Monday, June 22, 2015

In Re Welch (Cal. Supreme Ct. - June 22, 2015)

Here's an example of speedy justice.

To be clear:  I'm being sarcastic.

David Welch committed a heinous crime.  In 1986.  The jury found him guilty, and sentenced him to death, in 1989.

The California Supreme Court only took a full decade to resolve his direct appeal.  It affirmed in 1999.

To reiterate:  All these events transpired in the previous century.

Welch filed his first state habeas petition in 2002.  That's going to take a little while to percolate through the system, right?

Yep.  It's now 2015.  Over a dozen years later.  And only today does the California Supreme Court resolve the merits of this petition.  Which it unanimously rejects.

Mr. Welch was 28 at the time of his offense.  He's now 57.  And he hasn't even commenced litigation of this federal habeas petitions.

There's no way he's going to be put to death.  He'll die in prison.  The nearly thirty years (and counting) of litigation about his sentence are a meaningless waste.

Robinson v. Jewell (9th Cir. - June 22, 2015)

Here's the judicial equivalent of a lottery ticket.

The Kawaiisu is a non-federally recognized Native American group that claims to own an incredibly valuable piece of property -- the Tajon Ranch, one of the largest contiguous pieces of private land in California.  The Kawaiisu claim that they own this land notwithstanding a plethora of treaties with Mexico as well as various other tribes.

The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim.  The Ninth Circuit affirms.

There was no way this lawsuit was going to prevail.  On the merits or otherwise.  Robinson (and his counsel) would have been better off spending their time and money on Mega Millions.

Friday, June 19, 2015

Mitchell v. U.S. (9th Cir. - June 19, 2015)

Cases like this put Judge Reinhardt in a tough position.

It's a death penalty case, so you know how he's going to vote.  It's currently a habeas case, but a federal one.  Which means that there was also a prior opinion on direct appeal.  Judge Reinhardt was on that panel as well.  Which voted 2-1 to affirm.  You can guess who the 1 was.

At this point, the claim is ineffective assistance of counsel.  Notwithstanding Judge Reinhardt's dissent, there's not especially good evidence of attorney misconduct.  It was a federal prosecution, so multiple veteran federal public defenders, plus an attorney in private practice, were assigned to represent the defendant at trial.  This wasn't some backwater state prosecution with intoxicated lawyers doing a half-assed job just to make a buck.  This was a real defense.  So it's extraordinarily hard to find incompetent representation.

Oh, and who was the district court judge who oversaw the case?  Judge Murguia.  Currently on the Ninth Circuit.

So this leaves Judge Reinhardt with three options.  All of which he advances.

First, he notes that it's pretty weird that this guy ends up being sentenced to death.  Which is true.  The victim's family doesn't want it.  The Navajo Nation doesn't want it.  The relevant U.S. Attorney doesn't want it.  But John Ashcroft did.  So a guy with no criminal history gets sentenced to death even though his more culpable partners get life.  A result especially strange since the murder charge itself doesn't lead to the death penalty (since the Navajo Nation has opted out); only the fact that there was an underlying carjacking gets the dude sentenced to death.

This provides ample fodder for Judge Reinhardt's dissent.  And he uses it well.

The only problem being that this isn't a legal argument against the imposition of the death penalty.  So no relief there.

Second, Judge Reinhardt can go down the straightforward legal path and try to paint the lawyers as incompetent.  Which he does.  Well.

But, in my view, the facts just aren't there.  Even if hindsight was 20/20, I'm not at all confident that Judge Reinhardt's preferred "he's a bad guy but had a bad upbringing" strategy was any better than the choice of the actual defense attorneys to paint him as a good guy who did a terrible thing.  It's at least sufficiently close to make deference to the people with boots on the ground appropriate.  So that doesn't work.

Which leaves Judge Reinhardt to ask the President for clemency.  Which he does also.  Again:  Well.

There's lots to recommend such an approach.  Plus, maybe it's possible.  Maybe Obama or Clinton or someone else will listen.

But it's still a longshot.  These are political issues.  I'm not confident that a President will elect to use his or her capital on something like this.  Especially since one of throats that was slit belonged to a nine year old girl.

This isn't a state case that has been around forever.  It has progressed through the federal system fairly quickly.  The murder was in 2001.  The defendant was 20 years old at the time.  The conviction and sentence have already been affirmed on direct appeal, and now the habeas petition has been denied on the merits.  The only things left are a petition for rehearing and en banc review, and attempt at certiorari in the Supreme Court, and then a successive habeas petition.  All of which are even less likely, in my estimation, than executive clemency.

So, absent a blanket moratorium, you're probably looking at someone who's actually going to be executed.  Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Mitchell is probably on the low end of the "irredeemably evil" scale as contrasted with his contemporaries on death row.  The likelihood that this 35-year old guy dies in prison before the sentence is carried out is not especially high.

Thursday, June 18, 2015

People v. Saez (Cal. Ct. App. - June 18, 2015)

"On May 6, 2007, Saez assaulted a female victim with a garrote—a wire weapon used for strangulation—on a San Francisco street in broad daylight. A witness called the police after seeing Saez “stomping” on the victim as she lay on the sidewalk. Officer James Barber located Saez near the scene and detained him. Saez volunteered that “[t]he bitch was already dead” and was bleeding from her mouth when he came across her. 

