airlines (9th Cir. - July 30, 2010)

Alaska Airlines generally gets very positive reviews. But not in this Ninth Circuit opinion.

I think that Chief Judge Kozinski writes a "fair and balanced" opinion here, and one that's more persuasive than the dissent, authored by Judge Otero (sitting by designation). Perhaps what the flight crew did here was reasonable. But this is a summary judgment motion, and if you believe what the plaintiffs (and the impartial witness) says, they've got a legitimate case.

In Re Marriage of Guo and Sun (Cal. Ct. App. - July 28, 2010)

It's sweet that the two of you went to Las Vegas on Valentine's Day, 2001, and got married. It's an impulse, I know, but one from the heart.

The next day, the husband filed a petition to dissolve his marriage. To his first wife.

Problem. You might have wanted to do those in reverse order.

So there's no marriage, and when, for financial reasons, the husband wants to be declared a "putative" spouse, no dice. He knew he was married when he got married the second time. That's just straight up deliberate bigamy, not a basis for declaring someone a putative spouse.

So, if you're already married, remember: Divorce, then marriage. Not the other way around.

People v. Perez (Cal. Supreme Ct. - July 29, 2010)

When you spontaneously decide to do a drive-by shooting, you might want to make sure that the group of eight people who you think look like opposing gang members really are who you think they are. And not actually police officers.

Because police officers don't like getting shot at. And they're going to work pretty hard to close this one.

People v. Wong (Cal. Ct. App. - July 28, 2010)

Let's see what I learned from this opinion:

(1) Kaiser spends $9 million in Southern California to "influence" the community. This basically entails buying meals for government officials and others and taking them to sporting events. Oh, yeah, and buying the L.A. Deputy Mayor a massage that has a "happy ending". Glad to hear it.

(2) The guy at Kaiser in charge of (1) also embezzles money by buying tickets for Kaiser and selling them on the side.

(3) Graft in the private sector employment isn't the only way to make a living. The same guy in (2) was also appointed to various commissions by the City of L.A. And took bribes -- er, I mean, "consulting payments" -- from private companies to influence the City.

(4) He also cheats on his taxes.

Ah, the cesspool of public and private employment.

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrel (9th Cir. - July 28, 2010)

There's a forest fire in Montana. Trees are damaged, and some are going to die. So the Forest Service wants to allow a timber harvest of some of the dead and dying trees.

That makes sense to me. Sure, they're going to need to build some temporary roads to do the logging. But not that many, and they'll obliterate 'em after the logging. Seems fine.

The Forest Service wants this to happen quickly, without administrative appeals, because as the trees die, their volume and value diminishes. I can see that as well. We want to take these guys down before they fall and stuff, and during winter, we can't get to 'em. Arguably that's fine too, though I'm not entirely understanding the argument. Regardless, the Forest Service makes an emergency declaration and puts the logging up for bid, and tree clearing starts in late summer.

All of this makes sense to me. Mind you, part of the emergency declaration makes me a little wary, since it repeatedly refers to the fact that "the timber industry in Montana increasingly depends upon National Forest System timber supply as an essential element to keep their mills operational," which makes you suspicious about the true motivating factors here. But I'd still be largely inclined to allow the emergency declaration and let the timber harvesting go forward without allowing any appeals.

Except for two things. First, what's the alleged harm of delay resulting from administrative appeals? The Forest Service says that the delay won't harm the environment or anything, but instead will merely reduce the proceeds of the timber sales (since the trees will be smaller). I guess that could be a justification for circumventing the normal process. But how much are we talking here? $50 million? $500 million?

Nope. The Forest Service says that "[s]uch a delay [from allowing administrative appeals] would push the award of timber salvage contracts to late 2009 . . . . [and] by that time further deterioration of the affected trees will have resulted in a projected loss of receipts to the government of as much as $16,000."

Sixteen thousand American dollars?! You've got to be kidding me. Well, by all means, let's definitely disallow any environmental appeals then. We're talking a major revenue loss. The whole federal budget might need to be revised.

