Wednesday, August 21, 2024

Mahram v. Kroger Co. (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 19, 2024)

I literally just edited a brief on this exact subject last week, so I know a fair piece about when non-signatories to an arbitration agreement can move to compel arbitration against a signatory, as well as whether that issue gets decided by a court or the arbitrator. The correct answer depends in part on what precisely the text of the arbitration provision says, and the doctrinal issues are not all that straightforward (or at least less straightforward, in my view, than it might appear to readers of this opinion by the Court of Appeal).

It's true, though, that not all non-signatories can successfully move to compel arbitration, and that in many cases, that issue gets decided by a court, rather than an arbitrator, even if there's a delegation clause in the underlying arbitration provision. Justice Wiley is also correct when he says that in deciding that issue, it's critical to look at the text of that provision, and criticizes some other cases for not including the relevant contractual language in their opinions.

Justice Wiley doesn't make that same mistake, and quotes the arbitration provision in full at the outset of his opinion. (For background: Plaintiff bought some groceries from Ralphs through Instacart, the Instacart contract contains an arbitration provision, Plaintiff subsequently sued Ralphs, and Ralphs moved to compel arbitration pursuant to Plaintiff's contract with Instacart.)  

Here's what the arbitration provision says:

“Mandatory Arbitration: If we’re unable to work out a solution amicably, both you and Instacart agree to resolve through binding arbitration, rather than in court, any dispute, controversy, or claim arising at any time out of or relating to: (i) these Terms, including the formation, existence, breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation, validity, or enforceability thereof; (ii) access to or use of the Services, including receipt of any advertising or marketing communications; (iii) any transactions through, by, or using the Services, including any goods or services purchased or sold through, by, or using the Services; or (iv) any other aspect of your relationship or transactions with Instacart as a consumer.”

There's also a separate delegation clause that provides that any dispute as to arbitrability shall generally be decided by the arbitrator, not a court.

You can probably figure out the underlying textual dispute. Plaintiff contends that the arbitration provision only applies to disputes between him and Instacart, whereas Ralph contends that this provision applies to "any dispute" (including those with Ralphs) that "arise[s] out of or relate[s] to . . . any transactions through [Instacart] or . . . any goods or services purchased [] through Instacart," which these (allegedly) were since the dispute definitely involves the (allegedly false) price paid for the goods purchased through Instacart.

That's a complicated textual dispute, and you could see the arguments on both sides.

Here's the part I sincerely don't get, though.

Justice Wiley quotes the textual language of the arbitration provision in full, and reminds us that the text of that provision is critical (and, indeed, allegedly dispositive here). But here's the money quote at the end of page 7 of the opinion that explains why plaintiff didn't agree to arbitrate any dispute with Ralphs:

"With our italics, Instacart’s contract language was that the arbitration agreement 'applies to and governs any dispute, controversy, or claim between you and Instacart.' But Mahram had no dispute with Instacart."

Wait, what? That's supposed to be quoting the arbitration agreement -- the whole thing's in quotes. But what's in the quotes is not in the arbitration provision that Justice Wiley sets forth earlier in the opinion. the phrase "applies to and governs" appears nowhere in the opinion other than in the quote on page 7, and certainly not in the arbitration provision quoted earlier. (I double-checked: the word "applies" does not even appear anywhere else in the opinion other than in the quote on page 7.) Similarly, the only place the words "between you and Instacart" appear -- the ones that Justice Wiley emphasizes -- is in the belated quote, not in the original arbitration provision quoted in full at the outset.

So I'm legitimately confused. Does this quote come from somewhere else in the contract, somewhere never before mentioned in the opinion (and not in the original arbitration provision)? Or is this not an actual quote, but rather a purported summary of what the arbitration provision means (even though it's surrounded by quotes in the opinion)?

Maybe I'm missing something. Because if the contract actually said that the only thing that was agreed to be arbitration is what's listed in the quote on page 7, yeah, that's pretty good evidence that disputes with Ralphs aren't included. But if that language is not, in fact, in the contract, then you've got to go through the actual text and explain why Ralphs is wrong that, textually, the dispute indeed arises out of the purchase of goods through Instacart, so the arbitration provision at least textually applies to that.

Again, maybe there are two different arbitration provisions, or maybe what the Court of Appeal puts in quotes is not actually a quote. Those seem the likely possibilities, anyway. But I can't tell which is true, and it matters. Because the textual analysis is a lot more complicated if the contract doesn't actually contain that latter quote. (And is a lot easier if it does!)

Tuesday, August 20, 2024

Syre v. Douglas (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 19, 2024)

I'm somewhat on board with the result the Court of Appeal reaches in this case, which affirms the denial of an attorney disqualification motion by the trial court. There are nonetheless certain portions of the opinion that seem both doctrinally wrong as well as substantially pernicious in other cases, at least to people (like me) who are seriously concerned with legal ethics.

Here, an indigent person called up a public interest organization (California Indian Legal Services) to seek its representation in a lawsuit she wanted to file against her brother regarding a property dispute. An intake advocate talked to her about the lawsuit but the organization ultimately declined to represent her because she didn't live in the relevant county (Inyo) that the organization served. She subsequently was able to find a different firm to represent her and filed suit, at which point the organization she had contacted agreed to represent her brother in that very same action, and she then moved to disqualify that entity.

The Court of Appeal held that disqualification was not required, in part due to the fact that it was a public interest organization (seems right - DQ motions are somewhat disfavored for such entities), because the only person plaintiff talked to at that organization was an intake advocate who has now left the place (also seems right - that'd make it easy to screen, as well as practically limits the risk of potential transmission of confidential information), and in part due to the limited scope and nature of the information conveyed to the intake advocate (ditto: we're not massively worried about this, at least as a relative matter).

So all that seems fine to me.

What bothers me about the opinion, however, is its casual disregard of certain types of confidences and assertion that certain material doesn't count as "confidential" in the context of potential representation.

Justice Ramirez (somewhat) rightly notes that Rule 1.18 -- the ethical rule regarding duties owed to prospective clients -- doesn't expressly define what counts as "confidential information" under the rule. (Though that's largely because Rule 1.18 incorporates Rule 1.6 and Section 6068, neither of which use that term either.) It nonetheless says that if the lawyer received material in "confidence" (or "secrets") from a client, the lawyer and the firm is disqualified --unless there's effective screening, which there wasn't here.

Where the Court of Appeal errs, in my view, is when it holds that the law firm here didn't receive any confidential information from the client.

It's quite plausible that Justice Ramirez is right that the "income" information that the prospective client revealed to the legal advocate doesn't really count because it was only to see if she qualified for legal services and wasn't relevant to the lawsuit. Ditto, perhaps, for the "already-public" background data about the underlying piece of property; I could see not disqualifying someone for that.

But the Court of Appeal goes on to say the following:

"As for the information regarding plaintiff’s statements that defendant exercised undue influence on Willet, that information could not be viewed as confidential where it related to the theory of recovery she intended to pursue, and which would have been disclosed in the pleadings. The case-related information was not confidential, did not risk any harm to plaintiff, and was not material to her action to quiet title, although some of the information was, in fact, included in her quiet title action. Therefore, it cannot be said that the information that was communicated to the intake advocate, as relayed to those responsible for the decision whether or not to accept plaintiff’s case, was confidential in nature, much less harmful to plaintiff."

That just seems clearly wrong to me. That information is crystal clearly "confidential information" that is privileged under Section 962 of the Evidence Code since it was communicated solely for purposes of the anticipated litigation and not contemporaneously disseminated to third parties. That the client might subsequently reveal those same facts in the litigation is entirely irrelevant. You can't ask someone in a deposition or at trial "What did you tell your lawyer about your case?" even if you limit that inquiry to topics or information that were subsequently revealed by you in the case. It's privileged. It's confidential and protected.

Plus, the whole point of both Rule 1.18 and the underlying privilege is that we protect this information to make sure that no one gets to critically explore whether (or to what extent) the stuff that you said to your lawyer is consistent with what you later say under oath. Imagine that a prospective client tells the lawyer (as she might well have): "Yeah, my mother was a little bit out of it sometimes, but she was on balance coherent the majority of the time, and at least for the 5 minutes I talked to her, she seemed clear as far as I could tell." During the client's deposition, she might well have a much more forceful and less ambiguous recitation of those facts: "My mother was almost always coherent, and during the entire half hour I talked to her, she was clear as a bell." Do you think you're permitted to discover the quite-a-bit impeaching statement the client gave to her lawyer? No way. It remains fully confidential and protected -- and rightly so, because we don't want to chill attorney-client communications since we're worried that they might otherwise be less than forthright, with disastrous consequences.

The fact that the subject matter of the communication was later raised in the pleadings (or anticipated to be used therein) is totally irrelevant. It remains protected. So too here.

And that's true equally with both prospective and current clients. Once you, as a lawyer, have heard the unvarnished recitation of facts from the prospective client, you can't obviously can't ethically represent the adverse party in that exact same litigation. 'Cause if you could, you could -- and would -- surely ask (and know to ask) the obvious follow-up questions: "Didn't you in fact previously say, much earlier in time and before this litigation commenced, that she was only coherent a 'majority' of the time (rather than 'almost always', and say that she was only purportedly 'clear' for 5 minutes, rather than the half hour you referred to in your current sworn testimony?"

We don't allow that. If we did, you wouldn't be honest with your prospective lawyer. And you'd feel quite accurately unjustly turned upon if your would-be-lawyer used what you told him against you in the litigation.