Officer Barber found a homemade garrote in Saez’s jacket pocket. Saez’s jacket was bloodstained, and the garrote had hair and skin attached to it. Later DNA testing established that both the victim’s and Saez’s blood was on the jacket, and the victim’s blood was on the garrote. 

Officer Lynn Reilly found the victim where she had been assaulted. Officer Reilly described the victim as having “blood all over her face,” and she noticed blood on a garage door near the victim’s head. The officer testified that the victim was unconscious and there was a “gurgling, labored breathing sound coming from her mouth, and there was blood that appeared to be coming out of her left ear.” Sergeant Carolyn Lucas, who was also at the scene, testified that the victim was “either unconscious or barely conscious.” 

The victim was taken to the hospital. The attending trauma surgeon, Jan Horn, M.D., testified that when the victim was admitted she had lacerations on her neck, tongue, and fingers, and blood around her nostrils and mouth. She also had fractured bones near her eye socket and cheek, which were consistent with having had her face 'stomped' on."

I gotta admit that this factual recitation doesn't make me feel much sympathy towards Mr. Saez.  Indeed, when I read that he received a sentence of 39 years to life in prison, that sounded pretty right to me.  And that was even before I read about his prior convictions.

Nor was I especially impressed with Mr. Saez's legal argument that the prosecution didn't sufficiently prove that the prior convictions were his.  The evidence showed that a guy who committed these prior offenses was named Jose Antonio Saez, had a birthdate of February 22, 1960, and at that time lived at 425 E. Garfield in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  When the present defendant was booked, he had multiple identification cards that listed his name as Jose A. Saez, with a birthdate of February 22, 1960, and listed an address at 500 E. Garfield in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

That's good enough for me.  Beyond a reasonable doubt, even.  Regardless of the fact that there may well be lots of people named "Jose A. Saez" in the universe.

It was good enough for the Court of Appeal as well.

Mr. Saez gets a marginal amount of relief in the California Court of Appeal.  But my guess is that he'll nonetheless spend the remainder of his life in prison.

His offense was that heinous.

People v. White (Cal. Ct. App. - June 18, 2015)

"White does not contest that he engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. He also does not contest the victim had been "partying and drinking" on the night of the alleged assault and was "drunk" when the group reached the hotel at about 2:30 a.m.

However, White contends there is insufficient evidence he knew or should have known that the victim was prevented from or unable to resist the act of intercourse due to either intoxicating substances (§ 261, subd. (a)(3)) or unconsciousness (id., subd. (a)(4)(A)) because there allegedly is no evidence of the victim's condition at about 5:30 a.m. that morning when sexual intercourse occurred, including evidence of whether she was awake or sufficiently conscious at the time such that White would know or reasonably know she was unable to resist."

None of those contentions on appeal succeed.  White gets sentenced to prison and has to register as a sex offender.

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

People v. Miranda (Cal. Ct. App. - May 13, 2015)

It's interesting how all the various rights line up here.  In a case ironically involving a guy named Miranda.

David Miranda wants a speedy trial.  He's got a right to one in the Sixth Amendment.  He's also got an appointed attorney.  That's in the Sixth Amendment too.  But the appointed attorney isn't ready to go to trial so quickly.

So Miranda decides to represent himself since that's the only way to get to trial quickly.  He's got a right to do that under -- you guessed it -- the Sixth Amendment.  (Parenthetically, it may make sense for Miranda to want to exercise his speedy trial rights, since he's sitting in jail while he awaits trial since he can't make bail.  Notwithstanding his right to bail under the Eighth Amendment.)

So the trial court grants Miranda the right to represent himself, and the case goes to trial.  Evidence at trial, however, reflects that Miranda may have some serious mental problems.  Which is total news to the trial judge.  As well as a problem, since Miranda has right to adequate counsel under the (again) Sixth Amendment.  Which he won't have if he's being represented by someone incompetent/loony.

That puts the trial judge in a bind.  Does he declare a mistrial?  Make standby counsel take over?  Let the trial go forward?  All of these options potentially imperil various rights, as well as the efficiency of the process.  Tough call.

Ultimately the trial judge lets the thing go forward.  Miranda's convicted.  At sentencing, the trial judge again expresses his dismay.  He sentences Miranda to probation, saying:  "[Had] the defendant not represented himself at this trial and pretrial, there’s no question in my mind that had the defendant retained or had appointed competent counsel a disposition like the one that I intend to go forward could have been negotiated for this defendant. He was his own worst enemy by attempting to represent himself specifically with his mental health history of [sic] and the court has been totally unaware throughout the entire pretrial and trial."

Which I understand.  That should indeed have been the sentence.  And the plea.  And likely would have been if everyone was on the stick.

But in my mind, it wasn't really Mr. Miranda's fault.  He just wanted out of jail.  What he wanted to do was understandable, if misguided.  By contrast, the prosecutor and the defense attorney were fully able to have done what the trial court wanted -- a just and reasonable plea deal -- quickly.  At least in theory.  But the prosecutor didn't care about speed, since s/he's overworked, and he defendant's in jail in the meantime anyway.  And the defense counsel's overworked as well, and has to ability to coerce a deal from the prosecutor if the latter's not (currently) interested.