Second, the Forest Service's alleged need for speed here seems to be belied by the fact that the fire took place two years before they allowed the timber sales and declared an emergency. Why did they wait two years? No one knows. Not even the Forest Service's lawyer at oral argument. Somewhat inconsistent with a dire emergency, eh?

So I started out somewhat sympathetic to the Fire Service here. But didn't really end up that way. Nor did the Ninth Circuit. Which enjoined the "emergency" logging. Though half of it was already finished last year anyway.

Still. "As much as sixteen thousand dollars." Still brings a smile to my face.

Geo-Energy Partners 1983 Ltd. v. Salazar (9th Cir. - July 27, 2010)

It's not always easy reading every published decision. Sometimes you've got really, really long ones. Others begin: "This appeal presents the question of whether the procedures for periodic revision of units in the 1988 Amendments to the Geothermal Steam Act apply to pre-amendment contract provisions." Makes you really want to slog through the next twenty-one single-spaced pages, eh?

The take-away message I got from the opinion is that, apparently, you can waste twenty years or so essentially doing nothing productive on geothermal land leased from the government. Sadly. Though, eventually, we'll kick you out, and the Ninth Circuit will affirm.

And just to prove I read the whole thing: Page 10782, first full sentence, reads "In response, Geo-Energy sent a letter to the BLM complaining that in seven years the BLM had not nothing to compel FLPC to undertake diligent development, and should have removed FLPC as the operator." I think the "not" should be "done".

Though I can understand the lack of proofreading. It made me sleepy just reading this one once.

Still, I increased my knowledge of geothermal leases. From zero to slightly above zero. Which is something.

Constant self-improvement. That's my motto.

In Re Shippman (Cal. Ct. App. - June 8, 2010)

Robert Shippman is a regular guy. He "was raised on a chicken farm in central California by his mother and father with 10 older siblings. Petitioner‘s parents remained married, and provided well for their large family. His father worked as a rancher and then, upon his retirement, became a local pastor. Petitioner recalls a happy, stable childhood, with no issues of emotional or physical abuse, substance abuse, disciplinary problems or medical problems of any kind." Okay, so the chickens and the ten siblings are a little unusual, I admit. But otherwise totally normal.

Shippman graduates high high school and attends one year of college before meeting and marrying his first wife and leaving school to get a job. They have a daughter, but they get divorced. Why? Because, after seven years of marriage, Shippman's wife becomes pregnant by one of his best friends. Harsh.

So much for Wife I. Two years later, Shippman marries Wife II. They have a daughter (as well as a blended family) and are married for 22 years. Sweet.

But what happens? This time, Shippman -- who's now in his 50s -- has an affair. With twenty-something-old Juli. Who promptly becomes Wife III.

Shippman and Juli are married for two short years. What happens? Juli has affairs. Two of 'em. The second of which is with a local police officer and that prompts her to ask for a divorce.

Shippman is devastated, and desperately tries to get back together with Juli. But she's not interested. During one of their talks, when it becomes clear Juli's never coming back, Shippman takes out a rifle and shoots her three times -- twice in the chest and once in the head. He then does the same to himself. She dies. He lives.

Sex. It's a powerful thing. Not always in a good way.

Rahimzadeh v. Holder (9th Cir. - July 26, 2010)

It's not too hard to avoid deportation to Iran if you're a Muslim who converted to Christianity and proselytize. They don't really like that there. We won't do that to you.

The Netherlands, however, is another matter. That's a much tougher sell. Amesterdam ain't exactly Tehran.

Davis v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. - July 22, 2010)

I never understand why they ask the guy "Do you bang?" (i.e., if the person is in a gang) when the questioner is going to shoot the victim regardless of what he says.

I read cases like this all the time. What's the right answer that avoids you being killed? If you say "No," as here, you get shot. Clearly, if you say "Yes," you're getting shot.