The Court of Appeal repeats that same mistake, in my view, later in the opinion when it says: "We cannot consider communication of the nature of plaintiff’s anticipated action against defendant to be confidential information where plaintiff was seeking representation in anticipation of filing a lawsuit based on that information in court. Plaintiff’s cause of action alleges that any transfer of the title to the property in question is “void ab initio” without referring to any deed in favor of defendant, while also alleging that defendant is an ex-felon whose testimony in court would be subject to impeachment. It does not require prescience to predict that the basis of these allegations would be explored in discovery in this litigation. Plaintiff cannot reasonably assert that the preliminary information about the “issue” in the case was a confidential communication."

I could potentially agree that obviously public information isn't confidential and so doesn't necessarily require disqualification. But that's almost certainly not the only stuff that plaintiff revealed. And as an important doctrinal matter, it matters zero (in my view) that the information that you convey to your lawyer is information that you reveal "in anticipation of filing a lawsuit based on that information in court." When I tell a lawyer that someone punched me half a dozen times and it hurt like an 8 on a scale of one to 10, that stuff's privileged and confidential regardless of whether I presently intend to say the exact same thing (or perhaps something a little different) if asked that precise question at a deposition or at trial. My adversary doesn't get to learn what I told that would-be lawyer by either asking me at a deposition what I told him or by the mere expedient of hiring that attorney herself.

That's my view, anyway. I'd substantially narrow the opinion accordingly.

This from someone who occasionally teaches Professional Responsibility and takes this stuff seriously.

Monday, August 19, 2024

In re Dezi C. (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 19, 2024)

Today's California Supreme Court decision finally resolves the oft-litigated issue of what appellate courts should do in dependency cases when the trial court has conducted an inadequate inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The answer -- over the dissent of two justices -- is: conditionally reverse.

Both the majority and the dissent make good points. That's in part why there was such a solid split in the Courts of Appeal. So both opinions are definitely worth reading.

The opinion is also a great example of why one can't merely read the majority opinion to ascertain the "holding" of the case. Sure, the majority opinion here gets 5 votes, so it's clearly the law.

But the concurring opinion expressly agrees with Part II of the dissent, which involves "the threshold question of what constitutes an adequate initial inquiry under Cal-ICWA." Two justices agree with that portion of the dissent (Justices Kruger and Corrigan) even though they also join the majority opinion, and two justices agree with the dissent in toto (Justice Groban and Chief Justice Guerrero).

Add those all together and that makes four. Which is a majority of the Court.

So while that's technically dicta, it's still incredibly meaningful. Which what a majority of the Court has said is a pretty telling indication of what the respective Courts of Appeal should do in the future.

Friday, August 16, 2024

People v. Obermeuller (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 16, 2024)

Two words:

Creepy stalker.

On second thought, let's make that three words: 

Super creepy stalker.

Thursday, August 15, 2024

Election Integrity Project v. Weber (9th Cir. - Aug. 15, 2024)

I just thought that this portion of Judge Wardlaw's opinion was especially insightful, so I'll repost it here without elaboration. (The Ninth Circuit affirms therein the district court's dismissal on the pleadings of a lawsuit challenging California's statutory vote-by-mail -- "VBM" -- provisions):

"Finally, we are limited to reviewing the allegations of the complaint as it is written. EIPCa contends in its briefing on appeal that it has “allege[d] that nearly 124,000 ineligible VBM votes were counted in the 2020 election.” Op. Br. at 22. Counsel for EIPCa repeated this assertion at oral argument. See Oral Argument at 41:20–41:28 (Feb. 5, 2024), https://perma.cc/ZYN4-D894. 

These statements grossly misstate the allegations of the complaint and will not be credited. What the complaint in fact alleges is that “124,000 more votes were counted in the 2020 election than registrants with voting histories for that election.” SAC at ¶ 137. In other words, 124,000 people voted for the first time in California in 2020. Such an assertion does not remotely amount to an allegation that 124,000 ineligible voters cast ballots, or that 124,000 invalid mail-in ballots were cast. The only plausible inference we may draw from EIPCa’s allegation is one consistent with the ordinary practice of democracy: 124,000 people, accounting for less than one percent of all votes cast in California’s 2020 general election, voted for the first time in that election.

[Footnote -] Counsel for EIPCa is advised to review Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 and our corresponding Circuit Rules, which require parties to present accurate and reliable support for their claims on appeal. Grant v. City of Long Beach, 96 F.4th 1255, 1256 (9th Cir. 2024)."

U.S. v. Chichande (9th Cir. - Aug. 15, 2024)

Were I living in Ecuador, I might well find it exceptionally enticing to be offered $38,000 -- four times what I usually make in a year -- to pilot my small little panga boat from Ecuador to somewhere offshore Mexico.

Would I know for sure that the boat would contain cocaine? Maybe not, though I imagine I'd certainly suspect as much.

Would I know that I'd be carrying $28 million worth of cocaine? Probably not. But once those armed guards in Ecuador led me to my boat and I saw the stuff, I bet there's no way I could possibly back out.

Would I know that, if caught, even without any criminal history, I'd receive a full 15 years in prison as a result? Probably not.

But that's indeed what the defendant here received.

Defendant says he was a minor player, but both the district court and Ninth Circuit disagree.

P.S. - People often (understandably) critique judges who cite Wikipedia, as the opinion does here for its definition of what a panga is. The term is in the dictionary. It's also described in numerous other published opinions, including this one. Personally, I'd have probably gone with one of those. (Not that it matters, of course.)


Wednesday, August 14, 2024

In re Blixseth (9th Cir. - Aug. 14, 2024)

Montana files a claim in bankruptcy court (an involuntary petition for bankruptcy) and affirmatively seeks relief therein. Its counsel unequivocally tells the court, in response to its query, that the state affirmatively waives its sovereign immunity for any damages to the debtor arising from that claim.


It's good to be the king, apparently.

Monday, August 12, 2024

U.S. ex rel. Lesnik v. Ism Vuzem DDO (9th Cir. - Aug. 12, 2024)

It's got to be a somewhat depressing day when you sue various defendants, none of them ever show up, you request their default (which no one even opposes), and the district court still dismisses you lawsuit.

It's got to be even more depressing when you then appeal, no one opposes the appeal, and you still lose in the Ninth Circuit. Your only opposition being, apparently, the panel.

Yet that's what happens today. In a unanimous published opinion, no less.

One last thing. There was never any opposition filed to anything, and at issue is simply a request for a default judgment, and yet this lawsuit has been pending for eight years -- since 2016.

An unusual set of circumstances, to be sure. And one with which I'm quite confident plaintiff and his counsel are less than pleased.

Friday, August 09, 2024

People v. Wilson (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 5, 2024)

The next time you take a taxicab, can you please remember the following facts when deciding how much to tip your driver? Because it's often a horrible job, and they can use all the cash they can possibly get:

"The prosecution presented evidence that in early 2000, Wilson committed a series of crimes against cab drivers in the San Bernardino and Los Angeles areas. On each occasion, the perpetrator called for a cab, then robbed and murdered or attempted to rob and murder the cab driver. The first victim, James Richards, was robbed at gunpoint at the end of a rural road in San Bernardino County. The perpetrator attempted to kill Richards, but the gun jammed and Richards managed to escape. The second victim, Andres Dominguez, was shot and killed in the same location several weeks later. The perpetrator then used Dominguez’s cell phone to request another taxicab from a Pomona company. The driver of the cab that responded, Victor Henderson, was the third victim; he was killed approximately two hours after Dominguez, shot by the same gun used to kill Dominguez.

James Richards picked up a passenger in front of a grocery store in downtown San Bernardino on January 7, 2000. The passenger was going to Bloomington, about 20 minutes away. After reaching Bloomington, the passenger directed Richards to stop on a rural, dimly lit road. There, the passenger drew a gun and robbed Richards. Then, forcing Richards out of the cab and onto his knees, the passenger put the gun into Richards’s mouth and tried to shoot him. The gun jammed, however, and Richards was able to escape to a nearby house. The owner of the house heard Richards screaming and pounding on his door and saw a figure in the street pointing a gun at Richards before getting into a cab and speeding off. The cab company later recovered Richards’s stolen taxi from an apartment complex in Victorville."

Maybe Uber and Lyft drivers are a little bit more protected, since you the identity of the person who calls for the ride is (allegedly) discoverable. But still. Tips would definitely be appreciated. 

Thursday, August 08, 2024

In re Zoe H. (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 8, 2024)

I can summarize the central point of this opinion by Justice Menetrez without even mentioning the subject matter of the underlying dispute:

"We've told you before in other opinions that the law is X, but notwithstanding that fact, lawyers often keep telling us on appeal that the law is Y, and even some of our colleagues occasionally make the same mistake in published opinions. To be clear: The law is X, not Y. The only time the law is Y in when Z occurs, and yet people keep constantly saying that the law is Y in non-Z settings. To reiterate: The law is X, unless there's Z. So we're going to publish this one as well to make that crystal clear. Yet again."

(It's a dependency case, if you really want to know.)

Seems like an opinion worthy of publication to me. Sometimes people just gotta be reminded.

Tuesday, August 06, 2024

Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (Cal. Ct. App. - Aug. 5, 2024)

I'm totally on board for Justice Richman's opinion here, which affirms the trial court's decision to enforce an $100,000 -- including all attorney's fees -- settlement of a Lemon Law case. The trial court held that those were the terms to which the parties agreed at the settlement conference, even though plaintiff says the settlement was $100,000 plus fees.

That said, were I the trial court, and I had to guess, I suspect that what really happened was that defendant offered $100,000 total, plaintiff (and her lawyers) thought it was $100,000 plus fees, and the parties then "agreed" to that deal -- each thinking different things. The best evidence of that fact is that the defendant had essentially already admitted liability and previously made a CCP 998 offer of $70,000 plus fees, and the amount of fees had surely substantially increased (potentially by churning) since then. So an offer of $100,000 all-in wouldn't have made sense.

But the standard of review on appeal is dispositive here. The trial court could well have gone the other way. But there was substantial evidence for the factual position it took, so that's the end of the story.