Which leaves Miranda in precisely the bind he's in.  As well as (subsequently) the trial court.

There's a serious tension between our interest in having the just resolution of criminal cases -- which generally requires competent counsel -- and our interest in allowing defendants the autonomy to make the incredibly stupid decision to represent themselves.  There's another serious tension between our desire to expend as few resources as necessary on the criminal justice system and our hope that the results of this system comport with morality.

In Miranda's case, these tensions are amply demonstrated.

With serious consequences to Mr. Miranda.  Who's forced, among other things, to languish in jail even though everyone agrees that the "right" result here would have been a quick probation deal.

The Court of Appeal ultimately affirms.  Nothing's "legally" wrong with what transpired.

But I think the process is far from optimal.  To say the least.

Tuesday, June 16, 2015

People v. Hill (Cal. Ct. App. - May 13, 2015)

I hate to be cruel.  And fear that I am.  But I nonetheless hope that Rosa Hill and her mother, Mei Li, never get out of prison.  Ever.

I'll not attempt to summarize the underlying facts of this 56-page opinion.  Suffice it to say that Ms. Hill and Ms. Li were convicted of the first-degree, premeditated murder of a 91-year old woman and the attempted murder of her grandson (the former spouse of Ms. Hill).  In circumstances that are the archetype of actual premeditation, as opposed to the weak form of premeditation that you often see in contemporary appellate cases.

Read the first dozen or so pages of the opinion.  I rarely read more chilling stuff.  And I've read a lot.

The Court of Appeal ultimately reverses the first-degree murder conviction of Mei Li on the basis of instructional error.  Which made me sad -- even though I'm sure the Court of Appeal's disposition is the correct one -- because I fear that the D.A. might well elect not to try Ms. Li again, despite the fact that I'm quite confident that she'd again be convicted of this offense.

I'd wager that the theory in the D.A.'s office will be that it's not worth it to spend money on a retrial, even though the Court of Appeal reversed the first-degree murder conviction that resulte in a 25-to-life sentence for Ms. Li, since it simultaneously affirmed her attempted murder conviction that results in a sentence of life.  Why bother going for the additional 25 years when you've already got life?

(Though, of course, we know full well that life doesn't necessarily actually mean life.)

Which distressed me a tiny bit since, again, I didn't (and don't) want Ms. Li to ever get out of prison.

But then I read elsewhere that Ms. Li is 58 years old.

Fair enough.  A "life" sentence should do the trick.

P.S. - Ms. Lei's husband might also be happy I wasn't the trial judge in his case.  He was apparently an accessory, pled guilty, and was sentenced to four years in prison.  Maybe that's okay.  But if I did something different, I can assure you his sentence would be longer, not shorter.


Friday, June 12, 2015

Monterossa v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. - June 12, 2014)

I thought I was going to stridently disagree with today's opinion by Justice Butz.  But in the end, I agree.

With one (important) caveat.

The statute says that the court can award attorney's fees to a prevailing party, and also says that a borrower is a prevailing party if s/he obtains injunctive relief and/or damages.

A borrower files a lawsuit and obtains a preliminary injunction.  Can she obtain fees?

Ordinarily, I'd be inclined to say "No."  When we talk about who's the prevailing party, we generally look at the end of the litigation.  So the fact that you've obtained some provisional relief doesn't much matter to me.  Similarly, my sense is that when the Legislature talks about someone getting injunctive relief and/or damages, it's referring to the stuff that happens at the end of a trial.  Not in the middle (or at the beginning).

My intuitive sense in that regard was only magnified in the factual context presented by the present case.  The borrower here was trying to stop the foreclosure of his home.  He made some allegations, and the trial court decided to grant some provisional relief and temporarily delay the foreclosure.  The balance of hardships in this situation comes out on the side of the borrower; if the foreclosure goes forward, it's irreperable.

But -- and this is important to me -- the injunction's granted only on the condition that the borrower put up a bond of $20,000 (or pay the pending mortgage payments).  That will stop the borrower from just living in the house rent-free, which is sometimes/often the real objective of this type of litigation.

You could see why a trial court might enter such an order even if the borrower's lawsuit may be complete crap.  If the borrower wants to pay the mortgage (or post a bond), there's no harm in enjoining the pending foreclosure process.  Conversely, if the borrower won't pay, that's a decent sign that maybe he shouldn't get injunctive relief and is just gunning for free rent.

So a trial court might grant these orders simply as an equitable matter.  May even make a great deal of sense to do so.  Such provisional orders don't necessarily reflect the merits.

Which is another reason why it'd be unjust to award attorney's fees to a borrower just because it obtained such "put up or shut up" injunctive relief.

That was my sense as I read Justice Butz's opinion.  So when she held that provisional relief did count, I was pretty skeptical.  Even after reading the opinion.

There are, admittedly, several things in the opinion to recommend Justice Butz's conclusion.  She does a very good job, for example, explaining that in a lot of these borrower lawsuits, there's nothing really at issue other than preliminary injunctive relief.  So if you waited to see if the lender subsequently stopped the foreclosure process (thereby mooting damages and/or final injunctive relief), you might get a mistaken impression of who the true "prevailing party" really was.

