Tuesday, May 08, 2012

Aleksik v. 7-Eleven (Cal. Ct. App. - May 8, 2012)

I get what Justice McConnell is saying here.  Yes, the employees worked at 7-11, and yes, all franchises were required by 7-11 to use 7-11's payroll system.  But that doesn't mean that 7-11 is liable for errors in the payroll process.  Even systemic errors.  If there's a problem, maybe you can sue your employer.  But not 7-11.

That's an understandable point.

It's also colored, I imagine, by the underlying substantive claim.  Which lots of people would find trivial.

Plaintiffs contend that 7-11's payroll system shorts its workers.  That's a serious charge.  It's also totally correct; indeed, essentially undisputed.  Employees have to "clock in" at 7-11 electronically, and 7-11 then calculates the number of hours they've worked.  That's all fine.

But 7-11 ignores all hours after two decimal places.  So if you work 7.353 hours, you only get paid for 7.35.  You lose the .003.

So that's wrong.  But not much.  For example, 7-11 hired an economist to pull 158 random employees, and found out that only 348 pay periods were truncated.  Still, that's 348, right?  But of those 348, 336 involved no difference in pay even after truncation.  (That's the benefit, I imagine, of paying almost all of your people minimum wage and having them work part-time.)

That leaves, however, eight employees who were shorted for twelve total time periods.  How much pay did they lose?  An average of 4 cents per week.  With the largest loss in the sample of less than fifty cents.

So you can see why the trial court and the Court of Appeal probably aren't that excited about the case.  Who cares?!

That said, I must admit that I'm baffled as to why 7-11 elects to truncate the decimals rather than round them.  Sure, you could say that it's administrative ease.  But it's all computers.  You can round just as easily as truncating; indeed, probably more so.  And I'll bet dollars to Slurpees that 7-11 makes sure to round lots and lots of figures -- including the amounts it charges customers at the gas pump -- rather than truncate the numbers.  A penny here and a penny there, after all, adds up.

So I must say that I'm sympathetic with the plaintiff here.  And think that maybe claims like this are precisely why we have class actions.  Maybe there's only $1000 (or $10,000, or whatever) at stake.  But if people are getting ripped off for that amount, and its easy to do the right thing (as it is here), that seems like something we'd want to remedy.

The Court of Appeal holds that maybe plaintiffs can go after the individual employers -- the franchises.  Okay. 

Mind you, at that point, we're talking about maybe $10 per store, so I'm not sure it's economical.  But that's apparently what the law requires.  Which means that there's no remedy.

Which I'm not too sad about.  If 7-11 changes its policy.  But I gotta say that if, even after this action, 7-11 kept calculating pay this way, I'd be more than willing to slam them.

Because it's wrong.  Even if it's only a quarter.

Monday, May 07, 2012

People v. Dunn (Cal. Ct. App. - May 7, 2012)

If you give an eight-year old syphilis, you may well go to jail for 25 years to life.  At least down here in San Diego.

I won't comment much on syphilis counting as "great bodily injury" notwithstanding the fact that we're no longer in the seventeenth century and accordingly can successfully treat it relatively easily.  The term "great bodily injury" essentially means "any bodily injury" here in California; so much so that defendant does not even contest the point.  Words can sometimes mean the exact opposite of what normal people think they might mean.  Such is the case here.

The only reason the case is worthy of mention -- other than serving as a valuable reminder not to molest children -- is because the defendant's principal contention on appeal is that a mistrial should have been declared because his retained expert witness, Dr. Lynne Ticson, didn't show up for the trial.  What kind of expert witness accepts a case and then says "Oh, well, sorry, I'm not going to be able to make it; I'm on vacation that day?"  Especially in a case in which the defendant faces exposure of 25 to life?  Seriously?

Plus, I get that Dr. Ticson allegedly gave defense counsel the runaround (not answering the phone, etc.), but what kind of defense lawyer refuses to respond to these events by (1) not serving a subpoena on the expert, and/or (2) asking for a continuance from the trial court?  Seems to me like these are two fairly obvious solutions.

I agree with the Court of Appeal that there's no reason to reverse the conviction here.  But that doesn't mean that what transpired below wasn't -- let's put it nicely -- suboptimal.  Because it was.

To reiterate:  Don't molest children.  Don't give them syphilis.  Understood?

Maldanado v. Superior Court (Cal. Supreme Ct. - April 23, 2012)

Check out Justice Liu's concurrence (joined by Justice Werdegar) in this case.  And you'll see an example of why conservatives didn't want him on the Ninth Circuit.