Lesson for the day: Be super careful when to listen to the settlement terms recited on the record by the judge at your settlement conference. Super.

Monday, August 05, 2024

People v. Frazier (Cal. Supreme Ct. - Aug. 8, 2024)

If I'm honest, I probably don't feel as strongly about the refusal to stay this death penalty case (to allow the addition of a Racial Justice Act claim, rather than having it raised in a separate habeas proceeding) than Justices Evans and Liu. Yes, the habeas route almost guarantees massive delay. But it's a death penalty case; it's not like the guy's itching to have the sentence carried out, and it's California, no it's practically not going to happen anyway. The only way it would potentially matter is to the guilt phase. And the guy here is pretty much definitely guilty, and of a heinous crime: he bludgeoned a random woman who was on a lunchtime walk to death with an iron bar and then viciously raped her, his DNA was all over her, there were numerous eyewitnesses to him in the area, all of this plus his incriminating statements to multiple roommate. He's definitely getting convicted on any possible retrial anyway, so I'm not sure that delay as a practical matter means much.

Personally, I'm more interested in the very last thing Justice Evans touches on her dissent: the fact that the trial court denied the defendant's repeated (and unequivocal) requests to represent himself at the outset of his penalty phase. The Court holds that's too late, and that the defendant wasn't really objecting to the ends of the representation (not getting sentenced to death) as opposed to the means of getting there (tactics).

But the reason he wanted to defend himself is because he didn't want his lawyer to say at the penalty phase that his uncle molested him -- an allegation that the defendant insisted was factually untrue. To me, it's a pretty hugely deal to formally accuse someone at trial of molesting you as a child, particularly when (if the defendant is to be believed) that the allegation is false.

Especially when, as here, you're pretty sure you're going to be sentenced to death anyway, since the crime is so heinous -- and that, since it's California, the sentence probably won't be carried out in any event -- if I was a capital defendant, I could definitely see caring more deeply that my relative not be falsely accused of child molestation at my trial than whatever marginal (and/or entirely theoretical) benefit such a claim might (but in fact didn't) have at my upcoming penalty phase. And if my lawyer disagreed with that call, well, that's fine, but then I'd just as soon represent myself, thank you very much.

There's got to at least be some leeway there, right?

P.S. - While Justice Evans concludes her opinion by calling this a "Hobson's choice," I'm not actually sure that's the right terminology, at least in this particular case. A Hobson's choice isn't really a choice at all; it's a take-it-or-leave-it situation, with merely an illusory choice. I get that in some cases, telling a defendant that they can only represent themselves if they do it at the outset of the trial (rather than asking for such relief at the penalty phase) is a total nonstarter, because there's no way a non-lawyer can possibly defend a capital case on the merits. But, honestly, here, I think Mr. Frazier was getting convicted regardless; the evidence against him was simply too strong, and at least as far as I can see, there pretty much was no plausible defense available anyway. So, here, I actually would have found it quite plausible for the guy to represent himself at the outset. I'm confident the result wouldn't have been any different than it was.

Libitzky v. United States (9th Cir. - Aug. 5, 2024)

I kinda like it when the Ninth Circuit publishes its opinions before the usual 10:00 a.m. deadline. It often lets me start my work morning with something interesting.

This morning's opinion isn't particularly complicated. But it does seem unjust. Pretty much to everyone, I suspect. As Judge Lee explains at the end of the opinion:

"This is an unfortunate case with a potentially unjust outcome for the Libitzkys. Everyone agrees that the Libitzkys overpaid their taxes by almost $700,000. . . . The Libitzkys’ accountant, whom they relied on to file their tax returns, failed to meet critical filing deadlines. And with this decision, they cannot sue to recover their overpayments."

It seems especially unfair because, by all accounts, Mr. and Mrs. Libitzky not only routinely overpaid their taxes in advance -- so were hardly trying to game the system -- but are also exceptionally generous people.

A just government would give them back their money. I take no position on which branch should elect to do so.

But it should happen.

Friday, August 02, 2024

Kumar v. Garland (9th Cir. - Aug. 2, 2024)

Imagine that you're riding your motorcycle one sunny day and four men throw you off the thing, push you on your side, and then start kicking and beating you with wooden batons. You get beat like that for a full two to three minutes. (Go ahead, if you wish, and start beating yourself with a club right now to see what that's like. Count to 15. Keep going. Count to 60. Keep going. Now imagine that the person doing that to you seriously wants to hurt you. I bet it's no fun, right?)

You scream and cry during the beating, and eventually, a crowd forms and the men leave. You've got bruises all over, but no broken bones. You go to the hospital, where you stay for two days. Eventually the bruises and pain go away, and you're not permanently crippled or anything like that.

Judge Bumatay would like you to know that you've suffered "no significant harm" from the beating.

Oh, and imagine that you're putting up political posters -- let's say for Trump, or Harris (or Kennedy, even; take your pick) -- in an area that's quite adverse to your particular political philosophy and four men with weapons come up to you, tear down your posters, approach you to attack you (and back off only when a crowd forms), and one of them threatens to kill you if you ever dare put up your political posters again. One month later, four men -- including some of the same men who had previously threatened you -- conduct the several-minute beating referred to above, and at the end of it, one of your assailants tells you that next time he sees you putting up posters like that, he'll shoot you.

Judge Bamatay would like you to know that those death threats are only "vague threats" that don't really count; after all, you never actually saw anyone with a gun.

Suffice it to say that I strongly doubt that anyone who was actually a victim of any of these events would agree with those particular assessments.

(Nor does the majority of the panel.)

Thursday, August 01, 2024

Cal. Supreme Ct. (August 1, 2024)

I doubt this is an emerging trend, but August opens up with about as much dissent in the California Supreme Court as we've seen in a while.

Admittedly, there are only two opinions today, but the Cal Supremes are atypically fractured in both.

The first case involves whether one plaintiff in a PAGA suit is allowed to intervene to contest a proposed settlement of a different PAGA suit brought by a different plaintiff but that would effectively bar the first plaintiff's action. Justice Jenkins authors that majority opinion, which garners a total of five votes, holding that intervention isn't automatically allowed, but Justice Liu dissents (joined by Justice Evans), and Justice Kruger authors a separate concurring opinion joined by Justice Groban.

The second case is about what standards the appellate courts should employ to decide whether it was harmless error to not have a jury decide the relevant aggravating factors necessary to justify imposition of an upper sentencing term, a procedure required as of 2022 and applicable to cases that were on direct appeal as of that date. This one's even closer. Justice Corrigan authors the majority opinion, for which there are exactly four votes. Justice Kruger partially concurs and partially dissents, joined by Justice Jenkins. And Chief Justice Guerrero dissents, for a 4-2-1. (Which sounds kinda like a difficult split in bowling, TBH.)

Splits like these wouldn't even be worth comment if they came out of the U.S. Supreme Court; there, they happen virtually every single day. But California doesn't typically see days like today.

So August starts off with a bang.

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

People v. Hicks (Cal. Ct. App. - July 31, 2024)

I understand the whole part of this opinion about not necessarily being able to strike minority jurors due to their "attitude". That's an amorphous and essentially unreviewable category, as well as an attribution that's historically been differentially directed towards African-Americans (e.g., calling someone "uppity").

So when Justice McConnell doesn't think that explanation for striking the juror flies, I can potentially get behind that.

But this particular juror disclosed that she had two prior felony convictions. One for grand theft. The other for perjury.

I know that she said that she could be fair. Pretty much every juror says the same thing. But I don't know a prosecutor in the universe who'd want on their jury someone with multiple felony convictions -- including one for perjury, hardly a typical offense. Regardless of their race.

The Court of Appeal nonetheless reverses and remands for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred by finding the prosecutor's reasons for his peremptory strike of this juror race-neutral.

That's a tough one for me. Particularly since the prosecutor didn't strike the other African-American on the jury venire. It's just difficult to believe that a similarly-situated white juror wouldn't be struck for the identical reasons.

Maybe opinions like this one are a backhanded way of just getting rid of peremptory challenges entirely. Which might not be a bad thing anyway. I think that, normally, prosecutors find peremptory challenges more valuable than defense counsel, so would ordinarily fight to retain them as an option. But if even the "normal" reasons for striking jurors start to result in potential reversals, maybe now both sides can get on board for eliminating them.

Still, I think that there are a lot of panels in the Court of Appeal that would have come out differently on this one.

Lots.

Monday, July 29, 2024

Bailey v. San Francisco D.A.'s Office (Cal. Supreme Ct. - July 29, 2024)

The California Supreme Court unanimously holds today that even the single use of an unambiguous racial epithet (e.g., the "n-word") can potentially actionable constitute racial harassment in the workplace.

In my (academic) sphere, there are differing opinions about whether it's appropriate (or wise) to use actual racial epithets, rather than a shorthand, when discussing particular cases in which those words appear. Some -- likely most -- professors use a shorthand, while others use the actual words.

For those in California, I wonder if today's opinion will affect that calculus.

Regardless, for those outside the ivory tower, the lesson from today is probably fairly clear: Don't say it. (Or at least recognize that you run at least some degree of litigation risk if you do.)




Friday, July 26, 2024

In re Masingale (9th Cir. - July 26, 2024)

Mr. and Mrs. Masingale filed for bankruptcy and said they were claiming a statutory exemption for 100% of the value of their house. That's too much -- the statute only lets you keep $45,950. But no one objected to their petition, and the Supreme Court has expressly held that if a debtor uses the exact words that Mr. and Mrs. Masingale used on their form, they get to keep the excess -- even the amount about the statutory cap. The Masingale's house had appreciated a ton by the time the bankruptcy petition was finally resolved, so the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel relied on the Supreme Court precedent to hold that they were entitled to retain the full $200,000+ above-statute homestead exemption since no one objected in time.