That makes sense to me.  Mind you, I'd still be extremely concerned that the Court of Appeal's ruling might grant fees merely to borrowers who got a "preserve the status quo" preliminary injunction.  But I'd nonetheless at least understand where the Court of Appeal was coming from.  Even if that policy concern didn't necessarily completely turn me around.

But, in the end, I'm ultimately good with Justice Butz's opinion.

With one caveat.

If the statute said that the court "shall" award attorney's fees to a prevailing party, than I'd be very concerned about the Court of Appeal's holding.  And maybe even think it's wrong.

But it doesn't.  It says "may".  So I'm assuming that the statute's discretionary.  The trial court could award fees if it wants.  But it doesn't have to.

With that caveat, I'm more than fine with the Court of Appeal's opinion.  Indeed, I'm affirmatively psyched for it.

If the trial court primarily granted the injunction simply to make the borrower put up or shut up, then I'm confident it wouldn't -- and shouldn't -- award fees.  By contrast, if -- as perhaps here -- the trial court granted a preliminary injunction because it thought the plaintiff's case was indeed looking good, and that the foreclosure should indeed be halted on the merits, then, yeah, I think a fee award would be justified.  As well as permissible under the statute.

But the caveat's nonetheless worth mentioning.  Because it's critically important.

Justice Butz never mentions that the statutory fee award is (I think) discretionary.  I think it is.  And I think that's a critical point that's more than worth putting in the opinion.

Because, at least to me, that's a dispositive point.  Without it, the merits perhaps should come out the other way.

Thursday, June 11, 2015

U.S. v. Alcantara-Castillo (9th Cir. - June 11, 2015)

The majority thinks the AUSA improperly vouched for the border agent, so reverses the conviction.  The dissent thinks not.

Personally, I think that the evidence of prejudice is fairly low.  I believe Judge Wardlaw when she says that the border agent here had -- and I think this is unusual -- fairly substantial credibility problems.  But at least he had a story that made some sense.  I guess it's possible that a jury could believe the defendant's story that he "accidentally" crossed the heavily-patrolled U.S.-Mexico border in a methamphetamine-induced haze.  I gotta admit that it's not an especially good story, however.

And the fact that this guy had previously been convicted four times for illegal reentry doesn't help him either.

My money's on the dude being convicted at retrial.  Even without vouching.

And I'd give big odds to anyone who wanted to take that action.

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (Cal. Ct. App. - May 20, 2015)

Justice Ikola drops a footnote to say:

"Collectively, the parties’ thorough, well-researched “briefs” exceed 300 pages. The City’s appendix features 1,489 pages and the Conservancy’s appendix adds 98 pages. The electronic administrative record totals a whopping 49,046 pages. We have striven to limit our recitation of facts to those strictly necessary to the analysis of the issues before us and to refrain from discussing unnecessary background material and the parties’ arguments in the alternative. We assure the parties, however, that we appreciate their diligence in bringing all potentially relevant materials and issues to our attention."

Nice.

Tuesday, June 09, 2015

Bemore v. Chappell (9th Cir. - June 9, 2015)

When I saw that it was a death penalty habeas case, and that Judge Berzon had written the opinion, I felt I had a reasonable guess as to how it might come out.  When I saw that Judges Reinhardt and Gould were on the panel, and that neither had dissented, I felt even more strongly that I knew where this one was going.

But as I started to read the syllabus, I began to falter.  Deficient representation, sure.  But no prejudice.  No prejudice again.

Could it be?  Could this panel really affirm a death penalty case?!

Fear not.  I finally reach the end of the syllabus.  The conviction gets ratified.  But the death sentence gets reversed.

Which is what one might have guessed purely from the caption.

Monday, June 08, 2015

A.M. v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. - June 8, 2015)

Ms. S. lives in Weimar, California.  Population: 29.  She's adopted several special needs kids already.  She loves and cares for them.  She's willing to adopt A.M. as well.  Indeed, she very much wants to.  But the social worker doesn't want this placement.

Why not?  Seemingly no good reason.  There's no dispute that Ms. S. does a wonderful job with the children in her care/family.

What about A.M.?  What does he want?

Well, he's eight years old.  So even under normal circumstances, it'd be hard to tell.

But these are not normal circumstances.

A.M. is the product of incest.  He was born when his father/grandfather impregnated his mother.  A fourteen-year old child.  As a result of "parental consanguinity," A.M. is severely disabled.  Even at eight years old, he's already outlived his normal life expectancy.  Here's a summary of his life:

"[A.M. has] “profound mental retardation,” microcephaly, cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, spastic quadriplegia, and respiratory insufficiency. He had been hospitalized seven times, usually for breathing difficulties.

He was in a “semi-vegetative state.” He “d[id] not have any purposeful movement.” He could not walk or talk. He could not eat; he required a gastrostomy tube (G-tube). He had to be fed via the G-tube five times a day. He had no bladder or bowel control. He had to be catheterized approximately every four hours.

His vision and hearing were impaired. He “d[id] not respond to visual stimuli and rarely respond[ed] to auditory stimuli.” He had no facial expressions. He did not respond at all to “social interaction.” . . .