Friday, May 04, 2012

People v. Myles v. Livingston (Cal. Supreme Ct. - April 26, 2012)

Two different murder cases.  Two different death penalties.  Two different direct appeals to the California Supreme Court.

Decided on the same day.  Same result.  Convictions and death sentences unanimously affirmed in both cases.

So it's a race to see whether John Myles gets to die first or whether David Livingston will beat him to the needle.

Assuming, of course, that California voters don't vote in November to repeal the death penalty and replace it with LWOP.

Thursday, May 03, 2012

People v. Thomas (Cal. Supreme Ct. - May 3, 2012)

What sorts of things do you keep in your storage locker at Derrel's Mini Storage?  Just keepsakes and momentos.

A backpack.  My high school diploma.  Some cash -- okay, $13,000 -- in the backpack.

Oh, yeah.  And 2.3 pounds of cocaine.

You know.  Just the essentials.

Estate of Morgens v. CIR (9th Cir. - May 3, 2012)

"This case presents the question whether gift taxes paid by the donee trustees of a Qualifying Terminable Interest in Property (QTIP) trust, based on a 26 U.S.C. § 2519 deemed inter vivos transfer of the QTIP property within three years of the donor’s death, must be included in the transferor’s gross estate under the so-called “gross-up rule” of § 2035(b)."

Duh!  Who doesn't know the answer to that question?!

Hello?!  It's a QTIP.  (No, not the ones that go in your ear.)  It's 2519 and 2035(b).  The gross-up rules, silly!  It's so simple, maybe you need a refresher course.

The answer, of course, is yes.  Obviously.

Who has these problems?  Just your ordinary 26-year old.  To be more precise, your ordinary 26-year old who marries the former president and CEO of Proctor & Gamble from 1957 to 1974, once he dies of a heart attack at age 89.

And I know what you're thinking.  "Gold-digger!"  Because Judge Bea's opinion mentions that Anne Morgens married Howard when she was 26, but doesn't mention the date they were married.

Which is relatively easy to find out.  The two were married for . . . 65 years.

Plus, it's not really the former 26-year old's problem anyway.  She died two years after he died.  Which which what caused these tax "planning" (read: avoidance) issues in the first place.

The Ninth Circuit gets this one right.  You can't do some tricks on your death bed in order to decrease your estate tax.  Sorry about that.  But Congress knows the scoop.  So do judges.  And now, so do we.  Even if the words QTIP and gross-up continue to mean something different to tax practitioners than they do to normal people.

Wednesday, May 02, 2012

Husain v. McDonald's Corp. (Cal. Ct. App. - April 30, 2012)

If you've ever eaten at a McDonald's in Marin County -- and I express no judgment on this issue -- and wanted to know more about the franchise at which you dined, here's an opinion for you.

Who knew that these things were so complicated (and expensive)?

Lewis v. Fletcher Jones Motor Cars (Cal. Ct. App. - April 25, 2012)

I feel pretty confident that Fletcher Jones Motor Cars is going to win the underlying case.  Despite the fact that they lost their motion to compel arbitration below, as well as the resulting appeal from that ruling.

It also sounds like their lawyers are going to continue to scorch some earth during the process.  As they have already.

Notwithstanding my predictions of victory, their counsel don't come out smelling very pretty.  Not only do they lose (twice) and run up legal fees (on both sides), but their arguments on appeal are -- to be frank -- super weak.  Lame, even.
I'm also not the only one who noticed it.  Justice Aronson writes an opinion that makes pretty clear the many deficiencies of Fletcher Jones' arguments.  And misreadings of cases.  And silliness.

No shrinking violet, that one.

Tuesday, May 01, 2012

Ginsberg v. Gamson (Cal. Ct. App. - April 30, 2012)

Here's a multiple choice question for you:

Parties enter into a lease for a commercial retain premises.  The initial lease term is for five years, but an addendum to the lease also gives the tenant the option (if there's no default) to "extend the Term of this Lease for 5 (FIVE) YEARS additional FIVE year periods upon the same terms and conditions herein contained."  Note the "s" at the end of the word "periods".  This provision also refers to "each option term" -- presumably meaning there may be more than one.

The rent payable for any additional term(s) under the lease is to be calculated by using the consumer price index for 1996 over the CPI for 2001 times $3,000, and then next to this equation the word "(etc.)" appears -- presumably meaning that future terms will have an adjustment of 2001 over 2006, etc.