The Ninth Circuit reverses. It distinguishes the prior Supreme Court case on the grounds that, here, there were other statements in the Masingales' petition that suggested that they were not, in fact, claiming an amount in excess of the statutory limit. So they're limited to the usual amount.

Motivated in part, I'm confident, to disincentivize bankruptcy petitioners from attempting to pull a similar trick in the future.

Seems fine to me. They've changed the relevant bankruptcy form in the interim to reduce any similar potential manipulation in the future. But I don't feel too bad for the Masingales. They got a discharge. There's no need to give 'em the extra couple of hundred grand. That can go to their creditors, and if there's anything left, great, they get that anyway.

I also noticed one last thing about the opinion that made me smile.

In Property class, professors often talk (as you may know) about "Blackacre" and -- sometimes (especially in the modern era) -- "Greenacre". Mr. and Mrs. Masingale's home is in Washington state. In a tiny little community on the eastern border of the state of around 5,000 residents called Greenacres. So the Ninth Circuit repeatedly calls their home the "Greenacres property".

And in this fashion, a law school hypothetical comes to life.

Thursday, July 25, 2024

Okonowsky v. Garland (9th Cir. - July 25, 2024)

Free speech and the workplace intersect in complicated ways. Outside the workplace, you can say pretty much anything (with few exceptions) about anyone. Insider the workplace, by contrast, you're limited -- both practically and doctrinally -- in what you're categorically permitted to say without potentially adverse consequences.

But those spaces intersect. Many of the people you interact with on a daily basis are those you meet at work. What can you say about them in your private sphere; e.g., on Instagram?

It's a toughie. As this Ninth Circuit opinion amply demonstrates.

Here, the Ninth Circuit holds that it's potentially a Title VII violation (hostile work environment) for one co-worker to make various derogatory posts on his Instagram page about another co-worker. Read more from Judge Wardlaw if you wish.

I'm just now returning from a family vacation, so don't have much to say about the opinion other than it, at a minimum, demonstrates a practical reality:

Be careful what you publicly say about your co-workers. Your freedom in that sphere is not nearly as expansive as what you're able to say about, say, presidential candidates.


Monday, July 22, 2024

AGK Sierra de Montserrat, LP v. Comerica Bank (9th Cir. - July 19, 2024)

Most of what Judge VanDyke (who authors the opinion) and Judge Miller (who authors the concurrence) seems right to me. The Ninth Circuit previously relied on California state precedent to say that first-party attorney's fees are recoverable as damages when third-party attorney's fees are recoverable. But thereafter came a ton of California appellate cases that held to the contrary, saying that prior California (and federal) precedent was wrong.

Normally, a Ninth Circuit panel is bound by circuit precedent unless the intervening authorities from higher courts make it clear that circuit precedent is wrong. But the standard's different when it's state law, since each panel is "predicting" what the highest tribunal in that state would do. There's more flexibility in that context. So, here, when it's (now) pretty clear that California courts would hold X, a Ninth Circuit panel applying state law can hold X even though prior circuit precedent has held Y.

So far, so good. I agree.

But it seems to me that the panel's opinion, while correct in the current case, is perhaps a bit too broad as a general matter.

Here, the intervening change in California precedent was fairly clear. California precedent was a bit split even at the time of the initial panel's decision, but thereafter, the Court of Appeal's holdings seem almost uniformly tilted the other way. So I agree that California law has changed.

But both Judge Van Dyke and Judge Miller take quite the "permissive" (to use Judge Miller's words) view of the ability of one Ninth Circuit panel to depart from another circuit panel when issues of state law are in play. To quote Judge Miller (with emphases in original, but citations omitted):

"On the other hand, we have stated, albeit without explanation, that circuit precedent interpreting state law “is only binding in the absence of any subsequent indication from the [state] courts that our interpretation was incorrect.' That statement suggests a more permissive view—that a decision of an intermediate state appellate court could be a sufficient basis on which to depart from circuit precedent on a state-law question. . . . Today the court correctly adopts the more permissive view."

Isn't that way too broad?

Imagine, for example, that there are 20 Court of Appeal decisions that squarely hold X, and that none go the other way. On that basis, a Ninth Circuit panel holds that state law is X, and applies and follows it in a given case. In the next two decades, there are 50 Court of Appeal decisions that similarly hold X, all in reasoned opinions, but since there's no horizontal precedent in California, there's also a single outlier opinion by a crazy panel that holds Y. No other Court of Appeal opinion holds Y, and the other 50 Court of Appeal opinions critique the one outlier and say it's wacko.

According to AGK Sierra, a new Ninth Circuit panel isn't bound by the earlier circuit precedent, and can hold that state law is in fact Y. Because there is indeed some intervening precedent that says Y. (Remember: There just needs to be "any" indication from "any" state court that Y is true, and even a single opinion can suffice.)

That seems to me to grant insufficient consideration to the value of horizontal precedent in the federal system. Particularly in the present politically polarized era. A conservative panel that likes Y (or go the other way -- a liberal panel that likes Y) might well be inclined to go with Y in such a setting despite the existence of circuit precedent and the weight of authority in the state. Then you'd need an en banc court to fix the problem: the very thing that Judges Van Dyke and Miller (rightly) want to avoid.

I would think that the better standard would say something like: "Circuit precedent on state law is not binding when there is substantial intervening authority in the state court suggesting that state law on the issue has changed." That's not as tough as the standard for intervening federal authority, which requires "clearly irreconcilable" precedent, but still tougher than the very "permissive" state law standard set forth in this opinion.

A somewhat minor change, perhaps. But I think a valuable one regardless.

Because circuit precedent matters. A fair piece.

Even in state law cases. Predictability, safeguard against political manipulation, etc. All that jazz.

Thursday, July 18, 2024

Let Them Choose v. San Diego USD (Cal. Ct. App. - July 18, 2024)

I definitely agree with Justice Dato's opening missive in this opinion, which begins as follows:

"A developed system of justice, with fair and impartial courts to decide disputes among citizens, is in many ways the hallmark of a civilized society. By providing an accessible forum for resolving both economic and philosophical disagreements, courts preserve order and a sense of community, preventing these differences from devolving into active conflict and even violence. Equally important, courts foster attitudes of tolerance for and respectful acceptance of different points of view, traits often sadly lacking in today’s polarized political landscape."

Bravo for that.

He goes on to hold that the trial court erroneously refused to award CCP 1021.5 fees to a group that successfully challenged the San Diego Unified School District's "Roadmap" for a potential future student vaccination requirement for in-person learning during the height of the COVID-19 epidemic. 

Reasonable minds could (and surely do) disagree on that point. The trial court thought that fees weren't warranted because the litigation did not, in fact, change anything; the District abandoned the "Roadmap" for reasons unrelated to the litigation, given the changing dynamics of the epidemic. By contrast, the Court of Appeal concludes that the litigation still achieved a public benefit: namely, the recognition that school attendance requirements (even during COVID) had to be passed statewide, not by local school districts.

Fair enough. Process is indeed important. On that we can likely all agree. Admittedly, not every lawsuit that obtains a precedent qualifies for fees under Section 1021.5, otherwise every dispute that resulted in a published opinion would qualify. But this one was perhaps special. I see the point.

Hopefully the fees ultimately awarded on remand won't be huge. But they will -- and should -- include the fees incurred in this appeal. So they definitely won't be tiny.

But particularly given that no actual physical change resulted from the lawsuit, I simultaneously hope that the courts make sure that the fees are indeed reasonable.

As they should be in any fee award, obviously.

Tuesday, July 16, 2024

People v. Caparrota (Cal. Ct. App. - July 16, 2024)

As a practical matter, this seems a pretty darn important holding by the Court of Appeal. It definitely ups the ante for any of the readers out there who are trial lawyers in jury trial.

As you may or may not know, under the fairly recently enacted Racial Justice Act -- effective as of 2021 -- certain types of reasons for peremptorily striking potential jurors are now presumptively. Reasons that you might perhaps think would be valid, and that were definitely valid previously, but no longer. 

Here are some of the presumptively invalid reasons under CCP 231.7(e): 

(1) Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.

(2) Expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner.

(3) Having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.

(4) A prospective juror's neighborhood.

(5) Having a child outside of marriage.

(6) Receiving state benefits. . . .

(9) Dress, attire, or personal appearance. . . .

(11) Lack of employment or underemployment of the prospective juror or prospective juror's family member.

Once you strike a juror, sometimes the other side objects and you're forced to give a reason for your strike. Not surprisingly, sometimes, you give multiple reasons, if only because, typically, you do indeed have multiple reasons why you don't especially like that particular juror.

The Court of Appeal holds today that if any of the reasons you identify are within the presumptively invalid category, your strike fails. Period. Even if your other, nonprohibited, reasons are a valid basis for the strike.

So, at a minimum, know the words you're not allowed to say. Don't include amongst your reasons for the strike that the juror dresses poorly, isn't employed, distrusted the police or the legal system, etc.

Otherwise, you're going to be stuck with that juror.

Just say the reasons that are allowed, not the other ones.

And, critically, know the difference between the two.

Monday, July 15, 2024

Defense for Children Int'l v. Biden (9th Cir. - July 15, 2024)

I'm not sure what plaintiffs thought this lawsuit was plausibly going to achieve.

"Asserting violations of international law, the plaintiffs in this case ask us to enjoin the President and other senior Executive Branch officials from providing military, diplomatic, and financial support to Israel in its ongoing operations in the Gaza Strip. The plaintiffs also ask for a declaration that the United States’ current support of Israel is unlawful."

I guess that, in theory, one could imagine a federal judge somehow being so personally invested in the dispute to somehow find the matter to not involve a nonjusticiable political question. But even in that unlikely event, the opinion would undoubtedly be promptly reversed. So what's the point?