A.M. was “completely dependent on caretakers for all of his needs.” He needed “breathing treatments” every six hours. He needed a constant supply of oxygen, and his oxygen levels had to be checked once per shift. He had difficulty maintaining his body temperature, which had to be checked three times per shift. His daily medications included phenobarbital, Keppra, Trileptal, Valium, baclofen, Singulair, albuterol, Pulmicort, Bromocriptine, Robinul, Phos-Nak, Tums, Lactinex, Senokot, MiraLax, and Nutropin. He needed approximately 20 additional medications from time to time. He had to be repositioned every two hours to prevent bedsores."

Ms. S. is nonetheless willing to take on all of these tasks.  More power to her.

The trial court orders placement with Ms. S.  Minor's counsel appeals.  The Court of Appeal affirms.

What's the basis for the opposition to Ms. S.?  Who knows.  There's "speculation" that maybe she just wants to adopt A.M. "for the money".  But I can't fathom that the compensation for adopting a special needs child is anywhere near the level that would justify doing all the tasks for A.M. that are required for his continued survival.  There's "speculation" that maybe Ms. S. was also getting another special needs child around the same time.  IMHO, again, more power to her.  If she's indeed loving and caring -- which everyone seems to say she is -- then that's awesome.  Feel the love.  Something we should encourage, not dismiss.

Is it possible that some people just don't like the fact that Ms. S. is 70 years old?  Could be.  Though I think it's almost certain that Ms. S. will outlive A.M.  Regardless of what shape she's in.  Plus, she has made plans for her own demise.  There's someone who can take care of her kids after.

Enjoy Weimar, A.M.  Enjoy the life you have.

Well done, Ms. S.

People v. Scott (Cal. Supreme Ct. - June 8, 2015)

"In March 1988, Thomas Meyer and Dan King worked and lived at a construction site in Palm Springs. One night, they were awakened in their camper when Scott confronted them through a screen door and demanded money. Meyer threw his jacket to Scott, who remained outside. After finding no money in it, Scott became agitated, banged on the doorsill, and said, 'I have a double barreled sawed off shotgun here, and I am going to blow your mother fucking head off if you don’t give me some money now.' King took a gun which he kept under his pillow and fired four shots at Scott. Meyer thought Scott had returned fire from a shotgun. Scott appeared to be injured and was rolling on the ground about 10 feet from the door. He said, 'God. I am never going to do this again.' Meyer and King left the camper, and within minutes, the police arrived and arrested Scott."

Scott should have followed his own advice.  Four years later, again in Palm Springs, Scott broke into a home, found a woman in her bed, and killed her.

Scott was sentenced to death.  Something with which every member of the California Supreme Court is okay.

Friday, June 05, 2015

Maroney v. Iacobson (Cal. Ct. App. - June 4, 2015)

Here's a really good example of nineteenth century justice.

Plaintiff moves for a new trial after the jury returns its verdict, and the trial court thinks the motion is well founded.  But for complicated procedural reasons, the trial court isn't certain that the motion's timely.

The trial court accordingly decides to "conditionally grant" the new trial motion, saying that it thinks that the motion is right on the merits, but that it wasn't filed in time -- but that if the Court of Appeal disagrees on the (difficult) timeliness issue, then the motion's granted.

This leaves both of the parties in somewhat of a pickle.  Who exactly is the "losing" party here?  Is it the plaintiff, since the motion was only "conditionally" granted?  Or is it the defendant?

To play it safe, both parties appeal.  Which makes sense.

The Court of Appeal ultimately decides that the motion was, in fact, timely.  And publishes its opinion so holding.

So the plaintiff gets its new trial, right?

Nope.

The Court of Appeal says that the trial court was wrong that the motion was untimely.  So plaintiff was right on that front.  But what the trial court did was a "nullity" since you're not allowed to "conditionally" grant new trials.

Okay.  I get that the trial court did something wrong.  But the plaintiff (1) timely moved for a new trial, and (2) was right on the merits.  So it gets a new trial.

Not according to the Court of Appeal.  It says that there was conflicting evidence at trial, so the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the jury verdict necessarily lacked substantial evidence to support it.  Hence the Court of Appeal couldn't reverse the denial of a new trial by the trial court.

But wait.  The trial court granted a new trial.  It thought that the verdict was contrary to the evidence.  And it's expressly allowed to act as a "thirteenth juror" when deciding new trial motions.  Which is what it did in the present case.  So what's all this about the Court of Appeal not being "allowed" to accept the verdict of the trial judge.  The one judicial officer who was there at trial and who could view (and weigh) the evidence and the credibility of the various witnesses?

Sorry, says the Court of Appeal.  The trial court didn't "really" grant a new trial.  It only "conditionally" granted it in the event the motion was timely.  Which, as the Court of Appeal explained, was a "nullity".  Hence the trial court "really" denied the motion for a new trial.  Which we're required to affirm because the trial court's "denial" of a new trial was supported by some evidence.

That's just crazy.

The trial court admittedly got confused as to what procedure to employ.  But what it held is crystal clear.  It thought the motion was untimely -- a matter of law.  But it also forthrightly recognized that its conclusion on that legal issue might well be wrong.  So it expressly said that, on the merits, it would grant a new trial, were it allowed to do so.

The Court of Appeal turns that into a denial of a new trial on the merits, and then pretends that such a view of the evidence is protected from review on appeal.

Which ain't right.