The parties renewed the lease for one five-year term, and then the tenant tried to renew for another five-year term, but the landlord refused.

Which of the following is the correct interpretation of the lease:

(A)  The lease only permitted one extension of five years.
(B)  The lease permitted multiple five-year extensions (subject to a statutory cap of 99 total years).
(C)  It is unclear whether the lease permitted multiple five-year extensions; the lease did not "by express terms or clearly by implication" permit multiple extensions.

The Court of Appeal concludes that the correct answer is (C) -- reversing the trial court's contrary ruling at a bench trial -- and that accordingly, the result is (A).

Agree?

People v. Cornett (Cal. Supreme Ct. - April 30, 2012)

English is a funny thing.

Let me start by saying that I think I know what it means to be "18 or older."  It means you're either age 18 or older.  In short, that you've had your eighteenth birthday.  We can all probably agree on that.

But what about when it's the reverse?  I still think I generally know, but it's harder.  Imagine that you can't do something if you are "age 18 or younger."  Well, I think that means that if you're 18, or 17, or 16, etc., you can't do it.  You've got to have had your nineteenth birthday.

But what if it's slightly different:  What if a statute applies only if someone is "18 years of age or younger?"  That might well mean the same thing.  But it might potentially mean something slightly different.  One might read such wording to mean that once you hit 18, you're free:  in other words, that you're only exactly "18 years of age" on your birthday, and so the statute only applies if it's on that day or before then.

Context may thus matter a lot.  At least when we're using conjunctive or disjunctive language.

Let's then talk about an actual case.  This one.  One in the California Supreme Court.  What does it mean when a statute says that a defendant gets punished more severely if the victim is "a child who is ten years of age or younger?"  If the kid's ten-and-a-half, does the statute apply?

The Califronia Supreme Court unanimously reverses the Court of Appeal and holds that, yeah, ten-and-a-half is ten years of age or younger.  It adopts a very simple interpretation of the words.  To phrase it differently than the court did (but equally accurately), the term "ten years of age or younger" is simply disjunctive.  You can be ten or younger.  We commonly call ten-and-a-half year olds "ten".  Simple.  End of story.  Staute applies.

That version has a lot of truth to it.  To be honest, when I read the words, that's what they mean to me too.  If a ride at Disneyland says to need to be "ten yeas of age or younger" to ride it -- think, Teacups -- then I'd be pissed if they didn't let my ten-year old daughter (let's call her "Sierra") ride it.  I'd think she was entitled to ride.

But I'm not sure that's entirely dispositive of the matter.  Let's go into a little bit more detail.

Because, as I said, context matters.

The California Supreme Court understood that the statute was ambiguous, so looked at the legislative history.  Several pieces of which said, essentially, that the victim had to be nine years old or younger.  Exactly what the defendant said.  But the California Supremes said that this language isn't dispositive, and that the context that matters instead was the fact that this was anti-molestation language and hence was probably intended broadly.

I agree with the former but not the latter.

I agree that the legislative history isn't conclusive.  Yes, some people said the victim had to be nine or younger.  But they could easily have been talking loosely.  Staffers often aren't precise.  Legislators often use shorthand.  We shouldn't be overly distracted by what they say when we have a sense -- as I do here -- that they may be subject to these imperfections.

At the same time, I think the court here puts far too much weight on the anti-molestation context in which the statute was passed.  Did I think the Legislature wanted to protect child molesters?  Uh, no.  Duh.  But that doesn't necessarily mean they intended the most anti-defendant version of words that we can imagine.  They might still have meant that a line be drawn in one place rather than another.  The fact that they -- like the court -- doesn't have a soft spot for child molesters doesn't answer the question.  Doesn't even necessarily shed much light on it.

So what context do I think might matter?  One that the court never mentions.  The fact that the number the Legislature chose was ten.

Why ten?  Why are you punished more when the child is "ten" or younger?  We're not talking about an age we're all used to -- sixteen for driving, eighteen for voting, twenty-one for drinking.  Indeed, ten is not even the age we typically refer to when we talk about a kid hitting puberty or being a "kid".  That's generally twelve -- the last age in which you're not a "teenager".  If the Legislature said (as it does in many statutes) that you can't do X if you're "twelve years of age or younger," I find it very plausible to think that what they meant is that you should only be able to do it once you're a teenager.

So what's so special about ten?  Easy.  It's the first number with double digits.