Is there a secret password or something? Q: "Do you bang?" A: "Plastics". Q: "Have a nice day."

People v. Khaled (App. Div. - July 22, 2010)

Next time you get your picture taken at a red light camera, use this opinion to get out of the fine.

I'm a little bit dubious about the reasoning here, and am not sure there's really a Confrontation Clause problem here, but I'm happy to take advantage of the thing. While it lasts, anyway.

Mattel v. MGA (9th Cir. - July 22, 2010)

Not a good day for Barbie.

Mattel, which ows Barbie, sued MGA, which owns the "Bratz" line of dolls. Mattel obtained a favorable jury verdict at trial, although it received only $10 million of the $1 billion it requested. But Mattel won an even greater victory thereafter when the district court granted Mattel wide-ranging equitable relief that essentially awarded Mattel control over the vast majority of the Bratz line.

MGA appealed. And this morning, MGA defeated Mattel on virtually every point. Chief Judge Kozinski's opinion holds that while a retrial is likely required on remand, the scope of relief that might perhaps be awarded to Mattel therein is exceptionally limited.

MGA couldn't have hoped for a much more favorable opinion. Barbie took it on the chin.

People v. Wilson (Cal. Ct. App. - July 13, 2010)

What counts as "immediate"? Around 10 months, apparently. Even in the context of a criminal statute. Which is why Anthony Wilson is going to spend the next 25 years to life in prison. That plus, of course, the fact that he told a corrections officer that he'd "blast" him after he got out of prison in 10 months.

Here's what the Court of Appeal, per Justice Poochigian, says about the immediacy requirement: "We fully appreciate the importance of the time element in determining whether a threat violates section 422. The appraisal of the immediacy of a threat under section 422 quite

appropriately includes assessment of the sense of urgency and foreboding caused to the

person being threatened. . . . The targeted officer had a sense of urgency and foreboding which was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. The threat of serious injury upon the occasion of release of the prospective assailant from prison in just 10 months does represent an immediate prospect of execution—not a distant event beyond the scope of section 422." By contrast, Justice Wiseman says, dissenting in part: "These facts do not prove, however, that the threat conveyed an immediate prospect of execution, as required by section 422. The prospect of carrying out a threat in 10 months is not consistent with the plain meaning of the word “immediate.” Immediate is defined as “not separated in time; acting or happening at once; without delay; instant.” (Webster’s New World Dict. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 701.) . . . . Unlike other decisions addressing threats made by incarcerated prisoners, there was no evidence that Wilson said or that Officer Thornberry believed Wilson could carry out an immediate attack while in prison; could direct others outside the prison to carry out an immediate attack; or would be released within a few days and carry out an attack. The only “prospect of execution” at issue was the prospect of Wilson being released from prison in 10 months as scheduled, and at that time obtaining means to carry out an assault, finding Thornberry, and assaulting him."

An enlightening temporal debate.

County of San Diego v. Gorham (Cal. Ct. App. - July 21, 2010)

There's always been a part of me that's profoundly concerned with a lot of default judgments. We routinely base them -- as we must -- on declarations of service. The affidavits of service almost always look fine. But what if the process server is simply lying? Wouldn't it be totally easy just to say you've served someone, and instead go out and have a beer? The consequences for the defendant are severe, and how could we ever catch the process server in the lie?

Here's one way. When the person allegedly served was incarcerated when they were allegedly served at a place they hadn't lived over a year. When that's the case, well, it's pretty easy to catch.

But that's pretty unusual. In most cases, it'll be the "neutral" process server's word against the self-interested defendant's. Or, more often, the process server's completed declaration versus nobody, since the defendant won't show up. In such settings, who wouldn't believe the process server?

I can't devise a better system. We have to rely on people's word at some level. But here's a setting in which I'm not sure that reputational and other incentives really work, if only because of the low likelihood of getting caught. So it's a potential problem without any real solution. Except in cases like this one, which is the exceptionally rare case in which (1) we can be pretty sure the process server committed perjury, and (2) we can also be pretty sure that the allegedly served defendant had a totally good defense on the merits.