In any event, here, the district court held that it was a political question, and the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirms. The Supreme Court will deny certiorari, and that'll end the thing once and for all.

Were I the public interest groups pondering bringing such a lawsuit, that's not how I would have elected to spend my time and money.

Thursday, July 11, 2024

WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. - July 11, 2024)

Plaintiff's attorneys get a big win here, and secure the Court of Appeal's reversal of the trial court's grant of an anti-SLAPP motion in favor of the defendant. That's fairly huge, and, typically, would be the basis for undiluted celebration.

But the Court of Appeal's opinion concludes with a separate section that chastises the winning lawyers -- from Frost LLP in Los Angeles -- for their "incivility" and their appellate briefs' use of "inappropriately harsh terms to launch needless and unsubstantiated attacks on the decisions made by the trial judge, as well as against the opposing party and its lawyers."

The lawyers at Frost luckily get off without being sanctioned -- and, again, they win the appeal on the merits -- with only a concluding warning from the Court of Appeal that "Appellant’s counsel would be well advised to refrain from incivility in the future."

Which is definitely a suggestion best taken to heart. Particularly if you expect to potentially file appeals in the future before the same -- or even a different -- panel.

I'll admit that I didn't read the underlying briefs, but I'll add that at least with respect to the quotes in the briefs cited by the Court of Appeal . . . well, they're not great, but I've definitely read worse. The lawyers at Frost called the ruling below "transparently erroneous,” “egregious,” [and] a “truly perverse miscarriage of justice.” Those phrases are surely overwrought. Ditto for arguing that "the overreach by the trial court here is nothing short of shocking, effectively blessing Athens’ business threats . . . and immunizing them.”

Yeah. Definitely tone that down.

Though, again, I've read worse.

Regardless, a sound warning from the Court of Appeal for everyone. The justices definitely prefer understatement to overstatement. Keep the adverbs to a minimum if you can.

P.S. - I wonder whether Frost's self-description affected the Court of Appeal in any manner, or even if the justices were aware of it. The law firm's website leads with a description that labels the firm (with emphasis) "unapologetically aggressive", and the first line proclaims (in 72-point type) "We are fighters." With professional MMA-type photographs of the various attorneys. Oh, and when you click on the photographs, the heading for each photo is "Our Warriors."

That's a theme, for sure.

Wednesday, July 10, 2024

People v. Canales (Cal. Ct. App. - July 10, 2024)

Justice Wiley seems right to me when he says that, under the statute, continuous sexual abuse of a child doesn't necessarily require an intent to sexually arose one's self, and that whatever the alleged flaws of the jury instruction given here, they don't really matter in this particular case, since the only alleged basis for defendant's digital penetration of this child was to "punish" her. That's not a good enough reason. You can ground the child or do other stuff (like taking away their phone -- always effective) to punish them, but molesting them is not one of the permissible options. Rightly so.

I'm less confident that Justice Wiley is correct when he says "This mental state—requiring only proof that Canales voluntarily inserted his finger or penis into his stepdaughter’s vagina, without any further level of mental culpability—satisfies the presumption of mandatory culpability. Canales does not suggest, nor can we imagine, any morally innocent reason for him to decide to penetrate her."

Justice Wiley himself suggests, later on in the opinionlater on in the opinion, that there might well be acts that constitute literal violation of the statute and yet wouldn't (and shouldn't) constitute a crime. Inserting a rectal thermometer into a child's anus, for example. What Canales did was admittedly different. But I could at least "imagine" a situation in which digitally penetrating a child would be morally innocent (though, admittedly, not many). For example, a parent who was a gynecologist might perhaps morally innocently place his (or her) finger in a child for medical reasons; e.g., during a legitimate pelvic exam. Perfectly permissible, in my view.

So I think there is, in fact, a mens rea requirement here. Maybe not the requirement that one engage in the act for sexual arousal. But the jury instruction is, in fact, wrong when it says (and when the Court of Appeal says) that there is "no heightened mental requirement beyond his voluntary decision to perform the physical movements of the act." Otherwise the gynecologist is also guilty, for they surely perform the physical movements of the act, and voluntarily so.

The erroneous instruction here may well be harmless, because there was no evidence that Mr. Canales here performed the act for a morally legitimate reason. But it's still wrong, and should be revised. The statute does, in fact, require more, in my view. (At least unless we want to start throwing tons of doctors in prison.)

One last thing. Mr. Canales denied everything at trial, but the jury took only an hour to convict him, and he was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison. The one strike law doesn't, in fact, apply to him, so the Court of Appeal remands for resentencing. Nonetheless, he's going to almost certainly spend all (or nearly all) of his life in prison, and the jury didn't have much trouble at all in convicting him. That's a fairly good example of the prosecution winning big -- and easily.

Tuesday, July 09, 2024

Cassierer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Fund (9th Cir. - July 9, 2024)

Judge Graber feels strongly about this oneJudge Graber feels strongly about this one.

The case involves an otherwise arcane doctrinal dispute about whether California or Spanish law should apply to the dispute. But it's a high-profile fight about who should get to keep a Pissarro painting stolen by the Nazis; the Spanish museum that currently holds it or the sole living descendant of its original Jewish owner from whom it was stolen.

The painting is worth $60 million, by the way.

After a plethora of procedural fights, the Ninth Circuit decided that Spanish law applied, which meant that the lawsuit here was barred by the statute of limitations, and hence the museum gets to keep the painting. Judge Graber disagrees with the decision not to take the case en banc, and explains her position in forceful terms.

As I count it, her statement regarding the refusal spans roughly twenty pages and contains over thirty different places in which the statement underlines certain words or phrases for emphasis. As is usual for these sorts of things, these emphases are increasingly prevalent and emphatic as the statement goes on. And that's all in addition to the adjective-filled descriptions of the positions with which Judge Graber disagrees -- to take but one example, labelling the panel's prior opinion on one point as "myopic" as well as "illogical and without support in California law."

I get it. I, too, often get worked up when writing about issues about which I feel strongly. When writing briefs or articles, lots of my early drafts contain tons of italics and emphases.

Though, as the drafts progress, I typically try to tone the thing down for the final version.

Regardless, Judge Graber authors a strong statement about why she thinks this case should be taken en banc. Only Judge Paez joins her statement, so it doesn't look like it was a very close vote.

But Judge Graber nonetheless wants to make sure you know how she feels in this one.

Monday, July 08, 2024

Marks v. Davis (9th Cir. - July 8, 2024)

I often recommend the people read particular opinions that are doctrinally complicated or that contain factually interesting material. Basically, if I was glad that I read the opinion, and thought that others may perhaps similarly enjoy it, on occasion, I'll recommend it to others.

This one is the opposite.

Did I learn anything from reading it? Definitely. It's a death penalty case. It's got tons of details about the defendant's life, the crime, the procedural complexities of the trial, the attitude of the state court judge and their rulings, etc. I definitely learned stuff.

But here's the thing. It's long. L-O-N-G. 145 single-spaced pages. Essentially, a full book.

All about a person who committed crimes in 1990, for which he was sentenced to death 30 years ago, in California. A jurisdiction in which, in reality, no one's actually going to be executed at this point.

As a result, you'd basically be reading the resolution of a hypothetical question about a person who committed a long-ago crime the result of which is preordained. He's going to die in prison.

It's not that the story of how he got there isn't interesting. It's just that other 145-page books would likely be even more rewarding to read.

Unless you're a true death penalty and/or federal habeas nerd. In which case: Go to town.

As for the actual result: Judge Murguia writes the majority opinion, which remands the case for a new factual determination regarding whether the defendant is sufficiently mentally retarded to preclude his execution. Judge Berzon agrees with this, but would go a bit further. Judge Nelson disagrees, and would allow the execution.

The devil's in the details, of course. But that's the short and sweet version of the end product.

Friday, July 05, 2024

In re B.H. (Cal. Ct. App. - July 3, 2024)

It's true, as the Court of Appeal mentions, that there's no specific evidence that Father has ever driven drunk while four of his six children were in the car. Or that Mother knew that Father was driving drunk with those four children in the vehicle. For that reason, the Court of Appeal holds that it was improper for the trial court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over those four children.

But Father was twice arrested for driving drunk with the other two children in the vehicle. And Mother let him; indeed, she once let him drive drunk with the kids the very next day after she told the social worker that Father shouldn't drive drunk with the kids.

It's also not like this is an isolated incidence. Father has been arrested for drunk driving not once, not twice, not three times, but . . . twelve times.

Doesn't it seem reasonable to conclude that someone who's been arrested for drunk driving twelve times, included repeated occasions in which his kids were in the vehicle at the time, might again drive drunk with children in the vehicle? Including but not limited to the kids he's not yet been caught driving drunk with?



Wednesday, July 03, 2024

Musquiz v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. (9th Cir. - July 3, 2024)

Here's a very non-legal -- but perhaps fairly accurate -- summary of this opinion:

"Domingo Musquiz worked on the railroad for nearly 28 years. He left that job when he was 55 years old and, four years later, briefly worked for a hospital before being let go around two years later. He needed money -- he was in his 60s -- so he asked the Railroad Board to start his pension, and it did. The Board eventually discovered that Mr. Musquiz was later rehired by the hospital (because it has access to Social Security statements), but in the meantime, the interim pension benefits paid to Mr. Musquiz were slightly higher than they should have been. So the Board sued to recover the overpayment.

Mr. Musquiz is now 73 years old. He's on a fixed income, struggles to even make his monthly mortgage payments, has numerous health problems, and can't even afford a haircut (!). Leave the guy alone. If the Board wants to recover a tiny portion of the overpayment, go ahead. But otherwise, does it really make sense to hound the guy? Doesn't seem so to us.