The Legislature wanted to really slam child molesters who touched really small kids.  Where should we draw the line?  Thirteen?  Twelve?  Eleven?  When is it really, really bad?

You can't answer that question precisely.  So we use shorthand.  And here's an easy one:  It's really, really bad when the kid doesn't even have double digits in his age.  If he's six.  Eight.  Nine.  Wow.  You get to spend forever in prison.  Whereas if he's eleven or she's thirteen or whatever, sure, you get to spend forever in prison too, but not forever and a day.

So it seems plausible to me that in this context, that's what the Legislature meant by "age 10 or younger."  What they really meant is that the statute doesn't apply after the victim has hit double digits.  But the Legislature being the Legislature, they used imprecise language, and we're left to figure out what they meant.  And what they might well have meant is to punish extra hard people who molest people younger than ten.  Victims with single digit ages.

Am I certain that I'm right?  Of course not.  But it does explain the year they chose.  Indeed, may well explains it better than any alternative explanation.  Under the interpretation adopted by the court here, the Legislature essentially set the cutoff date at 11:  lesser penalties once the victim has her eleventh birthday.  That seems a weird age, huh?  Eleven is not an age we usually choose.  Or which we view as a "dividing line" in any meaningful way.  Either in statutes or elsewhere.

So what should you do?  One way to resolve ambiguities like this is to apply the rule of lenity.  To resolve the interpretation in favor of the defendant.  But get real.  We're not going to do that when the beneficiary is a child molester.  Or, truth be told, virtually any criminal defendant.  So we almost never find this principle dispositive.  And the California Supreme Court certainly isn't going to start doing otherwise here.  And doesn't.

Let me reiterate for the nth time that molesting kids is bad.  Let me also remind everyone that I have four kids of my own.  At least three of whom are "age ten or younger" -- four, if you adopt the court's definition here.  So I'm sympathetic to what the court's done here.  In addition to the fact that, on first glance, I gotta admit that I thought they were probably right.

But I've thought more about it now.  And the more I think, the less sure I am.

Sometimes first impressions lead one astray.  I wonder if that's the case here.

Monday, April 30, 2012

People v. Vela (Cal. Ct. App. - April 30, 2012)

It's the end of the month, so let's review.  Some very basic math.

Four prior DUIs + Driving with a .21 at 70 m.p.h. = Hitting a motorcycle and killing someone = 15 years to life in prison.

Rebecca Vela learns this lesson the hard way.  (Though not nearly as hard as the victim, Stanley Spaeth, learned it.  They pulled him out of a tree, dead.)

Diago-Guiness USA v. State Bd. of Equalization (Cal. Ct. App. - April 30, 2012)

When I read this opinion, I thought:  "This is awesome.  I'm going to start a new business today.  It'll get people drunk faster and also sleaze California out of taxes.  What's not to like?"

But then I did a little research.  And discovered that the spirits manufacturers have already beaten me to it.  In spades.

Damn.

The question in the appeal is how you tax certain forms of liquor.  The statute in California distinguishes between "beer" and "spirits".  Beer is taxed at twenty cents per gallon, whereas spirits are taxed at either sixteen-and-a-half or thirty three times that rate.  On the theory, I imagine, that we prefer beer to bourbon.  Which is true for me, at least.

This taxation regime seems pretty straightforward.  But at issue is how you tax what are called in the appeal "flavored malt beverages."  There's another term for them as well that's more colloquially used.  "Alcopop."  These are the spirits that you're increasingly seeing all over the place, and that young kids find especially appealing.  Mike's Hard Lemonade.  Smirnoff Ice.  Bacardi Breezer.  Sky Blue.  You've seen 'em.  And if you're anything like me, you've also imbibed them.  Yummy.

Flavored malt beverages ("FMBs") can be made in one of two ways.  First, you can just mix vodka (or whatever other spirit you're using) with whatever juice or other flavoring you're using to mask the taste and, boom, you've got something that 16-year olds love.  Which works from a marketing perspective, but from a tax perspective, you're clearly a "spirit" with this product, so you get taxed at the higher rate.

But here's where the brilliant folks at our alcohol manufacturers come in.  You can also make FMBs another way.  You can brew some beer, and then take everything out of the beer -- all colorness, bitterness, and taste -- essentially leaving only water, and then add the juice as well as lots of alcohol.  You're essentially doing the same thing you're doing in the alternative procedure.  But now, since you started with beer, you can call it "beer" and be taxed at the substantially lower rate.  Ta-da!