Small solace.

People v. Glazier (Cal. Ct. App. - July 19, 2010)

Here's a good hypothetical. Something appropriate for the California bar exam, or maybe a class on California criminal law:

"Defendant hates his next-door neighbor. While the neighbor is remodeling his house, and living elsewhere, defendant stands on his own property, uses a paint sprayer to spray gasoline into the crawl space of his neighbor's home, and lights it on fire with a 20-foot torch, burning the house to the ground. For what major crimes can defendant properly be convicted?"

I'm sure you got arson, of course. And if you're fancy, "arson of an inhabited structure or property." Possession of flammable material too, though the sentence on that isn't exactly major. Some other relatively minor charges as well.

But you're missing something. An offense that's charged in California in a very high number of cases, and that carries a heavy penalty. No, not attempted murder; remember, the house was unoccupied, and defendant knew that.

Burglary.

Did the defendant break into the house? No. Did defendant steal or take anything? No. Did defendant ever even leave his own lawn? Nope.

Still, in California, it's burglary. Because an instrument he held (the torch) entered the property of another in order to commit a felony.

Get that one right?

People v. Knightbent (Cal. Ct. App. - July 19, 2010)

I occasionally make fun of various appeals that concern trivial sums, particularly when the transaction costs of litigating the matter completely swamp what's at stake.

I'm glad to see the Court of Appeal make a similar mention.

Justice Raye begins the opinion by saying: "In this case, the services of an appointed counsel and a deputy attorney general, together with three justices and staff of this court, are applied to the resolution of a single issue: whether the court's order imposing a $34 fine on defendant was proper under Penal Code section 1202.5[]. Defendant argues the court erred and the fine must be reduced to $10."

I like it. Twenty four American dollars at stake. Almost enough to buy Manhattan. Definitely worth the investment of social resources.

Though I'll also mention that the Court of Appeal itself spends a lot more than $24 by deciding to publish the opinion. That's some trees, even for an 11-pager. Plus suggests that perhaps the appeal apparently concerns something that's at issue in a large number of cases and hence worthy of publication and social attention.

VISA Int'l v. JSL Corp. (9th Cir. - June 28, 2010)

The web site "evisa.com" illegally dilutes VISA's trademark, the Ninth Circuit holds in an opinion written by Chief Judge Kozinski. An opinion that, characteristically, is both well-written and makes sure to include a plethora of cultural and brand references.

Which is great. Now I'm just hoping they take down the State Department's evisa web site too.

La Serena Properties v. Weisbach (Cal. Ct. App. - July 15, 2010)

I agree with the Court of Appeal here. You can't sue an arbitrator for failing to disclose conflicts. Even if the failure to disclose as allegedly "corrupt" or part of a "conspiracy."

Your proper remedy is limited to vacating the arbitration award. Which is precisely what in fact transpired here.

That said -- and that's all that need be said to resolve the case -- I think that if you're a proposed arbitrator and your girlfriend is the sister of defendant's lawyers, you need to say more than just: “[Defendant's lawyer] is a personal friend. While I do not believe that our relationship would prejudice my hearing of this matter, this relationship does present a potential conflict."

How about: "I am in an ongoing romantic relationship with the sister of defendant's lawyer, and also know counsel personally. Let me know if you would like to select a different arbitrator." Or, even better: "I unfortunately cannot accept the appointment, as my relationships might create at least the appearance of impropriety."

People v. Alexander (Cal. Supreme Ct. - July 15, 2010)

There's virtually no physical evidence at all. The eyewitness identifications are shaky. The crime was unsolved for over a decade. It was a random shooting for inexplicable reasons.

But the person shot and killed was a Secret Service agent. On duty. And a woman. When you're convicted, you're going to be sentenced to death. And the California Supreme Court will affirm in a unanimous (and 130-page) opinion.