Imagine that the trial court had said -- in identical circumstances -- "I think the new trial motion's right, but I'm uncertain whether it's timely, but just to play it safe, I'm going to grant the motion, and if the defendant is right on the legal point, they'll win on appeal."  If the trial court had done that, there's no doubt that the Court of Appeal's decision would have to go the other way, and plaintiff would get its new trial.  The motion was timely, and the trial court's decision to grant a new trial despite the timeliness fight would be reviewed for abuse of discretion, and unquestionably affirmed.

The difference between this "hypothetical" and what the trial court did here is insubstantial.  It should make no difference whether the trial court got the timeliness issue -- an issue of law -- right or wrong.  It decided the merits one way.  It decided the timeliness issue another.  If the latter's wrong, then we should grant a new trial.  Period.  Doesn't matter whether the trial court decided the close (legal) issue one way or the other.  If the motion's timely (which it was), and the trial court was within its discretion to grant a new trial (which it was), a new trial should be granted.

Nineteenth century courts routinely elevated form over substance in the way the Court of Appeal does here.  But I thought we were beyond that.  I understand that new trial motions have strict procedural requirements.  But when the trial court (rightly) decides the merits, and simply wrongly decides a legal issue, that's doesn't vitiate the exercise of its discretion on the merits.  If the legal issue comes out the other way on appeal, the trial court's grant of a new trial should be effectuated, not negated by an artificial (and unjust) claim that the Court of Appeal is compelled to deny a new trial on the basis of "deference" to a denial on the merits that does not, in fact, exist.

The Court of Appeal decides to persist in its erroneous course even after a rehearing.  That's unfortunate.  It's not twenty-first century justice.

Thursday, June 04, 2015

Escobedo v. Applebees (9th Cir. - June 4, 2015)

Part of this morning's Ninth Circuit opinion seems undeniably right.  The opinion itself declares that "the resolution of this case emerges as simple."  True enough.  When you file a lawsuit alongside an IFP application, the filing date for statute of limitations purposes is the date you file, not the date your IFP motion is granted, or denied, or you eventually pay the fees.  Filed means filed.  Stops the limitations period. End of story.

That part's clearly true, and it's fairly surprising the district court got it wrong.

The other part of the opinion is a tougher call.

The (important) question there is how much income counts as "too much" in order to be granted an IFP waiver for filing fees.  On the one hand, $350 (the filing fee in Nevada) is a fair chunk of change to most people.  On the other hand, it's a fraction of the costs that are actually incurred (both by the judiciary as well as the parties) in order to resolve a civil lawsuit, and lots of other people are paying it.  So when should we say that someone's sufficiently "poor" so they're entitled to a waiver?

Part of today's case is (again) easy.  The plaintiff says she only makes $210/week (i.e., around $900/month), and pays $684/month in rent and $15/month in credit card debt.  That leaves her with around $200/month to pay for everything else.  Food.  Medical care.  Transportation.  Etc.

(The Ninth Circuit's opinion says it leaves her with "less than $150 per month".  I think that's a math error.  $210/week x 4.3 weeks/month = $903/month, minus ($684 + $15) = $204/month.  A relatively small difference.  But a meaningful one to most people; if you're living off of less than $150/month, it would probably be a fairly big change if your income went up to $203/month -- a 35%+ increase.)

When you've only got $200 (or $150) a month to spend on food etc., I agree with the Ninth Circuit that's an easy case.  Of course you'd be entitled to IFP status.  Just trying to live by spending less than $7/day on food alone.  Good luck.  Clearly that's count as sufficient for a waiver of a $350 filing fee.  On this point the Ninth Circuit has no doubt, saying that "[i]f we were to consider only the monies coming to Escobedo herself, as set forth in her affidavit in support of her IFP application, we would have no hesitation in concluding that the magistrate judge’s denial of the application constituted an abuse of discretion. Escobedo was plainly indigent, and her application should have been allowed."

Clearly right, IMHO.

The harder -- and more interesting -- part is what happens when you count the husband's income as well.  Ms. Escobedo says that he makes $1800/month in disability income.  Well now.  That's a lot more than the $200 (or $150) per month we talked about before.  If you're making that much, should IFP status be granted?

For procedural reasons, the Ninth Circuit doesn't have to directly resolve this question.  The district court didn't assess in detail the husband's income, or his expenses.  Maybe there were other things (e.g., child support payments for other kids) that sucked up all -- or nearly all -- of the $1800/month.  On this record, we don't know.  Hence the remand.

The Ninth Circuit nonetheless goes out of its way to express an opinion on the subject.  It says that even the district court properly added the $1800/month to the $900/month, resulting in an income of $2700/month, the denial of IFP status would "represent[], at best, the outer boundary of stringency."

Hmmm.  Now that's interesting.  As well as important for a nontrivial number of litigants.  Does it ring true?

An income of $2700/month is $32,400/year.  That's not a huge number, to be sure.  Which is why I think the Ninth Circuit has a sense that this figure would probably justify IFP status.  Federal judges, after all, make over six times more than this, and still feel like they're scrimping along.  Imagine you had to live on one-sixth of that?!  The horror.  That's really poor.

So I get from whence that perspective derives.  I'm also personally sympathetic to it.