And they say that lawyers don't add any value to society.  Pshaw.

The California State Board of Equalization gets wind of this and decides that, nope, FTBs are spirits if they have a spirit- (rather than beer-) like alcohol content.  But the alcohol manufacturers aren't taking this lying down.  They file suit.  Proclaiming that teenagers have a constitutional right to get drunk on candy cheaply.  Or, more accurately, that California's taxing authorities have no power to decide what gets taxed as "beer" under the statute, only the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (the ABC).

Guiness loses in the trial court.  But the Court of Appeal reverses.  Cheap drinks for everyone!

The relevant statutes and regulations are complex, and you can read the entire 25-page opinion if you'd like.  But I must say that -- as my comments perhaps reflect -- I'm not entirely persuaded by the result.  It seems to me that the taxing authorities get to decide what gets taxed in the gray area that exists here, and that that's not inconsistent with letting the ABC decide how to substantively regulate this gray area.  And the Court of Appeal also expresses a conclusion on the merits that says that taxation of FMBs as "spirits" is substantively irrational regardless of which agency applies this principle.  That seems even less persuasive.  If it looks like a spirit and tastes like a spirit and has the wallop of a spirit, it makes total sense to me for a state to treat it like a spirit if it so chooses, notwithstanding the fact that this product started out as a beer that was turned into essentially water to be added to the spirit.  Sure, you could adopt a contrary regulation, but that's up to the state.  If it wants to tax these kiddie entrees into the hard-drinking world as spirits -- or at an even higher rate -- that's up to them.

So my idea to start up a new business with cheap alcohol apparently flounders against the reality that some of the brightest minds of our generation -- both legal and non-legal -- have already done so.

And have prevailed.

Friday, April 27, 2012

People v. Le (Cal. Ct. App. - April 27, 2012)

I'm glad that Justice Benke decided to publish this opinion.  Not because it involves anything doctrinally complicated, and certainly not because the legal issues were exciting enough to be worth wading through sixty-seven pages of text.  No, that's not it.

Rather, I was interested in the case because of the facts.  It's a murder case.  The opinion includes a bunch of wiretap transcripts and details about the relevant gangs in the area.

Which is not totally unusual.  Not surprisingly, I read lots of cases about murders.  Today's a day that ends in -y, after all.

But this particular case is interesting because the relevant gang is located in Linda Vista -- a particular community in San Diego.  A particular community that just so happens to also be the location of the University of San Diego, at which I am employed.

So I get to learn all about the gangs in the area and the murders committed therefor.  Which is nice.

So I didn't know, for the example, that I'm employed in an area controlled by the Tiny Oriental Crips.  Which means I probably shouldn't wear my "Tournament of Champions" t-shirt around campus, since it prominently displays the abbreviation "TOC."  Don't want anyone thinking that I'm advertising the wrong TOC.

Plus I know something about the TOC's rival, the Asian Crips.  Who are apparently derisively referred to by TOC members as "Ass Cracks."  Creative, those Tiny Oriental Crips.

I could go on.  But given my proximity to their turf, I'll probably keep my comments on this issue somewhat limited.

Suffice it to say that there are two TOC members who will not be coming around the University of San Diego anytime within the next 96 years to life.

Thursday, April 26, 2012

People v. Villegas (Cal. Ct. App. - April 26, 2012)

When I saw that this case involved an appeal of a conviction of a sex offender for failing to update his address, I initially thought it'd be one of those innumerable cases where a person forgets or waits a couple of days too long after his birthday to reregister, and gets thrown back into jail for a decade as a result.

Nope.

Here the guy registers for eight straight years, but apparently gets sick of it.  Not only with registration, but also with reporting to his parole officer, because he's currently on parole for an unrelated offense.  So he cuts off his leg monitor, leaves it in a motel along with a note saying he doesn't think he has to report any more (he's on probation , and skips to Alabama.

He's caught and convicted, and sentenced to four years in prison.

Yep.  That's what happens when you cut off your leg monitor and skip town.

Another in a series of bad choices for Hector Villegas.

In Re Alejandro G. (Cal. Ct. App. - April 25, 2012)

Alejandro is under 18 years old and is caught with a gun.  You're not allowed to possess one when you're a minor.  So off to trial you go.  The only relevant question (on appeal, anyway) being whether he was competent to stand trial.

Justice Huffman's opinion says that Alejandro's of average intelligence, with no disabilities.  When I read the opinion and learn what Alejandro has to say about his understanding of the criminal justice system, it seems fairly general, but what he says is indeed consistent with potentially being competent to stand trial.