Have a good Fourth of July, Mr. Musquiz. Thank you for your service."

Tuesday, July 02, 2024

Gutierrez v. Garland (9th Cir. - July 2, 2024)

Like death penalty cases, immigration disputes are another area in which there's often lengthy delay, in a manner in which no one -- not the pro-immigration folks, nor the anti-immigration ones -- should prefer.

For example, here, Sergio Gutierrez gets convicted of carjacking in 2006, and since Mr. Gutierrez is only a legal permanent resident -- he came here from El Salvador when he was a toddler in 1986 -- the INS files a petition to deport him.

All sorts of procedural wrangling follows, often revolving around whether carjacking in California is a "categorical" crime of violence. All of which results in today's opinion, which holds that it's not, and thus remands for the BIA and IJ to resolve the remaining issues in the case. Which, in turn, means that there are a lot more proceedings to come. In addition to all the ones that have come before.

With a reminder that Mr. Gutierrez's carjacking case was all the way back in 2006 -- 14 years ago (and counting).

He was 23 or so when he committed that crime. He's 37 or so now. It may well be that a lot has changed in the interim. Many people who are not-particularly-productive members of society in their early 20s have changed a fair piece as they approach their 40s. Yet we're still looking to deport the guy.

If you're an anti-immigration type, you're miffed that it's taken almost a decade and a half (and counting) to get the guy out of the country. If you're a pro-immigration type, you're miffed that Mr. Gutierrez has had to live his life the last 14 years under the specter of being kicked out of the only country he's ever known. Plus had to spend money on lawyers to fight the proceedings against him this whole time.

Sure, he has been able to stay in the country in the meantime, which I'm confident Mr. Gutierrez appreciates. But neither side particularly benefits from a decade-plus (and, again, counting) of delay.

A speedier resolution would be preferable for everyone. 

Friday, June 28, 2024

George v. Susanville Elementary School District (Cal. Ct. App. - June 28, 2024)

I disagreed with the result reached in this opinion until I read its very last substantive paragraph -- over a dozen pages in. That one probably changed my mind. Not for sure, but probably. Maybe.

The California Education Code says that school districts have to treat teachers uniformly in terms of salary and experience. No favoring one teacher over another. Fair enough.

The teacher's union enters into a collective bargaining agreement with a school district that sets teacher salaries based on years of experience and training level. It's a grid; so many years of experience plus a master's degree, for example, means you're paid $X.

Susan George worked first as a teacher for five years, and then worked as a teacher for the Susanville Elementary School District for seven years, so those years (5 + 7) put her on "Step 12" of the relevant salary schedule. She then leaves the district and teaches elsewhere for two years, then comes back. The collective bargaining agreement says that once rehired like that, she comes back starting at Step 13 (since her last salary at the district was at Step 12).

But Ms. George says she should be at Step 15 because she's got to get credit for the two (latest) years she taught outside the district.

To be clear: That's not what the collective bargaining agreement says. It says she's at Step 13. No credit for interim teaching if you leave the district and come back. But Ms. George says that violates the "uniformity" clause of the Education Code, which (if applicable) trumps the CBA. To which the school district responds: "Well, maybe, but there's no conflict; we're treating Ms. George the same way we treat everyone who gets rehired. No out-of-district credit."

To me, that's a pretty good response. I presume that school districts aren't required to give out-of-district credit if they don't want to. Maybe that out-of-school district stinks. Maybe districts don't want to have to judge whether a different district is "good enough" to give someone experience. Seems rational to me, and if the union and district agree on that -- as they did here -- that seems fine.

Which is what the trial court held. But the Court of Appeal says at the very outset of the opinion it's reversing, yet for 95% of the opinion, I'm sitting here thinking to myself: "Why? None of the opinion's arguments are persuasive to me yet."

But then I get to the very end of the opinion, which adds one fairly important fact -- one that I wish I knew about earlier. (One that, in retrospect, Justice Robie mentioned early on, in sentence about new district teachers potentially being at Step 13, but which I didn't realize the significance of until the end of the opinion.)

The Susanville Elementary School District does give credit for out-of-district experience. But only for new teachers (who haven't taught in the district before), and only for up to 12 years. Which means Ms. George is out of luck, since she's not a new teacher, but the Court of Appeal says that violates the uniformity clause. If you're willing to give (some) teachers out-of-district experience, you've got to do the same for Ms. George.

Okay. That argument makes some sense to me.

I'm still not 100% it's dispositive, but I could at least see the argument.

It nonetheless still bothers me somewhat to say that Ms. George isn't being treated like other teachers. True, some teachers get up to 12 years out-of-district credit, even though Ms. George only got 5 (the ones she received before coming to the district). But isn't it potentially rational for the district to make a distinction between old and new teachers in whether they receive credit? A district might well want to say "Hey, if you've got experience teaching at ANY level, you're better off than a brand new teacher who's never taught in the classroom before, so regardless of where you taught, we'll bump up your pay for the first 12 years of teaching, wherever it was. But after 12 years, at that point, you know your way around the classroom already, so after those first 12 years, we're not going to give you credit for school districts that might (or might not) just be totally easy and not teach you anything, because it's too tough for us to tell. We'll still give you credit for years in OUR schools, because we KNOW those give you a ton of experience, but otherwise, nope, you only get out-of-district credit for the first 12 years."

That would seem to me to make potential sense. Or at least enough sense for the teachers (through their union) and the school district to agree to such a deal. As, indeed, they unambiguously did here, in their collective bargaining agreement.

The Court of Appeal says that Ms. George is being treated differently because some teachers get 12 years of out-of-district experience but she's wrongly limited to 5. I agree that'd be the case if, say, she taught 5 years outside Susanville, then 2 in Susanville, then another 3 outside. Yeah, at that point, the uniformity clause might compel her (despite the CBA) to be at Step 11 (5 + 2 +3 plus the new school year) once she's rehired, because it's crazy to treat her differently than a new hire with all 11 prior years of experience outside of Susanville.

But Ms. George has already received her full 12 years of credit. Some from Susanville, some from other districts. She's not new any longer. As long as you treat "old" teachers like her the same, which the CBA does (unless some special provision of the Education Code requires otherwise, which it doesn't in this particular case), it still seems plausible to me that the uniformity requirement is satisfied. Ms. George is being treated the same way as all other teachers similarly situated to her.

So I think the Court of Appeal has a good argument in the end. I'd just (1) have liked it to have been clearer (at least to folks like me) earlier in the opinion, and (2) have liked to see the Court of Appeal respond to the above argument about the distinction between what I call "old" versus "new" teachers.

That said, I definitely see both sides, and don't think it's an easy case. I'm not even 100% sure where I stand myself. (I'd want to see how Justice Robie responded to my thoughts; it's eminently possible that he's persuade me in the end.)

Thursday, June 27, 2024

People v. Reed (Cal. Ct. App. - June 27, 2024)

I will say that I was impressed with the story the defendant here came up with the story the defendant here came up with. It's tough indeed for a guy on parole after a second degree murder conviction is outside his authorized 50-mile limit, evading police, and driving 124 miles per hour. Plus the whole cocaine part.

But he actually comes up with a pretty tolerable version of events.

Not one that the trial court believes, mind you. (Nor do I, to be honest.) But still. Fairly impressive. Better than the story I could have come up with under similar circumstances; that's for sure.

Wednesday, June 26, 2024

U.S. v. Page (9th Cir. - June 26, 2024)

I want this problem in my own life. Sort of.

Jeffrey Page files his annual federal individual income tax return -- and most (all?) of us do -- and expects to get a bit of a refund; $3,463, to be exact. He indeed receives a refund check from the IRS.

For $491,104.01.

It's a valid check. It's from the U.S. Treasury Department. It's 100% made out to him. Apparently, unbeknownst to anyone, the IRS accidentally credited tax payments from someone else to Mr. Page's account. Hence the half million dollar windfall.

Mr. Page thinks for a while: "What to do, what to do?" He (allegedly) calls the IRS to figure it all out but (allegedly) can't get through to anyone for an answer. 

He's still pondering what to do with his unexpected windfall around a year later -- a relevant time period because (at the time) refund checks expire if they're not cashed within a year.

So Mr. Page ultimately decides: "Screw it. It's made out to me. It's a valid check. It's mine." So he cashes the thing. Presumably hoping that the IRS never gets its act together.

Which -- unfortunately for him -- the IRS eventually does. Albeit a couple of years later.

The IRS sends Mr. Page several letters demanding the half million bucks back, but Mr. Page isn't feeling especially generous. Eventually, though, Mr. Page sends back $210,000, but keeps the rest.

At which point the IRS sues him to get the rest of the money back.

But there's a three year statute of limitations, and the district court feels pretty strongly that the IRS has blown the deadline. So even though Mr. Page has definitely been served and hasn't timely filed a response to the lawsuit, when the IRS seeks to enter his default, the district court sua sponte raises the statute of limitations issue, and after a couple of procedural moves -- none by Mr. Page, I might add, who's still sitting on the sidelines "representing himself" (but not bothering to even file an answer) -- dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

The IRS appeals. And, today, it wins, with the Ninth Circuit holding that the relevant three year statute of limitations runs not from the receipt of the refund check by the taxpayer  -- which is what some loose language from prior Ninth Circuit cases had said, which is why the district court did what it did -- but instead from when the check was cashed and cleared.

Which means that now Mr. Page has to actually go back and defend the lawsuit, which he likely can't do (successfully, anyway). So he'll have to give back the remaining $277,000+. If he still has it. Plus interest, presumably.

Personally, I'd be pretty psyched to receive an unexpected refund check for a half million bucks. Would I cash it? Maybe. Not sure. I'd definitely at least make a copy and frame it, though.

At a minimum, it's a problem I'd probably enjoy having. Especially around tax time.