But there's another side as well.  An income of $32,400 is far from trivial.  Indeed, guess how many families in America survive on less than that?  More than half.  Is the Ninth Circuit really saying that over half of America is entitled to IFP status?  That nearly half of American families are so poor that they shouldn't be forced to pay $350 towards a lawsuit that could easily cost tens (or even hundreds) of thousands of dollars to resolve?  Really?

That's a tougher sell.

To me, I'm not sure that the Ninth Circuit's focus on income is exactly right.  Don't get me wrong: of course it matters.  If you're only making (say) $900/month, sure, you get IFP status.  I don't care what else is going on in your world.  It'd be unreasonable to make you dump $350 towards a filing fee.

But at $30,000 or so -- and maybe even at lower stages -- to me, what may well matter much more than income are expenses.  Not only the quantitative size of those expenses, but their qualitative nature as well.

On the one hand, if you're making $2700/month, are spending $700/month on rent and $2000/month on food and transportation and medical care for you and your six kids, well, geeze, no problem, I'm going to give you IFP status every single time.  You've got a cheap apartment (with six kids!) and you are spending $60/day just to clothe and feed your brood.  Of course I'm not taking food out of their hungry little bodies by adding another $350 to your expenses.  Welcome to federal court for free.  (At least on the expense end.  Good luck getting a lawyer to take your case for less than $350.  All-in.)

But let's say you're making $2700/month, are spending the same $700/month on rent, but don't have any children, and spend $500/month on clothes and $500/month (net!) on lottery tickets.  Well, at that point, I don't at all think it'd be the "outer bound[s] of stringency" to make you cut back -- for a single month, no less -- on lottery tickets or purchases of new clothes in order to pay a $350 filing fee.  Not in the slightest.

Now, I know that there aren't in fact many people making $32,000/year who spend $500/month on clothes.  But the point remains the same.  In deciding whether a $350 expense is overly burdensome, what really matters is what it trades off with.  What one's other expenses are.  That's what's of critical significance, at least to me.  Much less than your mere gross income.

So I agree with the Ninth Circuit that you can't judge someone's eligibility for IFP status on the basis of their spouse's income without simultaneously assessing the extent of that spouse's expenses.  And I also agree that at a certain gross income level -- here, $10,000/year -- giving someone IFP status is a no-brainer.

But I'm not entirely persuaded that denying IFP status for someone who makes $32,400 a year would "represent[], at best, the outer boundary of stringency."  I like to sentiment, to be sure.  It stems from good principles, and the motivation is pure.

I'm just not sure it's right.

At a minimum, I'd express that sentiment differently.  As well as highlight the fact that it's not only income that matters, but also expenses.

Especially at $30,000-plus a year.  The income level of half of America.

Kohn Law Group v. Auto Parts Mfg. (9th Cir. - June 4, 2015)

It's more than understandable why a Santa Monica law firm -- the Kohn Law Group -- would want to litigate its case in the Central District of California rather than in the Great State of Mississippi.

Too bad.  Mississippi justice is what you get.  That's the first-to-file rule, and there's no reason to depart from it here.

Wednesday, June 03, 2015

Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC (Cal. Ct. App. - June 1, 2015)

When you're representing the appellant, it's not a good start when the first paragraph of the opinion reads:

"Seventeen months and more than 1,300 attorney hours after plaintiff Julio Oregel (Oregel) filed a class action against his former employer, defendant PacPizza, LLC (PacPizza), PacPizza petitioned to compel arbitration of Oregel’s claims. The trial court denied the petition, finding PacPizza waived its right to enforce a purported arbitration agreement between the two parties. PacPizza appeals, primarily contending the court erred in denying the petition, and also asserting two other claimed errors. We conclude the petition was properly denied, a conclusion that moots PacPizza’s remaining arguments. We thus affirm."

But it's even worse when the second paragraph reads:

"We begin with an observation that, as the appellant, PacPizza was tasked with providing in its opening brief a summary of all evidence in the record that is material to the issues raised on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C); Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) This, it failed to do. PacPizza sets forth a less-than-candid 'Chronology of Pertinent Events Underlying Appeal' that suggests little transpired in the 17 months between Oregel’s filing of his complaint and PacPizza’s filing of its petition to compel arbitration. Among other things, PacPizza has omitted any discussion of the extensive class discovery it conducted—an omission that is nothing short of brazen given the trial court’s finding that Oregel was prejudiced by the discovery the parties conducted on his class allegations during the lengthy period of time PacPizza delayed in seeking arbitration. What follows is a chronology of what actually transpired."

I won't pile on by quoting the various other portions of the opinion in which Justice Richman makes it clear that he's none-too-pleased with counsel for appellant, Robert Michael Bodzin.  It's enough to say that Mr. Bodzin was undoubtedly displeased with the opinion.

Nor the subsequent decision to publish it, I'm sure.

Tuesday, June 02, 2015

Mira Overseas Consulting v. Muse Family Ent. (Cal. Ct. App. - June 2, 2015)

"The Muse Parties are 20 investor entities that made loans to BTM Funding, Inc. (BTM), a company wholly owned by David T. Smith (David). In 2008, David used BTM to purchase a residence in Pacific Palisades, California (the property) for approximately $10 million. David had BTM take title to the property to hide it from his former wife during their contentious divorce proceedings. David married respondent Carmen Copple Silva (Carmen), who is also trustee of the Carmen Copple Silva Revocable Living Trust (trust). In November 2008, David caused to be executed a quitclaim deed which transferred the property from BTM to himself. On the same day, David signed a quitclaim deed transferring the property to Carmen. A year later, Carmen executed a quitclaim deed transferring the property from herself to her trust. None of these quitclaim deeds were recorded until 2009, after financial problems with BTM surfaced. Because David had listed the property as the primary asset of BTM, the effect of the quitclaim deeds was to render BTM insolvent.