But what I really would like to know is how old Alejandro is.  Justice Huffman doesn't say.  It's very possible that Alejandro is 16 or so -- he was sitting in a car, near a pack of cigarettes -- and his answers when being examined for competence are probably what you'd typically get from a n'er do well of his age and disposition.  If so, I have no problem whatsoever finding that he was competent; indeed, my reaction to the opinion was generally:  "What's all the fuss about?  This guy is obviously competent.  I can't believe the experts says it's close."

But it's also possible that he's, like, 12.  Or even younger.  His answers are also consistent with that.

So if we're going to say that someone's of average intelligence, when you're evaluating competence, it seems pretty important to say how old that person is.  "Average" for whom.

So I'd add that to this opinion.  Just so we know all the relevant details.

Wednesday, April 25, 2012

J.M. v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. - April 25, 2012)

You're not going to get a lot of sympathy from the Court of Appeal if you're a big Oxycontin user who lives in a crash pad in Ventura County and your five-year old child dies from overdosing on Oxy.  That's what happens when you leave pills lying around.

What also happens is that they take your seven- and four-year olds from you as well.  Quickly.  And the Court of Appeal refuses to intervene.  Denying your writ petition similarly quickly.  Taking less than a half-dozen pages to do so.

U.S. v. Apel (9th Cir. - April 25, 2012)

It'd be neat to get a case like this taken en banc.  And potentially thereafter to see it argued in the Supreme Court.

Panels disagree.  The circuits are split.

And law students are arguing the appeal.

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

U.S. v. Milovanovic (9th Cir. - April 24, 2012)

Judge Kleinfeld takes one view of "honest services" and publishes an opinion with his insights.  Judge Clifton signs on.  Judge Fernandez takes a different view, and dissents, both generally and as applied to this particular case.

The case gets taken en banc.  There's going to be a wide divergence of opinions, no?

No.

Judge Tallman writes the en banc opinion.  He takes a somewhat different view than Judge Kleinfeld.  And agrees with Judge Fernandez even less.  How many judges agree with Judge Tallman?

All of them.

All of them, that is, except Judge Clifton.  Who signed onto the earlier opinion and -- unlike Judges Kleinfeld and Fernandez -- were drawn for the en banc panel.  He sticks to his view.  Concurring in the judgment and saying that everyone else's opinion muddies the waters.

Anchor Pacifica Mgm't Co. v. Green (Cal. Ct. App. - April 23, 2012)

The next time that someone tells you that appellate jurisprudence has changed a lot during the past half-century, here's Exhibit A of your rebuttal.

Due process and state action requirements have changed a ton since the Warren Court.  But this same opinion could easily have been written back then.  Something I can almost never say when I read opinions from the California Court of Appeal.

That's either a good thing or a bad thing, depending on your view.  But it's definitely true.

The times they aren't (always) a-changin'.

Monday, April 23, 2012

Meras v. Sisto (9th Cir. - April 23, 2012)

Two quick points about this opinion by Judge Kozinski.  Identifying one part of the opinion I somewhat like and one I somewhat don't.

I like the introduction.  Which reads:  "Edward L. Meras, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims that testimony introduced during his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. He’s probably right, but he loses anyway."  That's a somewhat funny way of putting it (though I doubt Mr. Meras will agree).  It's also accurate.  Judge Kozinski goes through AEDPA and correctly notes that you don't get relief unless it's clear, and here, it wasn't.  One could even change the word "probably" in the last sentence of the introduction to "virtually certainly" given the existence of recent precedent.  But it doesn't change things.  No habeas relief.

So that's the good part.  Not super good, but worthy of mention, I think.

The bad part's similar minor.  It's a matter of taste, I know, but I don't really like using the term "cert" in an opinion.  It's fine as a citation abbreviation -- "cert. denied" -- but Judge Kozinski repeatedly uses it in the text (e.g., "had Meras filed a cert petition after the California Supreme Court denied review . . .").  I know that Judge Kozinski likes to be informal, and I'm on board for that, but not on this end.  Abbreviating Latin words seems unnecessary.  Even if we all know what you mean.  Judge Kozinski spells out the term in this (and other) opinions.  I think that "certiorari" is a fine word.  No need to shorthand it.

Nor -- just to make clear -- is there any need for Judge Kozinski to make up a different word for it.  Stand pat with "dissental," Alex.  "Certiorariooni" need not appply.