The discussion on pages 98 to 106 seems the most troubling issue to me. A juror says during jury deliberations that s/he's not willing to vote guilty because there's no positive identification of the defendant or physical evidence at the scene. But the other 11 jurors want a guilty verdict.

So the foreman writes the court a note, and tells the judge that the one juror said: "If we could positively identify him, I would fry his ass just like the rest of you. But without a positive i.d., I . . . cannot vote for guilty." The court then pulls the jury back in expressly instructs them about circumstantial evidence being okay and the like -- instructions clearly targeted at the holdout juror.

Those are proper instructions, of course. But the process used seems a pretty powerful way to deliver a specific message. So a specific juror who's vote you know and want to change.

Oh, yeah. When, at the penalty phase, you do the exact same thing again -- albeit in a different context -- it seems only worse. There, the foreman writes another note: "We have a split eleven to one + the holdout will not listen to any reason. Please let us know how to continue. The holdout is based on the children." So the judge calls the jury in and tells them that their decision can't be based on sympathy for a third party; e.g., the defendant's children. Thirty-five minutes of deliberations later, the jury unanimously comes back with a verdict of death.

At some point the judge risks becoming a participant in an interactive process with the jurors during deliberations. That's not right. Or at least it's not our system. Even though what the judge told the jurors was totally correct as a matter of law, the process employed here seems troubling to me.

Something that I'm sure will hear more about -- in another decade or so -- when the federal habeas proceedings reach the Ninth Circuit.

(At which point Alexander will be around 40 years older than when he committed the offense. If he lives that long.)

P.S. - For a sharp contrast to Alexander, take a look at Solomon, decided the same morning by the same court and with the same unanimous result. Solomon's unquestionably guilty, and the trial's not infected with any error. The result in Solomon is easy. The two cases are night and day.

Rhodes v. Henry (9th Cir. - July 15, 2010)

Paul Rhodes is charged with and convicted for the capital crime of first degree murder of -- as well as the kidnapping, robbery, and rape of -- Susan Michelbacher. He's sentenced to death.

Seems to me like also convicting the guy for "the infamous crime against nature" is sort of piling on, no?

Plus, maybe Idaho could make it's criminal code a little more "hip" -- as well as constitutional -- by changing the statute. Which currently reads: "Every person who is guilty of the infamous crime against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment in the sate prison [for] not less than five years."

I think we can handle the word "sodomy" in 2010. As well as allow it consensually. And maybe not punish all of it with a mandatory minimum of five years (to life).

I'm just sayin'.

POSTSCRIPT - Speaking of the infamous crime against nature, someone who did NOT testify before Congress recently pointed me in the direction of this unintentionally funny case (Lason), uncertain whether the case "is as well known to your generation." Let the diffusion of knowledge commence.

U.S. v. Hinkson (9th Cir. - July 14, 2010)

Rare.

Judges usually don't change their mind. Especially in a high-profile en banc case.

But here's what Chief Judge Kozinski says this morning, in a case that I've talked about on several occasions (here, here and here), and that -- as I've mentioned -- has been unusual from the outset:

"I continue to agree with, and join, that portion of the opinion explaining how we review for abuse of discretion, but now disagree with the application of this standard to the case before us. I had underestimated the trust some jurors would have placed in Swisher if they thought he was a decorated combat veteran, and the likely backlash if they had learned he was a fraud. My change of heart came about after I read the Supreme Court’s summary reversal in Porter v. McCollum,

130 S. Ct. 447 (2009), and the amicus brief of William Mac Swain filed in our case. Without Swisher, the government had no case. I’m now persuaded that Judge Fletcher has the better of the argument for the reasons articulated in his dissent, which I join in full."

Equally unusual as a change of heart is to single out an amicus brief as a motivating factor. Mac Swain, by the way, is the President of the Korean War Veteran's Association, and his brief was prepared by John Keker.

Impressive.