As for Mr. Page himself, I can't really fathom why he sent back $210,000 instead of the whole thing -- or nothing. If you're going to keep (or spend) it, keep (or spend) it all. Or don't. It seems like the middle ground -- sending back some, but not all, of it -- is the worst of all possible worlds. If you're hoping the IRS never catches on (within the statute of limitations, anyway), why not go for broke and keep the whole shebang? Or if you're sending it back, send it all back. (And make sure you don't spend it in the interim so there's only two hundred grand left. Surely Mr. Page knew that there was a real risk the IRS might eventually catch on, right?)

The other thing that I thought was strange was that Mr. Page is represented on appeal by four lawyers from Gibson Dunn. Can he really afford that? And is tax refund stuff of this type -- and (perhaps most critically) of this size -- really the kind of work that Gibson Dunn does these days?

All I can figure is either that Mr. Page had some prior relationship with Gibson Dunn or that since Mr. Page represented himself below -- not very competently, honestly, but successfully (ironically enough) -- the Ninth Circuit itself might have reached out and appointed him pro bono counsel. Though nowhere in the opinion does it say so (as it sometimes does).

Plus, to add to the irony, the non-attorney Mr. Page who doesn't even bother to file an answer and elects to represent himself wins in the district court, but once he gets a team of lawyers from Gibson Dunn to represent him, he loses.

Ouch.

Tuesday, June 25, 2024

Luo v. Volokh (Cal. Ct. App. - June 25, 2024)

What a pain for Eugene.

The last name "Volokh" is sufficiently unique that I assumed it was him when I saw the title of the case, a conclusion that was reaffirmed when I read the caption and then the opinion. It's another lawsuit (actually a series of petitions) brought by a pro se litigant against a law professor author that ends the right way -- dismissal -- but with the predictable hassle and expense for the defendant, who did nothing wrong.

So, as you might imagine, I'm sympathetic to his plight.

Xingfei Luo -- also known as Olivia Luo -- files various lawsuits anonymously (under a pseudonym), and Professor Volokh writes about anonymous litigation both on his blog -- the Volokh Conspiracy -- and in traditional law review articles. Professor Volokh's writing discussed, among other cases, those filed by Ms. Luo, identifying her by name. Ms. Luo didn't like that, so filed multiple requests for restraining orders against Professor Volokh, meritlessly asserting harassment. 

The restraining orders were predictably denied, and there were additional procedural complexities as well; e.g., a successful anti-SLAPP motion by Professor Volokh, Ms. Luo's failed effort to withdraw various exhibits that she regrets failing to file under seal, etc. After losing, Ms. Luo then (predictably) appeals, which requires Professor Volokh to spend more time and effort responding to her latest litigious missives.

Professor Volokh wins, of course, but on some of the subsidiary issues, he wins on procedural grounds, because the Court of Appeal concludesthe Court of Appeal concludes that various aspects of Ms. Luo's appeal involve nonappealable issues. Perhaps ironically, it's Professor Volokh that tries to convince the Court of Appeal to treat those aspects of Ms. Luo's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate -- understandably, since presumably Ms. Luo will just file yet another appeal after some procedural moves on remand -- but the Court of Appeal declines to do so. So a win for the party that should indeed prevail, but with potentially more work opposing yet another meritless appeal ahead.

On the upside, as the Court of Appeal mentions, Ms. Luo has at this point been declared a vexatious litigant, which should at least put somewhat of a crimp upon her efforts to meritlessly litigate against others with whom she finds disfavor. It nonetheless remains unfortunate that Professor Volokh had to deal with all this.

Though I suspect that he successfully got in the last word. Ms. Luo's big objection was that Professor Volokh had published her actual name, and the opinion here is under her own name (Professor Volokh having successfully prevailed upon the trial court to preclude Ms. Luo from suing him anonymously) and, while initially unpublished, is now published. So big (psychic) win for the defendant.

Doesn't make it worth all the hassle and expense, I'm sure. But still. Something.

Thursday, June 20, 2024

Legislature of the State of California v. Weber (Cal. Supreme Ct. - June 20, 2024)

There's an old saying that "Pigs get fat; hogs get slaughtered." Here's yet another appellate equivalent of that maxim.

Some anti-tax folks want to make it harder for the Legislature (or pretty much anyone) to raise taxes or fees on anything, so circulate an initiative to do exactly that -- the Taxpayer Protection and Government Accountability Act (the TPA). The initiative would amend the California Constitution to require that basically any new taxes or fees obtain both a two-thirds vote in both houses of the Legislature as well as approval by the voters in a referendum. The TPA contains a plethora of other provisions as well, all designed to cover pretty much any possible way a statute (or law, or regulation, or municipal act, or whatever) could raise revenue or impose costs. They get more than enough signatures on the initiative proposal, so it's scheduled to go to the voters in November.

But the California Supreme Court, in a rare pre-election review, strikes down the thing and removes it from the ballot, unanimously holding that the scope of the initiative is so radical and wide-ranging that it constitutes an impermissible "revision" of the California Constitution rather than a mere amendment. To reiterate: unanimously.

The proponents of the TPA could have accomplished a lot of their objectives by narrowing the thing to particular subjects or, potentially, by getting multiple different -- narrower -- initiatives qualified for the ballot. But by trying to do the whole thing at once, they end up getting nothing.

Hence the whole "pigs get fed, hogs get slaughtered" analogy.

Because, today, the initiative gets slaughtered.

I did, however, want to make one final point. Just about the saying itself. (Which is sometimes rendered as "Pigs get fed [rather than "fat"], hogs get slaughtered.")

I've mentioned this saying -- which I grew up hearing in Virginia many, many times -- in several prior posts. Its meaning is fairly clear, and is basically a more graphic equivalent of "Don't be greedy."

But in my heart of hearts, I've never really understood it.

As far as I know, hogs are pigs. It's just another name for the same thing. So if you're a pig, you're also a hog; you can't choose choose to be one or the other. So what's the point of the saying; there's actually no choice involved. (This is also, I think, why I often forget which one comes first; whether it's pigs that get fed or hogs that get fed. 'Cause they're the same thing.)

I understand that, colloquially, "hogs" are thought of as fatter. Though why I don't know. Plus, being a pig itself carries the whole "greedy" connotation; as in "Don't be a pig," or being "piggish". This is also why, again, I sometimes think the phrase begins with hogs and ends with pigs getting slaughtered. It's confusing. Especially, I might think, for non-English speakers, or someone hearing the phrase for the first time. Like: What?! What the hell are you saying?

My final point on the subject is that it's my firm belief that both pigs and hogs end up . . . slaughtered, right? No one raises pigs for their milk or something like that. Both are raised to be killed. Which also means hogs get fed too; otherwise, they wouldn't get fat in the first place.

So, really, the phrase should be: "Pigs and hogs both get fed, and both get slaughtered." Which sort of means to me that you might as well go for it and have a good time in the process. Which in turn is sort of the opposite of the message the maxim is trying to convey: that if you're narrow and circumscribed in your objectives, you're more likely to succeed.

Nope. Either way, you're getting a sledgehammer to the skull in the end. So why not eat as much as you can in the meantime.

I'm almost certainly going to keep using the aphorism. But, just to be clear, in my heart, I know it likely makes no actual sense.

Tuesday, June 18, 2024

L.R. v. K.A. (Cal. Ct. App. - June 7, 2024)

There were four published Court of Appeal opinions today, and one published Ninth Circuit opinion, but to be honest, none of them really struck my fancy. For example, is it somewhat interesting that the 32nd District Agricultural Association isn't required to obtain competitive bids to run the Orange County Fair? Well, yeah, I guess. To some, perhaps. But the opinion didn't really thrill me sufficiently to want to write anything about it. Ditto for the other opinions today.

So I thought about just writing nothing. It happens. Not every day merits a deep -- or even superficial -- look into one particular aspect of the appellate process. Some days merit a vacation. (Like tomorrow, I might add; Juneteenth.)

When I'm not exceptionally excited about the published opinions, on occasion, I'll waste some time reading unpublished opinions from the Court of Appeal. Not all of them, of course. God forbid.

I generally limit myself to opinions from my home jurisdiction -- the 4/1 -- and skip the criminal ones, on the theory that they're the least likely to be interesting. (The combination of the fact that nearly all criminal convictions get appealed plus a result that no one on the panel thinks merits publication strongly suggests that I can skip these.) That leaves a manageable number of opinions, so I generally check 'em out.

Today, I came across this one, from a couple of weeks ago. It's a run-of-the-mill family law dispute in which one of the former spouses files a pro se appeal. You see a ton of these. You can probably guess how pretty much all of them end up.

This one's no different. The former wife, L.R., filed notice of appeal as to which the Court of Appeal couldn't even figure out -- after some effort -- what she was trying to appeal, so ends up telling her that most of what's she's trying to appeal isn't appealable (because it's interlocutory) so to focus her opening brief on the only thing that's final: the sanctions decision. To which L.R. responds, according to the Court of Appeal, by filing "a 74-page opening brief addressing everything but the trial court’s denial of her request for sanctions under section 271."

So you can readily figure out what happens next. The Court of Appeal writes a short (5-page) unpublished disposition in which it affirms, concluding that "L.R. has failed to meet her affirmative burden on appeal to demonstrate reversible error" with respect to the one issue that was actually appealable.

No surprise there.

The opinion nonetheless struck me as interesting for two very pedestrian reasons.

First, as is typical in family law cases, the parties are uniformly referred to by their initials. L.R. is the former wife, and K.A. was her spouse. Family law is a sensitive area, so there's no need to make full names public, after all. Especially when, as here, there's a minor child involved, as well as therapy issues involving that child.

All well and good.

But since L.R. represents herself on appeal, the opinion nonetheless includes the following line immediately after the caption: "Leila Rhodes, in pro. per., for Appellant."