Meanwhile, during the divorce proceedings, David’s former wife (whom he later remarried) [Me: !] claimed that he hid assets from her, including the property. She and David eventually settled the issue by having Mira, a British Virgin Islands entity, originally beneficially owned by David transferred to her."

With all those machinations, yeah, I can see why things could rapidly get confusing.

Fortunately, Justice Ashmann-Gerst sorts it all out.

Monday, June 01, 2015

People v. Charles (Cal. Supreme Ct. - June 1, 2015)

I've read hundreds of cases in which, in my mind, the defendant was far more deserving of death than in this one.  Yet those defendants are sentenced to life and this one gets sentenced to the needle.

Seems somewhat arbitrary.

Not that what Mr. Charles did was at all okay.  It's not.  He killed his family:  his mother, father, and 19-year old brother.  For seemingly no reason.  He had dinner with 'em.  No arguments or anything like that.  But he inexplicably decided to come back later that night and kill them.  Stabbing his brother to death, choking his mom, and beating his father to death with a wrench.

Utterly no (rational) reason.

It's also not that Mr. Charles had otherwise indicated his profoundly righteous inclusion in the category of defendants properly sentenced to death.  He was an auto mechanic in a shop.  He had friends and family who still loved him notwithstanding his senseless crime.  He seems to have been completely nonviolent prior to this heinous act, and had utterly no prior criminal history whatsoever.

Hardly the poster child for a death sentence.

It also bears mention that this is this fourth penalty phase trial for Mr. Charles.  The first jury deadlocked on the penalty, and the prosecution retried him.  The second jury decided on death, but the trial court reversed this decision for juror misconduct.  The third jury deadlocked on the penalty again.

The fourth time, however, was the charm.  At least for the state.  Sentenced to death, and unanimously affirmed by the California Supreme Court.

You can't find manifest fault with the logic of the California Supreme Court's decision.  The jury found the guy guilty, and for ample reason.  What he did justified a death sentence under existing law.  There didn't seem to be an manifest impropriety in the process of the trial (though a couple of the prosecutor's statements during closing argument seemed a bit excessive to me).  Plus, there were reasons the jury decided to impose the death sentence.  It was a triple murder.  Twenty years ago, right after being first put into prison, Mr. Charles put a choke hold on a fellow inmate in the shower and knocked him unconscious.  And there was also a hacksaw in his prison cell.  Presumably Mr. Charles was scared after being sent to prison and looking to escape.  All these things undoubtedly explain why the overwhelming majority of jurors in all of his various penalty phases thought that Mr. Charles should be killed.

Yet from the perspective of someone who -- unlike the jury -- has seen a plethora of reported murder cases over the past couple of decades, it's hard for me to say that what Mr. Charles did was qualitatively different -- or even qualitatively worse -- than a ton of other cases in which the defendant was not sentenced to death, or in which the death penalty was not even sought.

You spin the wheel and you select some people for death.  Some people would be fine with that.  But that's a little to arbitrary for me.

And what we have is only slightly qualitatively different.

State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Ct. (Cal. Supreme Ct. - June 1, 2015)

The month of June 2015 begins with an especially depressing fact pattern in the California Supreme Court:

"In 2007, Gilton Pitre was paroled from state prison. Before his release, the State Department of Mental Health (DMH) assessed whether he should be civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) Ultimately, the Director of Mental Health did not request a petition for commitment and Pitre left prison. Four days later, he raped and murdered plaintiff Elaina Novoa‘s 15-year-old sister, Alyssa Gomez."

You might think that since the California Supreme Court is hearing the case, and it's one that involves the above facts, it's a death penalty opinion.  Not true.  At issue is a civil lawsuit against the State.  Mr. Pitre received life in prison, not death.

You might also think from the lineup in the California Supreme Court that it's a contentious result.  Justice Corrigan's majority opinion is joined by three justices -- Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin and Cuellar -- and Justice Werdegar's contrary opinion is joined by two (Justices Liu and Kruger).  So it's a 4-3.

Yet that's not really true either.  Every single justice agrees not only on the result, but also that there's no proximate cause.  It's true that the Department of Mental Health was required to evaluate Mr. Pitre before his release with two doctors, not just one.  (The one doctor concluded that Mr. Pitre was not a sexually violent predator, and on that basis the state exercised its discretion not to seek the further involuntary commitment of Mr. Pitre.)  But even if that might have been a but-for cause of Ms. Gomez's death, the California Supreme Court unanimously agrees that it wasn't the proximate cause.  Hence that the lawsuit against the Department of Mental Health was properly dismissed.

The only disagreement between the justices is over precisely why there's not proximate cause; in particular, whether public policy concerns also support the conclusion that there's no proximate cause.

Which is an interesting debate, but also one that's entirely academic. Because there's no proximate cause here.  End of story.