There's a lot to be said for the result here. But I wish that Justice Hull's opinion would perhaps been a bit more moderate and nuanced.
Mr. Chism has been sentenced to 60 years in prison, but is dying, and wants compassionate release. The Department of Corrections wants that too; they don't want to have to spend all the state's resources on his medical care, which is not a core DOC function. They would rather release the guy, have him go on Medi-Cal (paid for with substantial federal, not state, dollars), and then die in 16-19 months on someone else's dime.
That's what the Legislature wants too. Which is why it passed a statute that requires compassionate release in particular cases. Like this one, says Mr. Chism.
Justice Hull analyzes the statute and notes, correctly, that compassionate release also requires a postrelease plan. The Legislature doesn't want the Department of Corrections simply dumping these people on the street, after all. Hence the rule.
Here, as Justice Hull explains, and for the precise reasons identified by the trial court, the postrelease plan submitted with respect to Mr. Chism wouldn't work. The plan was to have him live with his sister, but that doesn't jibe with his parole requirements.
Fair enough. So there's no adequate postrelease plan, and the Court of Appeal cogently explains why. And on that basis, affirms the trial court's decision to refuse compassionate release.
But in reaching that result, I think the Court of Appeal doesn't give sufficient weight to either the statutory text or its purpose and structure. Yes, the statute does indeed require an adequate postrelease plan. But I think it's important to note that this plan is not an obligation of the defendant; it's a requirement imposed on the Department of Corrections. The statute says that compassionate release must be requested (and, if there's no danger to the public, granted) if the "incarcerated person has a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory." That seems to be the case here (though Justice Hull is correct that given the trial court's holding on an unrelated point, there's no actual finding in this regard).
The statute also says that “any recommendation for recall submitted to the court by the department” must include a “postrelease plan.” True enough. That's what the Court of Appeal holds did not properly happen here, and it's why the trial court denied compassionate release.
But denying the defendant release from prison because someone else didn't do their mandatory duty under an express statute hardly seems fair. The defendant suffers because the DOC can't get its act together? Is that really what the Legislature intended? So even though the Legislature expressly wanted non-dangerous prisoners released when they're terminally ill, the Department of Corrections can nonetheless keep them in prison until they die by not submitting a proper postrelease plan? That's what the Court of Appeal seems to hold, and I'm not confident that's the proper remedy. At the very least, I would like the issue explored in depth; an analysis that doesn't really exist in today's opinion, which is more categorical and casts itself as the obvious result of a statutory command.
Do I want there to be a proper postrelease plan for Mr. Chism? Of course. Do I want him released without one? Like the Legislature; no, not really. I want the DOC to do what the statute requires -- not only for the sake of the public, but also for Mr. Chism's sake. There should be a plan for how we're going to get this guy housing and medical care once he's released; at a bare minimum, so he doesn't spend his last months on this Earth in agony.
But is the solution categorically to just keep him in prison until he dies? That's the solution that the Legislature intended? That's the solution that the statute affirmatively requires?
Those are the issues I would like to see addressed. Because I think the problem here is a nuanced one, rather than one easily and simply solved by a purported statutory command.