That sort of defeats the purpose of calling her L.R. in the caption and in the opinion, right?

Second, the name sounded somewhat familiar, and a quick search revealed that that's because I drive by her office -- with a big sign that includes her name -- approximately ten times a week, since it's on a busy surface street that's on the way to and from my kids' school and their sports practice locations.

Now I know a little bit more about her than I got from the sign.

Maybe it's rule, maybe it's not (I honestly don't know), but when a litigant represents themselves in a case in which we use initials, my suggestion is that we maybe also should use those same initials on the "counsel" listing. That'd make sense to me.

Monday, June 17, 2024

U.S. v. Rivera-Valdes (9th Cir. - June 17, 2024)

This opinion will go en banc. 

The question is whether the Due Process Clause requires the government to do more to deport someone when it sends notice of the deportation proceedings via certified mail to the address that the individual to be deported provided some months ago (with no updated address in the interim) but the notice is returned by the USPS is undeliverable.

The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires that the government do more than this before it sells someone's home for nonpayment of taxes. Is the same amount of effort (or more) required before deporting someone from the country?

The majority says "No." The dissent says "Yes." One hundred and sixteen single-spaced pages explain the associated reasoning of the various members of the panel. Feel free to peruse it at your leisure.

Who wins in my predicted en banc proceeding will, I think, likely depend on the panel draw. I suspect the vote will be close either way.

And then the Supreme Court may well take the case up.

In short, I suspect this is very much not the last word on this subject.

We'll see.

Friday, June 14, 2024

DeFries v. Union Pac. R.R. (9th Cir. June 14, 2024)

I don't typically post anything about an opinion if the only thing I have to say about it is that it's extraordinarily well-written and cogent. Particularly when the opinion is written by someone sitting on the Ninth Circuit by designation.

But, today, I'm going to make an exception.

Judge Hamilton is a senior judge on the Seventh Circuit. He authors this opinion, which is about when American Pipe tolling ends (rather than begins) for putative class members who are ultimately excluded from a class definition ultimately certified by a court (and, here, then decertified on appeal).

The opinion is . . . extraordinarily well-written and cogent.

Well done.

Thursday, June 13, 2024

In re Jose R. (Cal. Ct. App. - June 13, 2024)

Today's opinion doesn't recite the facts of the underlying offense in any detail, largely because the legal issue on appeal (precommitment custody credits as a applied to the maximum term of confinement) does not depend in the slightest on those facts. Nonetheless, here's how the Court of Appeal briefly describes the offense:

"This case arises out of a shooting in which Jose and an adult man fired multiple gunshots, killing the victim."

As a minor, the sentence imposed on Jose for his offense is . . . .

Three years in juvenile lockup.

Now, I understand that Jose was only 15 at the time, so his sentence reflects that fact, and also that this was a negotiated plea. It might also be the case that Jose ends up spending less than 3 years -- if there's a finding that he's rehabilitated, with reviews every six months -- and that if he's really in bad shape, his absolute maximum confinement is 6 years (with credit for a year served, so five extra years total at the outside).

All that said, if 15-year olds get three years in juvie for killing someone, you can readily see why gangs might elect to employ minors as their killers -- as they apparently do.

Wednesday, June 12, 2024

Lee v. Thornell (9th Cir. - June 11, 2024)

There are plenty of judges who are not all that keen on actually putting someone to death, and are even potentially willing to jump through the (very high) hurdles to granting federal habeas relief under AEDPA. But even where the Ninth Circuit panel in this particular case -- Judges Callahan, Nguyen and Bress -- so inclined (and they're not), the stark facts of the underlying crimes would make it very surprising were this case to have come out any different than it did.

Which, by definition, it didn't.

It's a death penalty case from Arizona, and even though it's taken 32 years (!) to work itself through the system, I'm fairly confident it's going to end up as you would ultimately expect. Here's a quick synopsis of the relevant facts:

"On April 6, 1992, Lee, then 19 years old, and his accomplice, David Hunt, age 14, called Pizza Hut from a pay phone and ordered a pizza delivered to a vacant house. When Linda Reynolds arrived with the pizza, Lee and Hunt pointed a rifle at her and forced her to remove her shorts and shirt. The two put Reynolds in Lee’s car, and Lee drove her into the desert. Hunt drove Reynolds’s car to meet them.

Once in the desert, Lee and Hunt removed Reynolds’s car stereo, smashed the windows and other parts of her car with a bat, punctured the tires, cut various hoses and wires to disable the engine, and shot a bullet through the hood. Lee later testified that he destroyed Reynolds’s car to prevent her from escaping.

Lee and Hunt forced Reynolds to remove her shoes, socks, and pantyhose and to walk barefoot into the desert. Hunt then raped her, and Lee forced Reyolds [sic -- the panel should really correct this mistake] to perform oral sex on him. After finding Reynolds’s bank card in her wallet, Lee drove Reynolds and Hunt to an ATM. Lee gave Reynolds his flannel shirt to wear and then forced Reynolds to withdraw $20 of the $27 she had left in her account.

From there, Lee and Hunt drove Reynolds back into the desert. Reynolds tried to escape, but Hunt forced her back to the car. By the time she was returned to the car, her face and lips were bloody. According to Lee, Lee and Hunt argued in front of Reynolds over whether to kill her, and Reynolds “freaked” and tried to grab the gun.

Lee shot Reynolds once in the head. But Reynolds was still alive. Lee retrieved a knife from his car and twice stabbed Reynolds in the chest to “put her out of her misery.” Lee and Hunt then drove away. Medical evidence indicated that Reynolds “would have been alive for at least a couple minutes, and probably more,” following the stabbings. The next day, Lee pawned Reynolds’s car stereo, wedding ring, and gold ring for a total of $170."

Pretty bad, right?

But wait. There's more:

"Ten days later, on April 16, 1992 around midnight, Lee used another payphone to call a taxi. David Lacey was dispatched to pick up Lee. Meanwhile, Hunt drove Lee’s car to the location where Lee and Hunt planned to rob the driver. When Lacey arrived, Lee pulled out a revolver and demanded money. According to Lee, Lacey attempted to grab the gun. Lee then fired nine shots, four of which hit Lacey. Lee took “forty dollars from Lacey’s pockets and dumped his body by the side of the road.” Lee then drove Lacey’s cab to a dirt road, where he searched the cab’s contents and shot its windows and tires."

You can see why Lee gets sentenced to death.

But fear not. There's still more. Eleven days later:

"On April 27, 1992, Lee entered a convenience store around 1:00 a.m. to purchase cigarettes. When Harold Drury, the store clerk, opened the cash drawer, Lee shot Drury in the shoulder, causing Drury to fall backwards. Lee then “shot Drury in the top of the head, the forehead, the cheek, and the neck.” After Drury slumped to the floor, Lee “walked around the counter and shot Drury two more times in the right temple.” Lee retrieved the cigarettes and took the cash drawer before leaving the store. Hunt was waiting in Lee’s car, and they left together."

I don't think there are many judges at all out there who are going to bend over backwards to try to find a way to give this guy habeas relief. Even notwithstanding the fact that he was 19 years old at the time.

Simply too many senseless murders in way too short a time.

Needless to say: Denial of habeas relief affirmed.

Not going to change en banc or in the Supreme Court either, IMHO.

Tuesday, June 11, 2024

In re Andrew M. (Cal. Ct. App. - June 11, 2024)

Cases like these would be the hardest for me personally.

The Court of Appeal seems to be convinced that the toddler here -- Andrew M. -- would be better off with his foster (to-be-adoptive) parents rather than his biological parents. They accordingly conclude that the trial court's finding to the contrary was an abuse of discretion and end the opinion by saying that parental rights to the child should be terminated unless there's something new that's extremely material.

I'm not nearly as confident.

The parents here seem clearly to love their child. They visit the child all the time when they're allowed to do so. The child definitely likes hanging out with them (again, when he's allowed to do so). There's lots to be said in the parents' favor, and there's none of the wholesale abuse or abandonment that you (sadly) see in so many of these cases.

Are the parents perfect? Of course not. They seem dramatically disinterested in taking drug tests, and on some (not-radically-often) occasions miss or are late for visits. Moreover, the would-be adoptive parents seem clearly wonderful.

The Court of Appeal seems strongly influenced by the fact that the toddler doesn't scream or make a fit when the visits with his biological parents end -- Justice O'Leary emphasizes that fact in several places in the opinion. But it seems harsh to make that the overarching principal of who gets a child. Maybe the child is just incredibly good natured. Were I the biological parent, I would very much hate to have my child's generally pleasant disposition used as a factor -- much less a major one -- in whether I'm allowed any future parental contact with him.

In the end, this seems to me one of those cases that's exceedingly close. Either set of parents might well turn out fine (or, perhaps, not so fine). It's incredibly hard to judge -- at least for me. Particularly on a paper appellate record, without ever meeting the child or the biological parents. Which is why we have abuse of discretion as the relevant standard, of course. But the Court of Appeal here seems very certain that the biological parents wouldn't be sufficient. I'd have a much harder time making that same call.

Which is not to say that Justice O'Leary might not be right. She might well be. I just simply don't know.

Monday, June 10, 2024

Olson v. State of California (9th Cir. - June 10, 2024)

Last year, in a high-profile case (and opinion), a Ninth Circuit panel held that A.B. 5 -- passed essentially to try to classify Uber and Lyft drivers as employees rather than independent contractors (something that Proposition 22 later reversed) -- was likely unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the fact that the standard of review was rational basis. The opinion was written by Judge Rawlinson, with Judge Forrest and Senior District Judge England joining the opinion.

Today, the en banc court disagrees, and holds that A.B. 5 was constitutionally validwas constitutionally valid. The vote: 11-0.

Kind of a crush.